

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. June 1906.

**CONFIDENTIAL.**

(8731.)

**PART 26.**

**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE**

**RESPECTING THE**

**AFFAIRS OF MOROCCO.**

**July and August 1905.**



## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.            | No.                 | Date.           | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Page |
|-----|------------------|---------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 1   | Mr. Lister..     | 238<br>Very Conf.   | June 28, 1905   | Conference. Conversation with M. Rouvier respecting conditions of acceptance of Conference. Possible stiffening of French foreign policy. Emperor misinformed by German Embassy on state of French Army (see No. 342, Part 25) .. ..                                                         | 1    |
| 2   | To Sir F. Bertie | 436<br>Confidential | July 1,         | Conference. French Ambassador's account of preliminary bases agreed upon by M. Rouvier and Prince Radolin (see No. 342, Part 25) ..                                                                                                                                                          | 2    |
| 3   | Mr. W. Smith     | ..                  | June 19,        | Arrival of First Secretary of French Legation and of Delegate of Loan Commission. Reports .. ..                                                                                                                                                                                              | 3    |
| 4   | Mr. Lowther      | 145                 | 19 <sup>a</sup> | German Mission. Military members leaving. Count Tattenbach having given out he may remain some time longer (see No. 336, Part 25) .. ..                                                                                                                                                      | 3    |
| 5   | " "              | 147<br>Confidential | 19,             | French advance into Morocco. Transmits Memorandum by Captain Malcolm ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 3    |
| 6   | " "              | 148                 | 19,             | Position of the Pretender and importance of Ujdah. Transmits Memorandum by Captain Malcolm (see No. 330, Part 25) ..                                                                                                                                                                         | 6    |
| 7   | " "              | 150<br>Confidential | 20,             | Borj-Saïda Concession. French Minister hears it may be granted to Germany. Action of Moorish Government probably a reply to stoppage of transit of arms, &c., through Algeria (see Nos. 333 and 339, Part 25) ..                                                                             | 7    |
| 8   | " "              | 153<br>Confidential | 22 <sup>a</sup> | Borj-Saïda Concession. Apparently not yet definitely granted (see No. 7) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 8    |
| 9   | " "              | 154                 | 22,             | General situation in Morocco. Report on ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 9    |
| 10  | " "              | 155                 | 22 <sup>a</sup> | Franco-German negotiations. Moorish Government anxious as to result of (see No. 9) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 11   |
| 11  | " "              | 156<br>Confidential | 23,             | German instructors for garrison of Borj-Saïda. Contrary to undertaking given by Moorish Government to France in 1902, but they are being encouraged to disregard this Agreement by Count Tattenbach. Refers to No. 8 ..                                                                      | 11   |
| 12  | " "              | 157                 | 23,             | Borj-Saïda Concession. Sultan's own idea. German Minister has submitted to German Government proposal for construction of harbour, fort, &c. (see No. 11) ..                                                                                                                                 | 11   |
| 13  | " "              | 158                 | 23,             | Conference. Transmits further note from Minister for Foreign Affairs hoping His Majesty's Government will yet accept invitation. Refers to No. 340, Part 25 ..                                                                                                                               | 12   |
| 14  | Sir E. Egerton   | 114<br>Confidential | 28,             | Franco-German negotiations. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed from Paris that German reply was conciliatory (see No. 342, Part 25) .. ..                                                                                                                                                 | 13   |
| 15  | Mr. Whitehead    | 174<br>Confidential | 28,             | Franco-German negotiations. French Ambassador says last German note maintains previous arguments in favour of Conference, and asks why Germany wanted most-favoured-nation clause in Treaty with Morocco of 1890 if most-favoured-nation treatment was already guaranteed (see No. 14) .. .. | 13   |

[1566]

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.                                               | No.                 | Date.        | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Page |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 16  | To Mr. Lister                                       | 437                 | July 3, 1905 | Conference. French Ambassador says M. Rouvier has handed Prince Radolin an amended version of the bases. Special position of France arising out of her Agreement with His Majesty's Government, and geographical position to be recognized by Germany. Refers to No. 2 .. .. | 13   |
| 17  | To Manchester Chamber of Commerce                   | ..                  | 3,           | Anglo-French Agreement. No opportunity for revising it will occur. It cannot be altered (see No. 352, Part 25) .. ..                                                                                                                                                         | 14   |
| 18  | Mr. Lowther                                         | 159                 | June 23,     | Attack made on house of Governor of Ait Yusi. Reports. Said to have been instigated by a Sherief who is in constant communication with Pretender .. ..                                                                                                                       | 14   |
| 19  | " "                                                 | 160                 | 24,          | Murder of Mr. Madden at Mazagan. Transmits despatch from Consul at Dar-al-Baida who proceeded to Mazagan to investigate matter. Circumstances attending the murder (see No. 321, Part 25) .. ..                                                                              | 14   |
| 20  | Sir A. Nicolson                                     | 49 Tel.             | July 4,      | Non-alienation of Spanish possessions. Informs of communication to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister, and King. Wishes to tell French Ambassador (see No. 336*, Part 25) .. ..                                                                                    | 16   |
| 21  | Mr. Lowther                                         | 161                 | June 25,     | Murder of Mr. Madden at Mazagan. Précis of Inclosure in No. 19 handed to Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sultan has instructed that everything possible shall be done in the matter .. ..                                                                              | 17   |
| 22  | To Mr. Lister                                       | 446                 | July 5,      | Turkish Mission to Morocco. French Ambassador's account of alleged German proposals to Sultan for (see No. 256, Part 25) ..                                                                                                                                                  | 17   |
| 23  | " "                                                 | 447                 | 6,           | Composition of Conference. French Ambassador thinks United States and Russia should be represented, and that it should be held at Tangier .. ..                                                                                                                              | 17   |
| 24  | To Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee | ..                  | 6,           | Importation of liquor into Morocco. Present is not a favourable moment to approach Moorish Government on the subject. No effective control appears to be possible under present management of customs-houses (see No. 254, Part 25) .. ..                                    | 18   |
| 25  | Mr. Lowther                                         | 73 Tel.             | 3,           | Withdrawal of Missions from Fez. French Minister has no instructions yet. Observations on proposal (see No. 336, Part 25) ..                                                                                                                                                 | 18   |
| 26  | Sir A. Nicolson                                     | 50 Tel.             | 7,           | Programme of Conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs afraid it may be settled without reference to Spain. Wishes to convey reassuring message .. ..                                                                                                                         | 18   |
| 26* | Mr. Lister ..                                       | 49 Tel.             | 9,           | Conference. Communiqué to press stating France accepts, having come to an agreement with Germany on programme (see No. 16) ..                                                                                                                                                | 18*  |
| 27  | Mr. Lowther                                         | 162                 | June 26,     | Conference. Sultan's idea of result of. German Minister has informed him that nearly all Powers have accepted (see No. 26*) .. ..                                                                                                                                            | 19   |
| 28  | " "                                                 | 163<br>Confidential | 26,          | His Majesty's Government's refusal to attend Conference. French Minister denies it has caused embarrassment to his Government, as stated in some newspapers (see No. 13) ..                                                                                                  | 19   |



## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.                                       | No.                 | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Page |
|-----|---------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 29  | Mr. Lowther ..                              | 164                 | June 28, 1905 | Insecurity of life and property at Mazagan. Transmits despatch from Consul Maclean, inclosing letter from British residents. Submits that no useful purpose would be served by dispatching a ship of war to Mazagan, as desired by British residents .. | 20   |
| 30  | " ..                                        | 165                 | 28,           | Murder of Mr. Madden. Transmits further report by Consul Maclean. Suspected persons in the town are stated by Moorish Government to have been arrested (see No. 21)                                                                                     | 21   |
| 30* | Sir A. Nicolson ..                          | 126<br>Confidential | 29,           | Spanish policy. President of Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs both express desire for intimate understanding with His Majesty's Government (see Nos. 20 and 26)                                                                                 | 23   |
| 31  | " ..                                        | 127<br>Confidential | July 1,       | Spanish policy. Conversation with French Ambassador. Spain will probably carry out Franco-Spanish Agreement, though it is not generally approved (see No. 30*) ..                                                                                       | 24   |
| 32  | " ..                                        | 128                 | 4,            | Conference. Conversation with King of Spain, who expressed desire for good understanding with His Majesty's Government (see No. 30) ..                                                                                                                  | 25   |
| 33  | To Sir A. Nicolson ..                       | 49 Tel.             | 8,            | Morocco Conference. No list of subjects yet put forward by France or Germany. His Majesty's Government will be careful to avoid committing themselves without consulting Spain. Refers to No. 26 ..                                                     | 35   |
| 34  | Sir A. Nicolson ..                          | 51 Tel.             | 9,            | Programme of Conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs' thanks for message from His Majesty's Government. Spanish suspicions of France and desire not to offend Germany (see No. 33) ..                                                                  | 25   |
| 35  | Mr. Lowther ..                              | 166                 | June 28,      | Conference. Count Tattenbach hopes it will bring about revision of Anglo-French Agreement of 8th April, 1904. Germany has no intention of allowing France to assume Protectorate over Morocco (see No. 16) ..                                           | 26   |
| 36  | Sir A. Nicolson ..                          | 130                 | July 7,       | Conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs says he is anxious to learn programme before giving Spanish adhesion (see No. 33) ..                                                                                                                           | 27   |
| 37  | Mr. Lowther ..                              | 74 Tel.             | 6,            | Possible special Moorish Mission to Berlin. Is being considered by Sultan. This affords striking instance of Sultan's uneasiness ..                                                                                                                     | 27   |
| 38  | Sir F. Bertie ..                            | 50 Tel.             | 10,           | Ministerial statement on subject of Morocco. Received coldly by Chamber, which awaits further information as to M. Rouvier's policy before expressing approval ..                                                                                       | 28   |
| 39  | Papers communicated by French Ambassador .. | ..                  | 11,           | Conference. Franco-German declaration of 8th July and identic notes exchanged same day (see Nos. 16 and 26*) ..                                                                                                                                         | 28   |
| 40  | Sir A. Nicolson ..                          | 52 Tel.             | 11,           | Programme of Conference. Result of Franco-German negotiations will be communicated to Spain by French Minister. Probable Spanish inquiry as to attitude of His Majesty's Government (see No. 33) ..                                                     | 29   |
| 41  | Mr. W. Smith ..                             | Telegraphic         | 11,           | Conference. Informs of Belgian acceptance (see No. 326, Part 25) ..                                                                                                                                                                                     | 29   |

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.                 | No.                 | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Page |
|-----|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 42  | To Sir F. Bertie ..   | 459 A               | July 11, 1905 | Conference. Conversation with French Ambassador. French and German Governments have come to an agreement as to bases on which it might be held in compliance with Sultan's invitation. Transmits text of correspondence between two Governments (see No. 39). Moorish Government have been informed that His Majesty's Government are willing to accept in principle proposal to participate .. | 29   |
| 43  | Mr. Lowther ..        | 167                 | June 30,      | Borj-Saïda. Transmits report on by Captain Malcolm, showing small commercial or strategical value of (see No. 12) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 30   |
| 44  | " ..                  | 169                 | July 2,       | Moorish Pretender. Possibility of German protection for Bu Amama in return for helping Sultan against Pretender (see No. 6)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 31   |
| 45  | " ..                  | 170<br>Confidential | 3,            | Withdrawal of Missions from Fez. Conditions which French Minister thinks necessary to enable him to retire with dignity. German Minister unlikely to move as long as French and British Missions remain (see Nos. 4 and 25) ..                                                                                                                                                                  | 32   |
| 46  | " ..                  | 171                 | 3,            | Murder of Mr. Madden. German protégés implicated in murder. Transmits correspondence between German Minister and Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Refers to No. 30 ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 32   |
| 47  | Sir A. Nicolson ..    | 53 Tel.             | 12,           | Conference. Spanish Government ask for views of His Majesty's Government as to acceptance in view of Franco-German Agreement. They have also asked French Government for details of programme (see No. 40) ..                                                                                                                                                                                   | 34   |
| 47A | To Sir A. Nicolson .. | 52 Tel.             | 12,           | Conference. Is satisfied by French Ambassador that Spain and His Majesty's Government will be consulted as to programme. Has promised to keep Spanish Ambassador informed. To inform Spanish Government of No. 42 (see No. 47) ..                                                                                                                                                               | 34*  |
| 47B | To Mr. Lowther ..     | 42 Tel.             | 12,           | Conference. To inform Moorish Government that His Majesty's Government accept subject to satisfactory programme, &c. (see No. 42)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 34*  |
| 48  | To Sir F. Bertie ..   | 463                 | 12,           | Conference. Transmits No. 39. Conversation with M. Cambon, who desires close co-operation between His Majesty's Government and French Government. His Excellency informed that His Majesty's Government must see programme before accepting ..                                                                                                                                                  | 34   |
| 49  | To Sir A. Nicolson .. | 84                  | 12,           | Conference. Spanish Ambassador informed that any details of programme known to His Majesty's Government shall be communicated to him (see Nos. 36 and 47 A) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 35   |
| 50  | Mr. W. Smith ..       | ..                  | 7,            | Conference. Dutch Government will be represented provided Great Powers are (see No. 41) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 35   |
| 51  | Sir A. Nicolson ..    | 131                 | 10,           | Conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed that His Majesty's Government will consult with Spanish Government as to programme (see No. 49) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 35   |
| 52  | Sir F. Bertie ..      | 256                 | 11,           | Franco-German Agreement. Newspaper comments on, in connection with proposed Morocco Conference ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 36   |



## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.                                                 | No.                   | Date.        | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Page |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 53  | Mr. Lowther                                           | .. 75 Tel.            | July 9, 1905 | Moorish Mission to Berlin. Proposal abandoned. Moorish Government nervous as to Franco-German Agreement (see No. 37) ..                                                                                                                                                                     | 37   |
| 54  | Sir A. Nicolson                                       | .. 54 Tel.            | 13,          | Conference. Spanish Government will accept on same terms as His Majesty's Government and express thanks for attitude of His Majesty's Government (see No. 49) ..                                                                                                                            | 37   |
| 55  | To Sir F. Bertie                                      | .. 469                | 13,          | Conference. Programme. Conversation with French Ambassador. M. Rouvier's views on. M. Rouvier will consult His Majesty's Government and Spanish Government before laying programme before German Government (see No. 48) ..                                                                 | 37   |
| 56  | Mr. Lowther                                           | .. 76 Tel.            | 10,          | Tangier Harbour Concession. Sultan, on pressure by German Minister, has renewed promise to give to German firms (see No. 316, Part 25) ..                                                                                                                                                   | 38   |
| 57  | Mr. W. Smith                                          | .. Secret Telegraphic | 14,          | German loan. Menebbi says Sultan is negotiating with German Minister. 4,000,000l. at 4 per cent. (see No. 225, Part 25) ..                                                                                                                                                                  | 38   |
| 58  | Sir A. Nicolson                                       | .. 55 Tel.            | 14,          | Conference. Instructions to Spanish Minister at Tangier are similar to Mr. Lowther's. They have also received concurrence of French Ambassador (see No. 54)..                                                                                                                               | 38   |
| 59  | Mr. Lowther                                           | .. 77 Tel.            | 12,          | Departure of Missions from Fez. French Minister not expecting to leave at present (see No. 45) ..                                                                                                                                                                                           | 39   |
| 60  | To Mr. Lowther                                        | .. 66                 | 15,          | Insecurity of life and property at Mazagan. To inform British residents that their Petition, inclosed in No. 29, will be borne in mind ..                                                                                                                                                   | 39   |
| 61  | Mr. W. Smith                                          | .. Telegraphic        | 16,          | Conference. Spain has accepted on condition of previous consultation as to programme (see No. 54) ..                                                                                                                                                                                        | 39   |
| 62  | Mr. Lowther                                           | .. 173                | 5,           | Transit of arms for Makhzen through Algeria. Prohibition withdrawn (see No. 7) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                           | 39   |
| 63  | Question asked in the House of Commons (Mr. Disraeli) | ..                    | 17,          | Conference. Have His Majesty's Government been invited? Have they accepted? Informed of Sultan's invitation and reply ..                                                                                                                                                                    | 40   |
| 64  | Mr. W. Smith                                          | .. Telegraphic        | 17,          | French yacht "Aigle." Arrived at Mogador on 5th for stay of eight days. Party on board occupied in making maps of country and chart of the bay ..                                                                                                                                           | 40   |
| 65  | Mr. Lowther                                           | .. 174                | 5,           | Moorish coinage ordered in Europe. Moorish Government have sent instructions to Tangier for temporary suspension of delivery of. Should deliveries from Europe continue, Moorish coinage will further depreciate in value. It is now 75 per cent. below that of English and French money .. | 40   |
| 66  | "                                                     | .. 177                | 7,           | Rottenburg case. German Government seem to consider Madrid Convention not binding against German subjects ..                                                                                                                                                                                | 41   |
| 67  | Sir A. Nicolson                                       | .. 182 Confidential   | 10,          | Franco-Spanish Agreement. New Government will not do more than carry out letter of, and is anxious not to offend Germany (see No. 31) ..                                                                                                                                                    | 41   |

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.                                                  | No.                 | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Page |
|-----|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 68  | Sir A. Nicolson                                        | .. 133              | July 12, 1905 | Franco-German relations. Conversation with Minister of State. He has asked French Ambassador what part Spain is to play in the Conference. Satisfaction at termination of Franco-German differences. Spanish Government anxious to learn views of His Majesty's Government, with whom they will act in conjunction. Annoyance at "patronising airs" of France towards Spain (see No. 49) .. | 42   |
| 69  | "                                                      | .. 134              | 13,           | Conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed of instructions to Mr. Lowther as to acceptance. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked that similar instructions might be sent to Spanish Minister (see Nos. 51 and 54) ..                                                                                                                                                                   | 43   |
| 70  | "                                                      | .. 56 Tel.          | 18,           | Conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs says German Ambassador is pressing for Tangier as meeting-place, and says Italy has accepted proposal. Minister for Foreign Affairs anxious His Majesty's Government should suggest Madrid ..                                                                                                                                                      | 44   |
| 71  | Mr. W. Smith                                           | ..                  | 12,           | Conference. Belgian Minister reports acceptance by his Government (see Nos. 41 and 50) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 44   |
| 72  | Mr. Lowther                                            | .. 78 Tel.          | 19,           | German loan. Cannot ascertain that negotiations have been recently renewed (see No. 57) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 44   |
| 73  | To Sir F. Bertie                                       | .. 487              | 19,           | Concessions in Morocco. French Ambassador informed of rumours of loan and harbour works. Suggested all Powers abstain from such action (see Nos. 56 and 72)..                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 44   |
| 74  | To Mr. Whitehead                                       | .. 174              | 19,           | Conference. Conversation with German Ambassador. His Government favours Tangier as meeting-place (see No. 70) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 45   |
| 75  | Mr. W. Smith                                           | ..                  | 14,           | Tangier and other harbour works. Surveys made and estimates sent in by a French company (see Nos. 56 and 73) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 45   |
| 76  | Sir H. Howard                                          | .. 127 Confidential | 18,           | Conference (see No. 175). Informs of Dutch acceptance (see 50 and 71) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 46   |
| 77  | Question asked in the House of Commons (Sir John Leng) | ..                  | 20,           | Open door in Morocco. Revision of Anglo-French declaration (30 years Article). No question of revision (see No. 17)..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 46   |
| 78  | To Sir A. Nicolson                                     | .. 57 Tel.          | 20,           | Meeting-place of Conference. French Ambassador has no instructions yet, so no answer can yet be given to Spanish Government (see Nos. 70 and 74) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 46   |
| 79  | To Sir F. Bertie                                       | .. 495 Confidential | 20,           | Programme of Conference. Translation of as communicated by French Ambassador. Reply sent to his Excellency suggesting inclusion of question of taxation of foreigners (see No. 55) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 46   |
| 80  | Mr. W. Smith                                           | .. Telegraphic      | 21,           | Conference. Russian Government have accepted (see No. 76) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 47   |
| 81  | Mr. Lowther                                            | .. 179              | 9,            | Tangier Harbour Concession. Has been given to German firm in spite of more favourable French offer. Has had no answer from Maghzen as to British proposal (see No. 75) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 47   |
| 82  | Mr. W. Smith                                           | .. Confidential     | 14,           | German loan. Details of furnished by Sid-el-Menebbi. A British firm to take part in (see Nos. 72 and 73) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 48   |



## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.              | No.         | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Page |
|-----|--------------------|-------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 83  | Mr. Whitehead ..   | 187         | July 16, 1905 | France and Germany. Prince Bülow and Baron von Richthofen gone for holidays. Difficulties presumably at an end ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 48   |
| 84  | Sir A. Nicolson .. | 140         | 19,           | Meeting-place of Conference. Germans pressing for Tangier. Spanish Government wish His Majesty's Government to propose Madrid. Climate good in September (see No. 78) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 49   |
| 85  | Mr. W. Smith ..    | Telegraphic | 22,           | German loan. Is certainly that referred to in No. 57. Tangier agent of lenders awaiting reply from Fez as to security (see No. 82) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 49   |
| 86  | Mr. Lowther ..     | 79 Tel.     | 22,           | German loan. Forwood's is probably British firm interested, if any. No indication of further negotiations at Fez at present (see No. 85) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 49   |
| 87  | Mr. W. Smith ..    | Telegraphic | 23,           | Conference. Informs of instructions to French Minister to avoid lengthy negotiations with Sultan respecting programme (see No. 79) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 50   |
| 88  | " ..               | Telegraphic | 23,           | French yacht "Aigle." Still at Mogador on the 19th July. Expedition is making a survey of whole of Moroccan sea-board, which will probably take a year to do (see No. 64) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 50   |
| 88* | Mr. Lowther ..     | 176         | 6,            | French proposals for reform. Confidential Memorandum by Vice-Consul MacLeod ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 122  |
| 89  | " ..               | 181         | 12,           | Murder of Mr. Madden. Transmits information respecting. One of the assistants at the murder discovered. Refers to No. 46 ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 50   |
| 90  | " ..               | 182         | 12,           | Protender. Progress of campaign against. Question of foreign protection for Bu Amama's son (see No. 44) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 51   |
| 91  | " ..               | 183         | 13,           | Tangier Harbour Concession. Minister for Foreign Affairs confirms reported grant to German firm. Warned that other countries, including Great Britain, would expect concessions (see No. 81) ..                                                                                                                                                                                              | 51   |
| 92  | " ..               | 184         | 13,           | Murder of Mr. Madden. Governor of Mazagan unable to cope with case, as many of his relatives are implicated. Is assured by Minister for Foreign Affairs that Governor is doing his utmost, and Moorish Government taking all possible steps to discover murderers. Has thought it better not to insist on suspension of Governor. Five Moors are suspected of the crime. Refers to No. 89 .. | 52   |
| 93  | " ..               | 80 Tel.     | 25,           | Meeting-place of Conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs anxious for Tangier (see No. 84) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 53   |
| 94  | " ..               | 81 Tel.     | 25,           | German loan. Rumour that German Government have offered 1,000,000/4 without guarantee (see No. 86) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 53   |
| 95  | Sir A. Hardinge .. | 467         | 23,           | Conference. Transmits official communiqué stating Russian Government have accepted (see No. 80) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | 53   |
| 96  | Mr. W. Smith ..    | Telegraphic | 26,           | French yacht "Aigle." Survey operations executed by party from yacht have angered the natives (see No. 88) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 53   |
| 97  | " ..               | Telegraphic | 27,           | Tangier Harbour Concessions. Hears German tender has been definitely accepted (see No. 91) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 54   |

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No.  | Name.                    | No.              | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Page |
|------|--------------------------|------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 98   | To Mr. Lowther ..        | 46 Tel.          | July 27, 1905 | Programme of Conference. His Majesty's Government have approved French proposals. Gives heads of programme (see No. 79) ..                                                                                                                                         | 54   |
| 99   | To Sir A. Nicolson ..    | 62 Tel.          | 27,           | Programme of Conference. To inform Spanish Government His Majesty's Government approve French proposals (see No. 98) ..                                                                                                                                            | 54   |
| 100  | Señor Polo de Bernabé .. | ..               | 21,           | Conference. Informs of acceptance by Spanish Government (see Nos. 54 and 95) ..                                                                                                                                                                                    | 54   |
| 101  | Sir A. Nicolson ..       | 68 Tel.          | 28,           | Programme of Conference. Spanish fears as to effect of proposed reform of Moorish coinage (see No. 65) ..                                                                                                                                                          | 55   |
| 102  | To Mr. Lowther ..        | 47 Tel.          | 28,           | Meeting-place of Conference. To join French colleague in representation to Sultan that Tangier is unsuitable. Concessions to Germany. To join French colleague in pointing out to Sultan concessions should not be granted till Conference has met (see No. 93) .. | 55   |
| 103  | To Sir A. Nicolson ..    | 64 Tel.          | 28,           | Programme of Conference. To stop at San Sebastian if possible and communicate to Spanish Government His Majesty's Government's approval of French programme (see No. 99) ..                                                                                        | 55   |
| 104  | Sir A. Nicolson ..       | 59 Tel.          | 29,           | Programme of Conference. Understands French Government have already communicated it to Spanish Government, but will stop and do so himself (see No. 103) ..                                                                                                        | 56   |
| 104* | To Sir A. Nicolson ..    | 67 Tel.          | 29,           | Programme of Conference. Approval of programme, not programme itself, to be communicated to Spanish Government (see No. 104) ..                                                                                                                                    | 56   |
| 105  | Sir A. Nicolson ..       | 61 Tel.          | 29,           | Conference. French Ambassador anxious Sir A. Nicolson should have interview with French Minister for Foreign Affairs. Any objection? ..                                                                                                                            | 56   |
| 106  | To Sir A. Nicolson ..    | ..               | 30,           | Proposal to visit the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on his way through Paris. No objection. Refers to No. 105 ..                                                                                                                                             | 56   |
| 106* | " ..                     | 68 Tel.          | 30,           | Interview with French Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 106). No objection. Advice as to meeting-place of Conference might be useful ..                                                                                                                        | 56   |
| 107  | Mr. Lowther ..           | 186              | 18,           | Surprise of Moors at early conclusion of Franco-German Agreement. Reports ..                                                                                                                                                                                       | 56   |
| 108  | " ..                     | 187              | 19,           | Conference. Transmits note to Moorish Government accepting, as instructed by telegram. Refers to No. 98 ..                                                                                                                                                         | 57   |
| 109  | " ..                     | 188              | 19,           | Franco-German Agreement. Light in which it is presented to Sultan by German Minister (see No. 27) ..                                                                                                                                                               | 57   |
| 110  | " ..                     | 189              | 20,           | Daralbaida harbour works. German firm supported by German Minister has asked leave to carry out. Tangier harbour works. Negotiations may be completed any moment (see No. 97) ..                                                                                   | 58   |
| 111  | " ..                     | 190 Confidential | 20,           | French proposals. Army scheme accepted by Sultan before negotiations were broken off (see No. 315, Part 25) ..                                                                                                                                                     | 58   |



TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.               | No.              | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Page |
|-----|---------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 112 | Sir A. Nicolson ..  | 144              | July 28, 1905 | Programme of Conference. Accepted by Spanish Government in principle. Their fears respecting effect of monetary reforms and suppression of smuggling (see Nos. 100 and 101) ..                                                                 | 58   |
| 113 | Mr. W. Smith ..     | Telegraphic      | 31,           | Tangier Harbour Concession. Contract signed (see No. 110) ..                                                                                                                                                                                   | 60   |
| 114 | " ..                | Telegraphic      | 31,           | Conference. United States' Government and Portuguese Government have accepted invitation (see No. 100) ..                                                                                                                                      | 60   |
| 115 | Sir A. Nicolson ..  | 62 Tel.          | Aug. 1,       | Conference. Has informed Spanish Prime Minister of His Majesty's Government's approval of French programme. Views of Spanish Government as to meeting-place and Anglo-Franco-Spanish <i>entente</i> (see Nos. 93 and 104*) ..                  | 60   |
| 116 | Mr. W. Smith ..     | Telegraphic      | 1,            | Tangier mole. Report being spread by German Legation that, as part of the compensation exacted for the murder of a German subject at Fez, Sultan promised that concession of any work should be granted to a German firm. Refers to No. 113 .. | 60   |
| 117 | To Mr. Whitehead .. | 187              | 1,            | Concessions to Germany. Count Metternich sees no reason why Powers should not continue to seek concessions for their subjects (see No. 102). Original French proposals. Have evidently been seen by German Government (see No. 111) ..         | 61   |
| 118 | Mr. W. Smith ..     | ..               | July 23,      | German loan. Further details from Menebhi. Negotiations in progress since May and not yet complete (see No. 94) ..                                                                                                                             | 61   |
| 119 | " ..                | ..               | 27,           | French yacht "Aigle." Some members of the Expedition attacked by Moors. Has informed M. de Chérissey of particulars of occurrence. Expedition is entirely a private undertaking (see No. 96) ..                                                | 62   |
| 120 | Mr. Lowther ..      | 82 Tel.          | 30,           | Tangier Harbour Concession. Given to German firm. Surprise of German Legation at adverse comment (see No. 113) ..                                                                                                                              | 62   |
| 121 | To Sir F. Bertie .. | 522              | Aug. 2,       | Meeting-place of Conference and concessions to Germans. Informs of desire of French Ambassador that His Majesty's Government should take initiative with regard to, and reply (see Nos. 115 and 117) ..                                        | 62   |
| 122 | Mr. W. Smith ..     | ..               | July 28,      | Survey of Government land at Tangier. Informs of. German Chargé d'Affaires supposes it may be wanted as security for a loan (see No. 118) ..                                                                                                   | 63   |
| 123 | Mr. Lowther ..      | 191 Confidential | 21,           | Moorish Army. Transmits Memorandum on state of by British instructor of cavalry to Moorish forces ..                                                                                                                                           | 64   |
| 124 | " ..                | 192              | 24,           | Moorish prisons. Transmits reports on condition of prisons at Tangier, Dar-al-Baida, Mazagan, Saffi, and Mogador ..                                                                                                                            | 67   |
| 125 | " ..                | 193              | 25,           | Bad behaviour of Europeans at Fez. Informs of complaint made to foreign Representatives by Sid-ben-Sliman ..                                                                                                                                   | 71   |
| 126 | " ..                | 194              | 25,           | Conference. Conversation with Count Tattenbach. His surprise France has not yet notified acceptance to Sultan ..                                                                                                                               | 72   |

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

| No. | Name.             | No. | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Page |
|-----|-------------------|-----|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 127 | Mr. Lowther ..    | 195 | July 24, 1905 | Murder of Mr. Madden. Transmits report from Consul Maclean. Has again urged on Minister for Foreign Affairs removal of Governor of Mazagan from his post, but Moorish Government consider he is doing everything possible in the matter and specially emphasize his arresting the brothers Ben Yusef. German Minister has no power to order Ahmed-ben-Yusef's (German <i>semsar</i> ) retention in prison. Refers to No. 92 .. | 73   |
| 128 | " ..              | 196 | 24,           | Facilities granted to German surveyors at Larache and Borj-Saida (see No. 12) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 74   |
| 129 | " ..              | 197 | 25,           | Purchase of two steamers from Germany by Moorish Government. Negotiations in progress with German Minister for ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 75   |
| 130 | " ..              | 198 | 22,           | Claim of Hadj Taleb Lazrac against the Moorish Government. Details of. Requests instructions as to action to be taken in this and other similar cases of British naturalized subjects ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 75   |
| 131 | " ..              | 199 | 26,           | Meeting-place of Conference. Reasons for and against Tangier (see No. 121) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 76   |
| 132 | " ..              | 200 | 26,           | Pretender. Government troops have been constantly harassing his forces. He seems to be dispirited, and his partisans have deserted him since last battle. He has withdrawn from Oujdad with intention of attacking Fez, but his force is too small for the purpose (see No. 90) ..                                                                                                                                             | 76   |
| 133 | " ..              | 201 | 26,           | Menebhi. Conditions of arrangements under which he was to leave the country have remained unfulfilled by Moorish Government. Has been urged, in the name of the Sultan, to hasten Menebhi's departure. Has pointed out that conditions mentioned above are still unfulfilled ..                                                                                                                                                | 77   |
| 134 | " ..              | 202 | 28,           | Moorish prisons. Transmits report on prisons at Rabat. Refers to No. 124 ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 78   |
| 135 | Mr. W. Smith ..   | ..  | 29,           | French yacht "Aigle." As a result of the surveying expedition, tribes in neighbourhood of Mogador have refused to pay taxes, saying that they had only allowed themselves to be taxed, since they thought that the money would be devoted to the expulsion of the Frenchmen (see No. 119) ..                                                                                                                                   | 79   |
| 136 | Sir E. Egerton .. | 129 | Aug. 2,       | Meeting-place of Conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs denies truth of German statement that Italy had accepted Tangier (see No. 131) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 79   |
| 137 | To Mr. Lister ..  | 528 | 4,            | Concessions to Germany. Transmits copy of protest from M. Rouvier to Prince Radolin and account of discussions between French and German Governments, communicated by M. Cambon. Meeting-place of Conference. French Government have suggested Spanish Government should ask for Madrid or San Sebastian (see No. 121) ..                                                                                                      | 79   |
| 138 | Mr. Lister ..     | 292 | 2,            | French resentment at Count Tattenbach's action. Increasing. Conversation with M. Louis. Tone of press (see No. 109) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 83   |
| 139 | " ..              | 293 | 4,            | Count Tattenbach's attitude. M. Louis says German Government undertook to restrain Count Tattenbach's activity after signature of Agreement (see No. 134) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 84   |



| No. | Name.                          | No.                  | Date.        | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Page |
|-----|--------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 140 | Mr. Lowther ..                 | 83 Tel.              | Aug. 2, 1905 | German loan. Moorish Government apparently contemplating other possible measures for raising money (see No. 118) ..                                                                                                      | 84   |
| 141 | Mr. W. Smith ..                | Telegraphic          | 6,           | Concessions to Germany. German Legation has received instructions to decline till after Conference (see Nos. 117 and 137) ..                                                                                             | 85   |
| 142 | Sir M. de Bunsen ..            | 66                   | July 30,     | Conference. Informs of Portuguese acceptance (see No. 114), &c. ..                                                                                                                                                       | 85   |
| 143 | Mr. Cartwright ..              | 63 Tel.              | Aug. 7,      | Meeting-place of Conference. President of Council ready to make verbal, but not written, offer of a Spanish town (see No. 136)                                                                                           | 85   |
| 144 | Mr. Lowther ..                 | 204                  | July 30,     | French proposals. Sultan has invited tribes to send delegates to Fez to attend discussions (see Nos. 111 and 117) ..                                                                                                     | 85   |
| 145 | " ..                           | 205                  | 30,          | German schemes. German interpreter states they include a railway from Fez to Tangier and instruction in Germany for young Moors                                                                                          | 86   |
| 146 | Mr. Cartwright ..              | 65 Tel.              | Aug. 8,      | Meeting-place of Conference. Informs of Spanish note to French, German, and British Representatives. Suggesting a town in South Spain. Spanish Government very anxious this should be accepted (see No. 143)             | 86   |
| 147 | Notes by Vice-Consul Barber .. | ..                   | July 30,     | Borj-Saïda. Notes on (see No. 128)                                                                                                                                                                                       | 87   |
| 148 | Mr. Lister ..                  | 295                  | Aug. 8,      | Conference. French Government do not expect German reply to their note for a week or two (see No. 137) ..                                                                                                                | 88   |
| 149 | Mr. Cartwright ..              | 67 Tel. Confidential | 9,           | Meeting-place of Conference. Under-Secretary of State reports German Embassy much irritated at <i>note verbale</i> mentioned in No. 146 ..                                                                               | 88   |
| 150 | Mr. W. Smith ..                | Telegraphic          | 9,           | German advance to Sultan. Rumoured, on security of property at Tangier and Dar-al-Baida (see No. 122) ..                                                                                                                 | 88   |
| 151 | Sir A. Nicolson ..             | 146 Confidential     | July 29,     | Programme of Conference. Spanish anxiety as to and mistrust of French policy. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 115) ..                                                                            | 88   |
| 152 | " ..                           | 147                  | Aug. 1,      | Conference. Conversation with President of Council. Spain anxious about coinage, smuggling, and police questions, but seems ready to act in concert with France and His Majesty's Government (see No. 112) ..            | 89   |
| 153 | Mr. Cartwright ..              | 149 Confidential     | 8,           | Meeting-place of Conference. Transmits note which Spanish Government, though reluctantly, have communicated to French, German, and British representatives suggesting some town in Spain (see No. 146) ..                | 91   |
| 154 | Mr. W. Smith ..                | ..                   | 4,           | German concessions. German Chargé d'Affaires says Tangier Harbour Concession was given in return for agreement given by German Government not to insist on execution of murderers of M. Genthe (see Nos. 116 and 120) .. | 92   |
| 155 | " ..                           | Telegraphic          | 10,          | German advance to Sultan. Further details. Views of German Legation on (see No. 150)                                                                                                                                     | 92   |

| No. | Name.               | No.              | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Page |
|-----|---------------------|------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 156 | To Mr. Lister ..    | 539 Confidential | Aug. 10, 1905 | Conference. French Ambassador's complaint of German action in seeking concessions before answering French note (see No. 73). Informed His Majesty's Government would have no objection to Algieras as meeting-place (see Nos. 138 and 158) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 92   |
| 157 | To Mr. Lowther ..   | 72               | 10,           | Menebhi. Approves language held to Ben Sliman, as reported in No. 133 ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 93   |
| 158 | " ..                | 73               | 10,           | Hadj Taleb Lazrac's claim against the Moorish Government. To bear all claims of British naturalized subjects in mind and take any convenient opportunity which may occur for pressing them on Moorish Government (see No. 130) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 93   |
| 159 | Sir F. Bertie ..    | 53 Tel.          | 11,           | Concessions to Germany. Conversation with M. Louis. Irritation of French Government at German Ambassador admits explanation is required (see No. 156) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 93   |
| 160 | Mr. Lister ..       | 297              | 11,           | German loan. Irritation in France. Transmits "Temps" and "Débats" articles. M. Louis says German Embassy maintain that loan is a private affair (see No. 165)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 94   |
| 161 | To Mr. Lister ..    | 546              | 12,           | Tangier mole and harbour works. Conversation with French Ambassador. German firm entrusted with the works are unable to provide sufficient funds and have approached Messrs. Schneider and Creusot. Proposal that French and British firms should participate in enterprise. Meeting-place of Conference. Spanish Government have suggested Algieras. Spain's desire to be intrusted with police arrangements at a number of the principal Moorish ports (see No. 154) .. | 94   |
| 162 | Mr. Lowther ..      | 206              | July 30,      | Sale of Governors' posts in Morocco. Conversation with Court official. Reports three instances in Gharb district and another in Rahamna district ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 95   |
| 163 | " ..                | 207              | 30,           | Programme of Conference. Sultan preparing to resist any proposals for reform made by foreign Representatives ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | 96   |
| 164 | Mr. W. Smith ..     | ..               | Aug. 7,       | Conference. Visit of Envoy from Sultan to Tangier to ascertain feeling of Moors with regard to ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 97   |
| 165 | Sir F. Lascelles .. | 212              | 11,           | German loan. Attempt by "Cologne Gazette" to minimize importance of (see No. 160) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 98   |
| 166 | Mr. W. Smith ..     | Telegraphic      | 14,           | German advance to Sultan. Confirmed. German Chargé d'Affaires says French Minister for Foreign Affairs was informed ten days ago, and that it is merely a temporary measure, not a loan (see Nos. 155 and 160) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 98   |
| 167 | Mr. Lowther ..      | 209              | 6             | Tangier Harbour Concession. Details of contract. Untrue that it was promised long ago. Probably given in part satisfaction of murder of Dr. Genthe (see No. 154) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 98   |
| 168 | Mr. Lister ..       | 302              | 15,           | Morocco Conference. Conversation with M. Louis. Surprise at attitude of German Government. Germans seem to have realized that they will obtain less than they expected by a Conference. Attitude of Paris press. M. Clémenceau considers France's dignity has been seriously compromised by Germany's action, and insists on French Government taking a strong stand (see No. 160) ..                                                                                     | 99   |



| No. | Name.        | No.              | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Page |
|-----|--------------|------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 169 | Mr. Lister.. | 54 Tel.          | Aug. 17, 1905 | German loan. M. Louis says French Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier was informed by his German colleague that negotiations were not yet complete (see No. 166) ..                                                                                                                                                                           | 99   |
| 170 | Mr. W. Smith | Telegraphic      | 17,           | German loan. German Chargé d'Affaires says he suggested participation of French capital to his Government (see No. 169)..                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 100  |
| 171 | Mr. Lister.. | 299              | 17,           | German loan. French Government believe contract not yet completed. M. Louis thinks German Government wish to avoid holding Conference (see Nos. 168 and 169)..                                                                                                                                                                         | 100  |
| 172 | " "          | 307              | 18,           | Franco-German negotiations. Transmits official communiqué to press, giving account of since 8th July (see No. 68) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 100  |
| 173 | " "          | 55 Tel.          | 19,           | Reported attack on two Algerian schoolmasters by Moors. No official information received. No truth in reported incident with regard to officer of the "Aigle" ..                                                                                                                                                                       | 102  |
| 174 | Mr. Lowther  | 210 Confidential | 6,            | Withdrawal of Missions from Fez. Count Tattenbach thinks it useless for them to stay any longer, as Sultan will never agree to any reform proposals (see Nos. 45 and 59)..                                                                                                                                                             | 102  |
| 175 | " "          | 212              | 7,            | Tangier-Mogador cable. Scheme put forward by German Minister but not pressed ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 102  |
| 176 | " "          | 214              | 10,           | Murder of Mr. Madden. Dilatory action of Moorish Government in arresting murderers. The Moorish Secretary sent to Mazagan to investigate the case has been withdrawn. Has warned Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government may eventually be compelled to take some energetic measures in the matter (see No. 127) .. | 103  |
| 177 | Mr. W. Smith | ..               | 11,           | Valuation of Government properties at Tangier and Dar-al-Baida. German Chargé d'Affaires has no official confirmation of rumour that they are to be offered as securities for a loan (see No. 122) ..                                                                                                                                  | 103  |
| 178 | " "          | ..               | 12,           | State of Dar-al-Baida district. Tranquillity prevails. Very little respect for Government authority. Local authorities have received instructions from Fez to make a survey of all Government lands in and around Dar-al-Baida and to seize any waste lands near the town (see No. 178) ..                                             | 104  |
| 179 | " "          | ..               | 14,           | State of Rabat district. Unsatisfactory. Only due to precautions taken by Europeans that serious acts of brigandage do not occur. Governor selling rifles issued by the Makhzen to the tribes whose attacks he is supposed to repel with them ..                                                                                       | 104  |
| 180 | " "          | ..               | 14,           | Rottenburg case. French and German Governments dispute validity of Article XI of Madrid Convention as against their own subjects (see No. 66) ..                                                                                                                                                                                       | 105  |
| 181 | " "          | Telegraphic      | 21,           | Arrest of Algerian. French Chargé d'Affaires says French Minister's demands approved. Naval and military demonstrations threatened in case of Sultan's non-compliance (see No. 173) ..                                                                                                                                                 | 106  |
| 182 | Mr. Lowther  | 215 Confidential | 12,           | Programme of Conference. Count Tattenbach unable to present to Sultan, as he cannot decypher his instructions (see No. 163) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 107  |

| No. | Name.                                  | No.              | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Page |
|-----|----------------------------------------|------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 183 | Mr. Lowther                            | 216              | Aug. 12, 1905 | Arrest of Algerian subject by Moors. Informs of refusal of French Minister's demands for compensation (see No. 181) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 107  |
| 184 | Memorandum communicated by M. Geoffray | ..               | 22,           | Arrest of Algerian. French Government will demand complete reparation, but will not take the opportunity to obtain any special advantages (see No. 183) ..                                                                                                                                                              | 107  |
| 185 | Mr. Lowther                            | 84 Tel.          | 19,           | German loan. Thinks transaction not yet completed. Rumours of probably intended as a "feeler" (see No. 171) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                          | 108  |
| 186 | " "                                    | 85 Tel.          | 19,           | Programme of Conference. German Minister says Moorish Government will offer no serious objection to (see Nos. 163 and 182) ..                                                                                                                                                                                           | 108  |
| 187 | " "                                    | 86 Tel.          | 20,           | German loan. German Minister has informed Vizier that negotiations must be abandoned for the present. French Minister informed (see No. 185)..                                                                                                                                                                          | 108  |
| 188 | To Mr. Lowther                         | 81               | 25,           | Mr. Madden's murder. Approves language held to Minister for Foreign Affairs as reported in No. 176 ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 109  |
| 189 | Mr. Lowther                            | 217              | 14,           | German concessions. Count Tattenbach's "documentary evidence" that they had been granted previous to 8th July found to be of no value (see Nos. 154 and 156) ..                                                                                                                                                         | 109  |
| 190 | Mr. Lister ..                          | 315 Confidential | 25,           | Arrest of Algerian. M. Louis states intentions of French Government and attitude of Germany with regard to this and loan question (see No. 184) ..                                                                                                                                                                      | 109  |
| 191 | Mr. Lowther                            | 87 Tel.          | 23,           | Arrest of Algerian. Moorish Government have refused French demands (see No. 190) ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 110  |
| 192 | Mr. W. Smith                           | Telegraphic      | 26,           | Arrest of Algerian. French Government not satisfied with release. Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs claims Algerians resident in Morocco as subject to Moorish jurisdiction (see No. 191) ..                                                                                                                         | 110  |
| 193 | Mr. Lowther                            | 219              | 17,           | Pretender. Taib, son of Bu Amama, and two of his retainers consigned to prison in New Fez. Pretender collecting fresh adherents and supplies (see No. 132) ..                                                                                                                                                           | 110  |
| 194 | " "                                    | 220              | 19,           | Financial straits of Makhzen. Informs of sale of Mosque properties and probable results ..                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 111  |
| 195 | Mr. W. Smith                           | ..               | 18,           | French yacht "Aigle." Has left Mazagan for Gibraltar. Survey of southern section of coast finished. Results of expedition. Visit to Agadir was in defiance of advice of French authorities, who warned the Mission against it (see No. 135) ..                                                                          | 111  |
| 196 | " "                                    | ..               | 20,           | Visit of German training-ship "Charlotte" to Mogador. Merely part of regular summer cruise. Actual presence of German training-ship "Stosch" in Tangier Bay, together with above prospective visit, would appear to point to determination of German Emperor to show his flag as often as possible in Moorish waters .. | 112  |
| 197 | " "                                    | ..               | 23,           | Intertribal fighting on the coast. Prevalent. Cause would appear to be discontent of people with their káids owing to the way in which they extort money under pretence of collecting taxes, or by rapacity and ambition of káids themselves. District round Tangier unusually quiet ..                                 | 112  |



| No. | Name.                                  | No.                 | Date.         | SUBJECT.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Page |
|-----|----------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 198 | Sir H. Howard                          | 143<br>Confidential | Aug. 28, 1905 | Visit of Dutch cruisers to Tangier. Simply an act of courtesy in return for Sultan's invitation to the Conference. Possibility of visit being taken to mean that Netherlands Government share views of German Government respecting Morocco and Anglo-French Convention, in view of Dutch interests at Tangier being in the hands of the German Minister | 112  |
| 199 | Mr. Cartwright                         | 154<br>Confidential | 24,           | Conference. German Ambassador informed by French Ambassador and Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs of irritation caused by German dilatoriness. Conversation between Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador on Franco-Spanish relations (see No. 151) .. .. .                                                                              | 113  |
| 200 | Notes communicated by M. Geoffray      | ..                  | 28,           | Tangier mole and German loan. Notes exchanged between Prince Radolin and M. Rouvier (see Nos. 161 and 185) .. .. .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 114  |
| 201 | Memorandum communicated by M. Geoffray | ..                  | 28,           | Arrest of Algerian. Instructions to French Minister at Tangier respecting ultimatum to Sultan (see No. 192) .. .. .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 117  |
| 202 | Mr. W. Smith                           | ..                  | 24,           | French yacht "Aigle." Its visit to Saffi. Port authorities informed the expedition that they could not take observations unless they had Sherrefian orders. Expedition has now begun surveying operations at Mazagan (see No. 195) .. .. .                                                                                                               | 117  |
| 203 | To Mr. Lowther                         | 51 Tel.             | 29,           | Withdrawal of Missions from Fez. If French Minister leaves, to make arrangements for leaving about same time (see No. 174) .. .. .                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 118  |
| 204 | Mr. Lowther                            | 221                 | 20,           | Mr. Madden's murder. Transmits despatch from Consul Maclean. Difficulties in way of arriving at the truth. Governor of Mazagan, who has been the stumbling-block throughout the case, is strongly supported by a Court official highly in favour (see No. 188) .. .. .                                                                                   | 118  |
| 205 | Mr. W. Smith                           | ..                  | 24,           | German loan. Particulars furnished by Tangier agent of German group (see No. 200) .. .. .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 120  |
| 206 | ..                                     | Telegraphic         | 30,           | Algerian arrested by Moors. Has been handed over to French Minister at Fez (see No. 201) .. .. .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 120  |
| 207 | To Mr. Lister                          | 585                 | 30,           | Programme of Conference. Informs of French proposals for preliminary agreement with Spain (see No. 199) .. .. .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | 121  |

## ERRATUM.

Page 108, No. 185, line 5. For "Separate, of the 15th instant," read "14th instant."

## CONFIDENTIAL.

## Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Morocco.

## PART 26.

## No. 1.

Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 238. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 28, 1905.

I CALLED upon M. Rouvier this afternoon on the occasion of his weekly reception at the Quai d'Orsay, and asked him whether he had anything which he wished me to communicate to your Lordship.

He said that he had nothing special to say; that he reported daily to M. Cambon the progress of the negotiations, and that his Excellency kept your Lordship fully informed of all that was going on in Paris.

I alluded to the conversation which M. Cambon had with your Lordship on the 27th instant, as reported in your despatch No. 419 of that date, and M. Rouvier told me that he had modified his opinion with regard to the departure of the French and English Representatives from Fez. If a Conference were to take place, it would be better that they should all three leave together. I had already gathered, from a conversation which I had had earlier in the afternoon with the Directeur Politique, that M. Rouvier was inclined to accept a Conference, although M. Louis had said that it could only be accepted on condition that nothing "inconnu" (by which I understood him to mean nothing that had not been agreed upon beforehand) should be submitted to it for discussion. I asked M. Rouvier whether he intended to insist upon this condition, but he was not nearly so decided in his opinion as M. Louis. He merely shrugged his shoulders, and said that it was impossible to be certain beforehand that nothing "inconnu" would turn up. He considered that, under the conditions, a Conference was perhaps the best way of arriving at a satisfactory solution. The Emperor had made it a point of personal honour; France would go into it with the support of England, Spain, and possibly Italy, whereas Germany would be alone; Germany was prepared to admit the preponderance of French interests on the Algerian frontier. It was absolutely necessary to arrive at some solution, as the present situation was excessively dangerous. So long as the Conference was not accepted, Germany considered that she was entitled to a free hand in Morocco, and she was very active. She would ask for all sorts of concessions, ports, cables, &c., and were the Sultan to accede to such demands the situation both for France and England would become far more critical. M. Rouvier hinted that once the present difficulties had been more or less tided over at the Conference, it would be possible to see that Germany did not get too much in Morocco. There appear to me to be indications that the feeling is growing in France that it is necessary to treat the Morocco question in as conciliatory a spirit as possible, but that when further demands are made by Germany they should be met by a firm refusal. This opinion can be traced in the writings and utterances of MM. Jaurès and Clémenceau, and I have heard them expressed by men of very different political opinions. The feeling of resentment against Germany on account of her present action is very strong, and the spirit of the "revanche" is reawakening; the French have pulled themselves together wonderfully after their first panic, and they now seem



prepared to face calmly the contingency of war in the future should the pretensions of Germany continue.

There is, I think, no doubt that M. Rouvier could at present command a very large majority in the Chamber on any question of foreign policy, and his efforts to preserve peace by conciliation, so far as conciliation can go without loss of dignity, will only enhance his position in the eyes of his countrymen, and assure him their unanimous support in the event of such a policy being rendered impossible.

I mentioned to M. Rouvier that I had heard from private sources that the Emperor had been in a very excited and irritable state of late, and he answered that he feared that the French note could not have improved his temper, although he personally considered that it had been most moderate and courteous. His Majesty had expected a complete climb-down to follow upon the change of direction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but, as his Excellency said, there was no reason because he parted with M. Delcassé that he should throw himself "dans les bras de l'Empereur et sur son cou."

There appears little doubt that His Imperial Majesty has been misinformed as to the state of feeling in France. He believed that the French Socialists would follow the lead of M. Hervé, whereas MM. Jaurès and Clémenceau, their two most distinguished chiefs, have gone in a diametrically opposite direction. Prince Radolin and M. de Miquel have collected and reported all the stories with regard to the French army, which they have picked up in the salons and clubs of the Faubourg St. Germain, and which are in most cases grossly exaggerated, and M. Delcassé's resignation has not brought about the complete *volte-face* in French foreign policy which the Emperor had been led to expect.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

## No. 2.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 436. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 1, 1905.*

THE French Ambassador called on me this morning. He told me in strict confidence that there had been a further conversation between M. Rouvier and Prince Radolin, and that the result had been to strengthen the impression that an understanding might be arrived at under which, upon certain prearranged bases, a Conference might take place, and perhaps have useful results.

M. Rouvier had suggested to his Excellency the following preliminary description, partly derived from his conversations with Prince Radolin, of the bases in question.

Germany would declare that it was not her object in any way to prejudice the ulterior rights reserved for France in Morocco ("L'Allemagne ne poursuit aucun but compromettant l'avenir réservé à la France au Maroc") or to act contrary to French interests. The following principles would be laid down:—

1. Maintenance of the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan;
2. Preservation of the integrity of his possessions;
3. Maintenance of commercial liberty;
4. Admission of the necessity of military and financial reforms, the introduction of which would be for the time being regulated and sanctioned by means of an international arrangement of strictly limited duration;
5. Recognition of the special position belonging to France in Morocco in consequence of the extent of the French frontier and the special relations resulting from the vicinity of the two countries;
6. The Sultan to be admitted to the councils of France and Germany for the purpose of determining the programme of the Conference.

M. Rouvier thought that if an Agreement upon these lines could be arrived at the Missions might be at once recalled from Fez.

His Excellency told me that the description which he had given to me must only be taken as a sketch, and that the actual terms of the Agreement would have to be most carefully considered. He would himself like to introduce some mention of the Agreement between Great Britain and France as to Morocco. I told his Excellency that I did not see on the face of the terms which he had suggested anything which I

could adversely criticise. In the event of its becoming necessary to tax foreigners for the purpose of carrying out reforms, I did not see how it was possible to avoid some form of discussion with the other Powers, particularly as that view had been strongly held by France two or three years ago. With regard to his Excellency's proposed reference to the Anglo-French Declaration, I thought it might be usefully cited for the purpose of showing that the policy of both France and Great Britain had been in favour of maintaining the independence and integrity of Morocco and preserving commercial equality.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

## No. 3.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*British Legation, Tangier, June 19, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Count Saint-Aulaire, First Secretary of the French Legation here, accompanied by M. Régault, Delegate of the Loan Commission, his private secretary, and a French engineer, arrived here from Fez on Friday evening last, coming from Larache on board the French cruiser "Galilée."

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

## No. 4.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 145.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 19, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the three military officers who accompanied Count Tattenbach, namely, General Schenck, Major von Senden, and Captain Kleist, are leaving Fez to-morrow.

Count Tattenbach has given out that, as he is likely to remain here some time longer, and as the services of these officers are required elsewhere, it has been decided that they should leave.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

## No. 5.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 147. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 19, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a Memorandum drawn up by Captain Malcolm, attached to this Mission, dealing with the subject of a French advance into this country.

The Memorandum is compiled from information previously in the possession of Captain Malcolm, together with such data as he has been able to collect since he has been with the Mission.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.



## Inclosure in No. 5.

*Memorandum by Captain Malcolm respecting a French Advance into Morocco.*

## 1. General Considerations.

IN considering the question of a possible French advance into Morocco, and the military difficulties which may be encountered, it should be borne in mind that it is the one thing which might unite the various parties in the country. Hatred of France is the one sentiment which is shared by every tribe and by all conditions of men.

## 2. Objective.

It may fairly be assumed that the main objective of any French advance would be Fez.

## 3. Bases.

There are two obvious bases and lines which might be used in an advance on Fez:—

- (1) From Tangier.
- (2) From Ujdah.

A third base might be established at one of the coast ports, possibly Rabat, for a reason which will be explained later. The inaccessibility of the western ports would probably prevent them from being utilized for the main bases.

## 4. Lines of Communication.

The line from Ujdah to Fez is about 230 miles, through country which, though at present independent of the Sultan of Morocco, is bitterly hostile to France. It is quite possible that a more troublesome resistance would be met with from the followers of the Pretender than from those of the Sultan, as the latter has far more personal authority.

## 5. Difficulties of Ujdah-Taza-Fez Route.

On this line the right flank of an advancing force would be exposed to constant harassing by the "Riff" tribes on the north, as well as by the Rogni and Bu Amama on the south.

The route is little known, but the water difficulty, often so great in our own campaigns in little known countries, probably does not exist in this instance.

Ujdah itself is a very considerable distance, 50 miles, from the railhead at Tlemcen, and the engineering difficulties in the way of continuing the line to Lalla Maghnia are very great. It is possible that this difficulty may be met by running a line to Ujdah either from Nemours or from Port Say. Nothing is known of the latter place except that work on a fairly large scale, including road-making, has been going on lately.

## 6. Tangier-Fez Route.

The distance from Tangier to Fez is, roughly, 170 miles. An advance on this line would be opposed by Raisuli as well as by the Sultan's followers. It is, of course, most unlikely that any resistance in force would be encountered, but that very fact increases the French difficulties—*vide* Somaliland, the Hereros in South-West Africa, the later phase of the Boer War, and many other instances.

An important point to consider here is whether the French would be allowed to use Tangier as a base for military operations. Once so used they would certainly wish to fortify it, and once fortified, the nature and angle of fire of the guns set up could hardly be controlled. With the precedent of Bizerta before their eyes the other

Mediterranean Powers might well object to Tangier being utilized. It would, moreover, be quite easy for Germany to give the Moors a hint that this objection would be raised.

## 7. Strategy.

The main objective of any invading force would, as has been said, be Fez, but, as has been so often seen, the mere occupation of a town rarely has any effect in war, and in this case it would certainly not give the French army control over the rich districts of the south.

An advance on Fez would probably drive the Sultan to Marrakesh without in any way simplifying the military task. The French would, therefore, still have the harder part of their work to do while maintaining a very extended line of communications through hostile country. They would scarcely wish to arrive at Fez with less than 10,000 men, not to fight, but to garrison important places in the neighbourhood, and to make small expeditions in every direction. To get this force at Fez and to guard the lines means the employment of a large number of men.

In Somaliland, with a total force of about 8,000 troops, General Egerton had great difficulty in placing 2,100 men in the field at a distance of 220 miles from the base at Berbera. (These figures are from memory but are approximately correct.) This in a country where the communications were never even threatened, and where transport was easy. It may, therefore, be calculated that to get 10,000 men to Fez a force of 40,000 men would have to be employed.

To prevent the Sultan from retiring to Marrakesh, the French would probably utilize Rabat as a subsidiary base from which to send out small flying columns in excess of the numbers already estimated.

If cut off by this force the Court might perhaps make its way direct to Marrakesh or to Tafilelt, the place of origin of the present dynasty. In either case, the theatre of operations would be greatly extended and the expense enormously increased.

If, then, the occupation of Fez failed to pacify the country, the occupation of the ports and the garrisoning of the more important inland towns, Mekness, Sfru, Marrakesh, Alkazar, &c., would probably be resorted to. In this there would be no sort of military difficulty, but it would be a tedious and costly business, and in the rainy season the supplying of these garrisons would be far from easy.

## 8. Available Forces.

If 40,000 men is taken as the number required for the enterprise, we are at once met with the difficulty of where these men are to come from.

In Algeria and Tunisia there are available some 54,000 troops of all arms. Of these perhaps 20,000 might be spared for operations in Morocco, but the condition of Algeria is not such as to warrant the withdrawal of a greater number of men, for it must be remembered that among the population there are some 20,000 Arabs and Berbers who have received a thorough military training, and who might very easily form the nucleus of a dangerous popular rising.

There remain 20,000 men to be drawn from other sources. Of these 10,000 could be taken from the Colonial army in France, but the ordinary conscript cannot legally be made to serve beyond the seas. A law legalizing the sending of troops abroad might be passed, but in the present state of French politics this might meet with grave opposition.

A year ago it might have been possible for France to introduce troops into Morocco under the pretence of assisting the Sultan to re-establish order. Had this measure been accompanied by a programme of reform, which included the taxing of Europeans and protected subjects, much might have been done.

It is, however, to be feared that such an opportunity will not occur again, and that France must make up her mind to undertake a serious military expedition.

Such an undertaking will be very much simplified when a railway is built to Lalla Maghnia and when the Figuig line has been extended to Tafilelt, say, in three years from the present date, but it will be difficult to postpone it for so long a time.



*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 148.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 19, 1905.*

I HAVE requested Captain Malcolm to furnish me with a Memorandum on the present position of the Pretender and the importance to the Sultan of the retention of Ujdah, as well as on the effect of the possible withdrawal on the part of the Algerian authorities of the permission granted to the Moorish Government to pass troops, arms, and ammunition through Algerian territory.

This Memorandum I have the honour to inclose herewith.

Since it was written the above-mentioned permission has actually been withdrawn by the Algerian Government.

Connected with this subject I may mention that of the 500 troops recently sent from here and reported by me in my despatch No. 122 of the 4th instant to replace the garrison at Tangier only 350 arrived, the remainder having deserted. Further, when an effort was made to collect 500 men of the garrison of Tangier, to send them to Ujdah none were forthcoming, but after many efforts on the part of the authorities 191 men were collected from the streets, and, in a condition of fear, were dispatched to Borj Saida or Anjerud to endeavour to reach Ujdah over Moorish territory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 6.

*Memorandum by Captain Malcolm respecting the Position of the Pretender and the importance of Ujdah.*

#### 1. Position of the Pretender.

FROM the Algerian border to a point some 20 miles east of Fez, and from the Mediterranean coast southwards for about 100 miles, the Pretender is supreme.

He goes about with an umbrella and assumes all other Royal prerogatives. He holds Melilla and collects customs at that port, while the tribes under him are the only ones in Morocco, which at present pay any sort of taxes.

The Riff tribes on the north have managed to maintain their semi-independence, but their sympathies are with the Pretender rather than with the Sultan. The Beni Znaten, near Ujdah, are divided into factions owing to internal feuds, and the Sultan occasionally derives a certain amount of assistance from one of these parties.

#### 2. Ujdah.

Otherwise, the only remaining vestige of the Sultan's authority in the eastern portion of Morocco is the fact that his troops still garrison the town of Ujdah. Arms, ammunition, supplies, and pay for the troops are at present sent from Tangier to Nemours by sea, and thence to Ujdah through French territory. By the courtesy of the French Government all such supplies have been hitherto allowed to enter Algeria free of duty.

The Pretender is at present encamped about 1½ hours (6 miles) west of Ujdah, and Bu Amama a little further south.

Shots are exchanged between the garrison and the enemy daily, but the fighting never assumes any serious character. The forces of the Pretender vary from 300 to 1,500 men. Fairly large detachments come in from time to time and bring food for three weeks or a month; as soon as the food is finished they leave and return after some time with fresh supplies.

#### 3. Threatened Stoppage of Supplies.

The French authorities have recently threatened to stop supplies for Ujdah passing through Algerian territory, and thereby to bring pressure to bear on the Government of Morocco.

#### 4. Possible Consequences.

The result of this action will probably be the early fall of Ujdah.

There is no real military reason why Ujdah should not hold out for a considerable time, even if no fresh supplies of arms and ammunition reach the town. Under honest administration the garrison should be able to hold out indefinitely against the contemptible efforts made by the Pretender to induce it to surrender. However, the principal reason for maintaining the defence appears to be that the senior officers in charge drive a lucrative trade in selling Government arms to the enemy, and are also able to pocket a great deal of the pay sent for the men.

Pay is usually sent several months in arrears, and during these months the strength of the detachments is greatly reduced by desertion. As the pay is sent for the full numbers believed in Fez to be present on service, the whole of the pay of the deserters goes into the pockets of the Kaïds. Should this profitable business cease, the Government officials will have no interest in maintaining the defence, and the town will fall. From a military point of view the fall of Ujdah is of no importance. It will be a blow to the prestige of the Makhzen, but as the town has already been lost once, and recovered, the effect can scarcely be great.

#### 5. Military Results.

With regard to a possible French advance, previously discussed, it merely means that the whole country from Ujdah via Taza to Fez will be under the Pretender, instead of partly under the Sultan; but the main question will be in no way modified.

Politically, the fact that all signs of the Sultan's authority had finally disappeared might give the French a reasonable excuse for an advance, should they wish to have one.

#### 6. Borj Saida.

The Makhzen is believed to have said that, if facilities for supplying Ujdah from French territory are withdrawn, they will use Borj Saida—a small place just west of the Algerian frontier, on the Wad Kiss—as a base of supply. This suggestion can scarcely be considered seriously. The road to Ujdah would be constantly harassed by the Pretender, and the tribes would have to be heavily bribed to allow convoys to pass through their territory. Even so, it is most unlikely that they would remain true to any engagements into which they might enter once they had received the promised bribe.

#### 7. Conclusions.

It therefore appears that, if the Sultan attaches much importance to the maintenance of his sovereignty at Ujdah, he must conciliate France in some way or other. It is, however, very doubtful whether he really does so.

(Signed) NEILL MALCOLM.

*Fez, June 16, 1905.*

#### No. 7.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 150. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 20, 1905.*

INFORMATION had just reached me that there had been to-day called together a meeting of the Notables to consider a proposal submitted by His Majesty to grant to the Germans a concession to improve the port of Borj-Saida on the Algerian frontier, the French port of Ajerud being on the opposite bank of the river.

The French Minister shortly afterwards came to see me, and told me that last night the Foreign Minister had sent to him and had represented that, in consequence of the withdrawal of the permission for some time accorded for the passage of men,



arms, and ammunition through Algerian territory, the situation of Ujda had become extremely critical. The Pretender had at once taken measures to close the land route for Moorish troops, &c., from Borj-Saïda to Ujda. The fall of Ujda would have most serious consequences to the Moorish Government, and would threaten the very existence of the dynasty.

To this M. Saint-René had replied that the complaint of the Moorish Government regarding the passage of arms through Algerian territory had been duly submitted to Paris, but that no reply had as yet been received. He hoped, however, from one moment to another to receive it, and for my information he added that he had suggested that the reply should be of a rather conciliatory and calming nature. M. Saint-René had added, in speaking to the Foreign Minister, that the French Government had no desire to see Ujda fall, for it would only produce further disorder on the frontier. The Foreign Minister seemed but little satisfied with this reply, but gave no hint of any action on the part of the Moorish Government.

This afternoon M. Saint-René had heard that, in order to facilitate the dispatch of troops, arms, and ammunition, the Makhzen had decided that Borj-Saïda should be opened as a commercial port.

Later on news had reached him, and this corresponded approximately with what I had heard, that a concession was about to be given to the Germans to carry out works of improvement in the port, and that the Notables had been called together, and that a plan of this nature had been submitted to them and been unanimously accepted by them.

M. Saint-René said that, while considering the news as very serious, he could not help thinking that it was opposed to the French Treaty of 1844, by which the Moorish Government was prohibited from maintaining a garrison of more than 2,000 men at Borj-Saïda, which was covered by the guns of the French fort of Ajerud. His Excellency said he would further study this Treaty, which, unfortunately, I have not at hand, but I told his Excellency that, in my personal opinion, from the facts that had reached me regarding the proposed concession, I did not think it would clash with the stipulations of the Treaty. In any case, without knowing much of the port, it was obvious that nothing could be done there in a day, and that the proposal might possibly have been put forward without the sanction of the German Government, for it involved very important considerations. I had heard vague rumours of something of this nature for a few days past, and this, I understood, had been a cherished scheme of Prince Bismarck, but when I had called M. Saint-René's attention to it, he regarded it as quite outside the range of political possibilities.

Without desiring, in the absence of means of sifting hurriedly the information at my disposal, to give any definite opinion on the subject, it appears to me as if this action on the part of the Makhzen had been taken rather with a view to pressing the French Government to give way in the matter of the facilities of arms, &c., than of pushing the proposed scheme to extremes.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 8.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 153. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Fez, June 22, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 150, Confidential, of the 20th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a rough map and some notes regarding Borj-Saïda or Ajerud, which have been compiled from information supplied by a messenger who visited the place four years ago.

To-day I had an opportunity of cross-examining a high official as to the report regarding concessions likely to be made to Germany there, and although that official at first denied all knowledge of it, I gathered no final decision had yet been taken regarding it. He however stated that facilities having been withdrawn by the Algerian Government, the situation of Ujda had become extremely precarious, and the necessity presented itself of opening the port of Borj-Saïda and garrisoning that town. He thought that by this means it would be possible to keep open communications with Ujda. The improvements of the port would for the most part be carried

out by the Moorish Government, but in those portions where the Moorish Government were incapable of doing the work, it was probable that German assistance might be invoked.

I took the opportunity, knowing that my observation would be repeated in high quarters, of warning the Moorish Government against the gravity of concessions of this nature, which might produce a dangerous precedent as other Powers would demand similar privileges.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 9.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 154.)

My Lord,

Fez, June 22, 1905.

FULLY conscious of the difficulties of forming a sound opinion in a brief space of time of a country like Morocco, yet, under the special circumstances of the case, I desire to lay before your Lordship a few observations on the general condition of the country and on the position of affairs as I found them on my arrival in Fez.

The administration of the country is completely at a standstill. There is no money, as far as one is able to judge, available, though His Majesty can probably obtain all he requires for his personal wants from the tribes that still remain faithful. But I do not believe that on the real financial condition any one can give an absolutely reliable opinion, and it is even said that the Makhzen itself does not know the true position.

According to the French forecasts on this point, the Makhzen should have absolutely come to an end of their resources in February last, and the French probably counted on the need of a fresh loan affording them a powerful hold in the negotiations for the proposed reforms. The Makhzen have only 40 per cent. of the customs dues available, the 60 per cent. going to pay interest on the French loan, and some of this 40 per cent. they are even reported to have set aside in order to pay off the next interest on the loan at once. There are, besides, the town market dues, which in Fez amount to about 7,000 to 10,000 dollars a-month, or about 1,050/ to 1,500/. Beyond this there are only the complimentary gifts. These to the Sultan himself are unimportant in amount, but to the Viziers must be substantial, especially for the sale of posts.

The real root of the deplorable financial condition of the country is the grotesque system in which the Makhzen administers its finance. One set of Umana are receivers, and one set of Umana are payers. There is no budget and no balance-sheet presented. Theoretically, the Sultan is supposed to be the supreme trustee, and Sultans have nearly always been careful of money and fond of dealing with it, but the present Sultan is strangely the reverse, and gets impatient with the subject.

There is no security of life and property anywhere. Formerly the positions of Kaïd were sold by His Majesty and a good price paid, but the Kaïd was left in undisturbed possession, and obtained some authority over his people. Now, no sooner is a Kaïd installed, than a competitor offers a higher price, the former is dismissed, and replaced by one whose authority is as insignificant as that of his predecessor. The disorganization of the Makhzen is complete, and it is almost useless to address notes to the Ministers. They probably think it labour lost to deal with such a condition of chaos, and they are callous to all circumstances. Brigandage is rampant, and what soldiers there are constantly desert as the pay is in arrears. This suits the commanders, as they draw belated pay for the number of men who are on their lists, though probably only half that number are actually serving.

A curious feature of the situation is the apparent calm with which the presence and action of the Pretender are taken. In his various approaches towards Fez, his men have usually deserted him when they got to within a couple of days of the capital. Convinced that the Pretender will never be able to take Fez, the Ministers and courtiers continue their calm life of luxury unruffled by any anxiety beyond that of acquiring plunder. The Pretender has surrounded himself with all the emblems of royalty and the paraphernalia of a Court, and in the mosques of the districts where he holds sway he has been prayed for for two years instead of the Sultan, whereas in former times the most independent tribes always prayed for the Sultan, thus recognizing him as their religious head.

This, amongst the tribes that are not strictly loyal to the Sultan, has, no doubt, to

[1566]

D



some extent shaken the Shereefian authority. In spite of this, it is a curious fact that the Sultan and his surroundings prefer that the Pretender and his supporters should continue to give them trouble rather than that they should be ousted by the interference of a foreign Power.

I have the honour to inclose a map\* showing the country under the sway of the Pretender, the country usually paying taxes, the country still nominally under the Sultan's orders, the country which never pays taxes, and the places where disorder is rife.

On my arrival I seized the first opportunity of pointing out to the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs that it would perhaps have been judicious to have waited a couple of days and to have ascertained the views of my Government, especially in view of the fact that the invitation to the Conference was hardly likely to meet with much enthusiasm on the part of the Powers most interested in Morocco. But for the moment, should the Conference fail, the Makhzen will, I imagine, be satisfied with having postponed what they consider to be the evil day for a short time, and will, perhaps, open fresh negotiations with the French later on, and thus gain further time.

I have been unable to find, in the opinions of any of the Ministers or private persons, that there is any objection to the reforms in themselves, but rather a distrust of what France will do when her power has made itself felt here.

This is born, no doubt, from the observation of French action in Algeria, and no declarations on her part alone respecting the integrity of the country will convince any Moor from His Majesty downwards. But the Makhzen and the Notables were, I understand, quite prepared to accept at any rate a part of the French programme of reform, until the arrival of the German Minister, when their attitude became uncompromising.

The general opinion among the Moors seems to be that some effort should be made to obtain from the Powers, either through the proposed Conference or by some other means, a guarantee that the integrity of the country will not be interfered with.

I have warned the Makhzen against granting under present circumstances concessions that later on might prove onerous, but reason does not play much part at present, whereas an irritation against France and a leaning towards Germany seem to be the prevailing note.

Moreover, in all their actions and arguments it is clear that Count Tattenbach has been their adviser, and I am absolutely convinced that he has assured the Makhzen that any movement here on the part of France would meet with a prompt answer on the part of Germany, even to a movement of troops on the French frontier.

But it must not be supposed that the Moorish Government has suddenly developed a complete confidence and trust in Germany, however much the Sultan, who is credited with a somewhat credulous, impetuous, and hasty nature, may at present be under the spell of the German Minister, but they cling to Germany for advice as they would equally have clung to Great Britain had she shown any inclination to waver in her support of France. This credulity and impetuosity on the part of the Sovereign, and the obsequiousness of his Court, are the main dangers at present in view of the representations that Count Tattenbach has been making.

I have thought it my duty to report the various schemes put forward—some of them quite tentatively—by Germany, but I have no reason to believe that the Moorish Government will give way in the most important proposals. It is, I think, rather the desire of Count Tattenbach to secure some small concessions and contracts, and thus be able to point to the fact that Germany has increasing interests in the country, and rather to postpone the demands of anything of the nature of territorial aggrandisement to a later date; but, at the same time, if Count Tattenbach finds the Sultan is in a very bending mood, he will no doubt take advantage of the occasion to secure something valuable.

There appeared to be a hope when I first arrived here that I should act as somewhat of an intermediary or arbiter between France, Morocco, and Germany in the destinies of the country, but I did not suppose that your Lordship would desire me to play that rôle, and I have from the first discouraged any notion of that kind, and, indeed, since the general decision regarding the proposed Conference is still in the balance, have somewhat held aloof in proffering advice, in the fear of being carried too far in the direction desired by the Sultan and his Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

\* Not printed.

No. 10.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 153.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 22, 1905.*

THE Secretary of Ben Sliman came to see me yesterday and after beating about the bush for an hour or more he, with an air of innocence, revealed the true purpose of his visit, namely to ascertain my views as to the probabilities of pourparlers between France and Germany regarding Morocco producing any definite result.

I regretted that I had no official knowledge which could help me to supply him with a reliable answer, but judging from what I had seen in the press, and taking into consideration that there was a great tendency everywhere to exhaust every possible means of conciliation and arrangement before taking more serious action, I had every reason to believe that the discussions which were now proceeding between the French Government and the German Ambassador in Paris would have a successful issue.

My answer seemed to disconcert the official, and I understand that the Government here is getting somewhat anxious on this point.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 11.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 156. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 23, 1905.*

I HAVE reported to your Lordship, by telegraph, the fact that the Moorish Government has invited the German Government, through its Minister here, to send German instructors to take charge of the garrison at the port it is proposed to open at Borj-Saïda.

In July, 1902, Ben Sliman, Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave a written undertaking to the present French Minister to the effect that no foreign instructors other than French would ever be employed in districts near the Algerian frontier. The French Minister, pending instructions, has not made any official representations to the Moorish Government with regard to this new proposal, but through his Algerian interpreter caused the Makhzen to be reminded of this engagement.

Whether the Government had forgotten it or did not dare to remind the Sultan of it is not clear, but on receipt of the message Count Tattenbach's advice was asked, and he replied that, under present circumstances, there was no necessity to regard written engagements, and that it was the stronger Power that would impose its will, and he need not remind them which was the stronger, Germany or France.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 12.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 157.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 23, 1905.*

THE last forty-eight hours have thrown a little more light upon what has really occurred regarding the decision to open the port of Borj-Saïda.

The idea appears to have emanated from the Sultan in one of those hasty and impetuous moments for which His Majesty bears a character, and as far as I am able to ascertain, the Viziers saw the difficulties that would confront them.

The scheme, however, was submitted to the Notables without any mention of any participation of Germany in the work, and the reply given by the Notables was to the effect that His Majesty well knew what was for the benefit of the country.

That same afternoon Ben Sliman sent for the German Minister, and, having propounded the scheme, asked his Excellency if Germany would assist the Moorish



Government in the construction of a harbour and in the building of suitable fortifications for the town, which is not even yet in existence.

Count Tattenbach said he would submit the matter to his Government, and later on he also consented to submit another request of the Makhzen, namely, that German instructors be sent to Borj-Saïda for the drilling of the troops there.

The Sultan's idea was obviously to set up German interests at a place between his country and Algeria, but no consideration appears to have been given to the practical obstacles in the way of the scheme apart from the political difficulties which must almost inevitably arise.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

## No. 13.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 158.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 23, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 132 of the 9th instant, in which I reported to your Lordship that I had informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs, verbally, of the decision taken by His Majesty's Government not to participate in the proposed Conference of the Powers represented at Tangier, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a letter received by me from the Sultan's Deputy, in answer to my written communication on the subject.

I have sent no reply to the communication, the object of which I have not yet been able to discover.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

## Inclosure in No. 13.

*Sid Hadj Mohammed Torres to Mr. Lowther.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

WE have received your answer of the 8th instant (12th June), concerning the answer given by your respected Government, that you be instructed to attend [*sic*] the Conference which it is intended to hold at Tangier, for the purpose which was explained to you. We note what you state.

We have to inform your Excellency that the Makhzen intends to introduce such reforms as are possible in its country by its own hand, and not by the hand of another as necessitated by the independence of the kingdom and its freedom; and the Makhzen only requested the holding of a Conference composed of those whom it should appoint and of the Representatives of the friendly Governments to discuss as to the manner of introducing these reforms, and as to sources from which the necessary expenditure will be derived, and which must be discussed with them because of the taxes their nationals will have to pay; and your respected Government, which is one of the signatories of the Madrid Convention, is not unaware that it is not possible to omit inviting any Power to attend this Conference.

As to your remark that this step was ill-advised, I have to inform your Excellency that this invitation was only issued after the opinions of the Shereefian Government, and the Notables were unanimous that it should be issued, to insure the welfare of the country and to safeguard the rights of independence.

I therefore still trust that you will attend the said Conference for the purpose of discussing the aforesaid.

May you rest, &c.  
(Signed) MOHAMMED-BEN-EL-ARBI TORRES.

17 *Rabia ii*, 1323 (June 21, 1905).

## No. 14.

*Sir E. Egerton to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 114. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Rome, June 28, 1905.*

M. TITTONI mentioned to-day that he learnt from Paris that the German answer to M. Rouvier's communication respecting Morocco had been received, and that it was conciliatory in form, but in no way abandoned the original scheme of a Conference.

It was a mistake to imagine that there had been no danger of war. Had not the attitude of the French Government been calm and such as it was, an ultimatum would have been sent by Germany, and France would have been invaded.

This was very regrettable, and blamable by public opinion, but he had no doubt that the German Government really meant to take action, and he attributed this decision to the collapse of Russia, and to no other cause.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDWIN H. EGERTON.

## No. 15.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 174. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Berlin, June 28, 1905.*

I HAD a short conversation with M. Bihourd, the French Ambassador, yesterday, and asked his Excellency whether he could give me some idea of the nature of his interviews with the Imperial Chancellor on the 23rd and 25th instant.

His Excellency replied that both the French note and the German answer were in very general terms, and that the latter maintained all the German arguments in favour of a Conference. As regards the Chancellor's remarks when handing him the German reply, his Excellency said that Prince Bülow was a fluent speaker, but that when one came to recall and note down what he had said very little came out of it. One point, however, was noticeable, namely, that during the whole of the two interviews the Imperial Chancellor had never once mentioned the name of Great Britain ("n'a pas une seule fois prononcé le nom de l'Angleterre").

With regard to the German contention that Article XVII of the Madrid Convention of 1880 assured most-favoured-nation treatment to the Signatory Powers in all respects, and not only in regard to protected persons, M. Bihourd stated that it had occurred to him that this contention could be met by the question why it was considered necessary, in that case, to introduce the most-favoured-nation clause specially in Article I of the Commercial Treaty between Germany and Morocco of the first June, 1890 (State Papers, vol. lxxxii, p. 968). I did not gather that his Excellency had used this argument in his conversation with Prince Bülow.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. B. WHITEHEAD.

## No. 16.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lister.*

(No. 437.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 3, 1905.*

THE French Ambassador told me to-day that M. Rouvier had had another interview with Prince Radolin, and had handed to him a Memorandum embodying the bases which his Excellency had described to me on the last occasion when he had spoken to me about Morocco. In conformity with his Excellency's suggestion, words had been added to the effect that amongst the French interests to be recognized by Germany were those arising out of the arrangements into which France had entered with us as to the future of Morocco. The wording of the fourth paragraph had also been amended so as to make it clear that police as well as military reforms were contemplated, and it had also been asserted distinctly that, owing to the special position of France with regard



to Morocco, she was concerned in the maintenance of order, not only in those regions which adjoined her possessions, but throughout the whole of the Shereefian territory. Prince Radolin had received the communication of these proposals without any observations.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

## No. 17.

*Foreign Office to Manchester Chamber of Commerce.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 3, 1905.*

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo on the subject of the Anglo-French Convention of the 8th April, 1904, and to state that the Board of Directors of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce appear to be under a misapprehension in supposing that an opportunity is likely to be afforded for revising that Agreement. The Declaration in question has been signed by the two Governments, and has already been put into execution, and cannot now be altered.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GORST.

## No. 18.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 159.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 23, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that I have received information of an attack having been made on the house of Oold-el-Kaid-Omar-el-Yusi, Governor of Ait Yusi, some 18 miles from Fez. The house is reported to have been razed to the ground, while the Governor is in sanctuary in Sefroo. This attack was, I am informed, instigated by a Shereef named Moulai Mehemed-es-Serghosheni, of Ait Sergoshen, a branch of the Ait Yusi tribe, who is reported to be in constant communication with Bou-Hamara, the Pretender, but who is credited with the intention of working for his own ends, should he ever hoist the flag of rebellion against the Sultan.

This information was obtained from the Head of the Shrine of Moulai Dris in this city. This personage enjoys considerable influence, due to his position as chief of the most important shrine in Morocco. He gave it as his opinion that the Makhzen is quite unable to send any force to that district to restore order, adding that a force of fifty men could with difficulty be spared in Fez at the present moment.

I merely report this incident to your Lordship in order to show the general state of anarchy obtaining in this country, and as an evidence of the inability of the Government to maintain order.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

## No. 19.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 160.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 24, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 144 of the 17th instant, on the subject of the murder of Mr. Madden at Mazagan, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a despatch on the subject received from His Majesty's Consul at Dar-al-Baida, who proceeded to Mazagan for the purpose of investigating the matter.

I shall take the earliest opportunity of communicating the substance of this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

*Inclosure in No. 19.*

*Consul Maclean to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 2. Separate.)

Sir,

*Mazagan, June 19, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge with thanks your despatch from Fez dated the 11th instant, relative to the murder of Mr. Daniel Madden.

My investigation has been as thorough as possible under the circumstances, but I find that natives and Europeans are afraid to say all they know.

General suspicion points to a gang of notoriously bad characters as being concerned in the crime.

I have examined the widow and employes of the deceased, besides many documents, but discovered nothing that gave a clue to a motive other than robbery.

It was well known that the deceased had several bags of money in his safe. It appears that many years ago Mr. Madden's house was broken into and robbed, and on that occasion pictures and curtains, &c., were torn from the walls and much wanton mischief done.

The same hand seems to have been at work in this case, and this fact leads me to suspect a bad character named Boo Ali, who suffered about seven years' imprisonment for the former robbery.

Boo Ali is an Oolad Ferj man, but was seen in the vicinity of Mr. Madden's house about the date of the murder. He belongs to a gang of notoriously bad characters who have committed many crimes and escaped punishment.

In this gang is another man named Ben-Maami, who appears to answer to the description given by the widow of one of the murderers.

Both these men have escaped to the country, and, so far, the provincial Governor has not arrested them.

Further inquiries led to information being obtained that another member of the same gang was seen close to Mr. Madden's house at about the hour of the murder. This man is named Abderahman-ben-Yusuf. He was a Portuguese semsar, but his protection has been withdrawn since the murder.

This individual is a well-known criminal, and lives in the same house as his brothers, Hadji Hamed-ben-Yusuf, a German semsar, and Abdullah-ben-Yusuf, a German mokhalat, both men with evil reputations.

Nearly all the natives are afraid of the consequences of giving information against these men.

The Notables of the town warned the Governor against attempting to arrest any of the above individuals, as they thought it might lead to a general uprising of the native population, and to bringing the Oolad Ferj tribe down upon the town.

On Friday night last the guards placed round Abderahman's house reported that he was making preparations for escape. The Governor sent out a mounted patrol under a Colonel. Some shots were fired; Abderahman was slightly, and the Colonel dangerously, wounded.

From the moment the murder was known general suspicion took the direction of this gang, and, so far, I am inclined to think that it was justified.

I am of opinion that when one or two of the men mentioned are in prison many people will come forward to give evidence.

The gang is on friendly terms with an ex-Kaid of Oolad Ferj, named Boo Ali-ben-Edris, who is still a power in his tribe, and protects refugees from justice.

One of the suspected men, named Boo Ali, is said to be actually in this man's house at present.

Boo Ali-ben-Edris is stated to be intriguing to replace the present Governor of Mazagan, and would encourage any enterprise likely to lead to the latter's removal. Boo Ali, the accused, is his brother-in-law.

The deceased father of the Ben-Yusuf family was badly treated by the deceased father of the Governor of Mazagan. All were bad characters.

The theory I have arrived at is that the knowledge of this large sum of money in Mr. Madden's house was the direct motive for the murder. Boo Ali had a double incentive, on account of his long imprisonment, and the others were glad to join in any enterprise likely to bring the Governor into trouble. They were all reckless characters, and have been accustomed to rob and murder with impunity.

The fact that more wounds were inflicted than were necessary to kill Mr. Madden I ascribe to the fear that he might recover and be able to state who the murderers were.



There was a candle burning in the room at the time.

The widow slept in an adjoining room with the door open. She heard her husband call her, and entered his room to find four men over him. She remembers that three were dressed in white and one in a black "haddon."

She pushed the latter, whose back was towards her, and he turned round and fired at her with a pistol.

The bullet entered the wall over the head of the deceased, but grains of powder penetrated the skin on the face of the widow, who then ran away and hid.

There seems to me to be no doubt that the insecurity and lawlessness which exists at present in Mazagan, and in the surrounding provinces, is primarily responsible for this murder. There is only nominal authority. The Governor, I think, is doing his best, but he seems powerless. He is not so much afraid of taking action as of its consequences. The members of the gang I have described do not hesitate to threaten him with vengeance.

It would be a great assistance to me if you would obtain from His Majesty the Sultan peremptory orders for the following provincial Kaids to search for, arrest, and send into town any individuals asked for by the Governor of Mazagan:—

1. Embark-ben-Bonshaib, Kaid of Oolad Ferj.
2. Kaid Hadj Abdallah-ben-D'hman, of Oolad Boazeez.
3. Kaid Hadj Mohammed-ben-Caddore-el-Kalally, of Oolad Boazeez.

Also for the Governor of Mazagan to act resolutely and fearlessly.

It would be useful, too, if His Majesty the Sultan sent orders for the Shereef in charge of the Mahalla in Dukalla to lend the Governor any force he may require to preserve order.

I have not been able to press the Governor to search houses on account of the general fear of an upheaval of the population and the absence of an armed force.

I have given you an imperfect report of my proceedings to date, but I have little doubt that in the end the murderers will be discovered and captured.

My endeavours to this end have been greatly hampered by the weakness of the Government and the state of the local population.

I find that the Articles of the Madrid Convention have been abused in the most extraordinary way in Mazagan. Nearly every bad character one asks to be produced is either protected himself or is associated with some foreign protégé. The Governor is much handicapped.

Information is being obtained by degrees, several arrests have been made, and the Governor begs me to have patience.

Subject to your approval, I will remain in Mazagan until the matter is clearer.

I think the Governor is aware who committed the crime, and is only waiting for orders from the Sultan to take more vigorous measures.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

P.S.—Mr. Madden's safe was under his bed and escaped the notice of the murderers.

A. M.

#### No. 20.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 4.)*

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Madrid, July 4, 1905.*

WITH reference to the possessions of Spain, I mentioned the substance of your Lordship's suggestions respecting their non-alienation to the Minister of State and the Prime Minister. I said, however, that I only wished them to think about it, and did not ask for a reply at present; and being received by the King yesterday I also mentioned the matter to His Majesty. As I should not like to keep the matter from M. Cambon, may I inform him of what I have done?

#### No. 21.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 5.)*

(No. 161.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 25, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I yesterday handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a précis, in Arabic, of Mr. Consul Maclean's despatch, of which a copy was transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch No. 160 of the 24th June.

His Excellency promised to lay the précis before His Shereefian Majesty and obtain orders to the various authorities, as requested by Mr. Maclean. At the same time he informed me that His Shereefian Majesty had instructed him to assure me again that everything possible would be done in this matter.

As regards the fear felt in Mazagan that disturbances might occur should the Governor take action against the persons suspected, his Excellency said that Commissioners sent from Fez to Mazagan to investigate and assist the local authorities were accompanied by a sufficient force of mounted men to insure the maintenance of order there, and that he expected they would reach Mazagan to-day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

#### No. 22.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lister.*

(No. 446.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 5, 1905.*

THE French Ambassador told me to-day, in strict confidence, that he had it upon excellent authority that at the time of the marriage of the Crown Prince of Germany Prince Bülow had proposed to Turkhan Pasha, the Turkish Envoy, that the Sultan should send a Minister to Morocco. Turkhan Pasha had replied that it was not the least likely that the Sultan of Morocco would receive a Turkish Minister. Prince Bülow had thereupon observed that the matter could be arranged for them without difficulty by Germany. Baron Richthofen had also approached Turkhan Pasha upon the same subject, and had added that Germany would be glad to show her goodwill towards Turkey by holding back the Italians in Tripoli.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

#### No. 23.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lister.*

(No. 447.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 6, 1905.*

I ASKED the French Ambassador to-day whether, as there seemed to be a strong probability of a Conference with regard to the affairs of Morocco, he did not think it might be as well to consider what Powers should be allowed to take part in such a Conference. The German proposal was, I understood, that all the Powers who had signed the Convention of 1880 should take part in it. The original proposal of the Sultan of Morocco, which the Germans professed to support, was, on the other hand, that the matter at issue should be referred to the Representatives of the Powers at Tangier. My impression was that Russia had not taken part in the Madrid Convention, but gave her adhesion to it subsequently. I thought we should have to consider carefully how the Conference should be composed: a numerous body of Representatives would be for many reasons most inconvenient. On the other hand we ought not to exclude those who were likely to take our view. His Excellency quite agreed, and expressed a decided opinion that Russia and the United States should take part. He thought the Conference should take place at Tangier, and should be given, so far as possible, a local character.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.



*Foreign Office to Native Races and the Liquor Traffic United Committee.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 6, 1905.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 9th ultimo, respecting the importation of liquor into Morocco, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you that a despatch has been received from Mr. Lowther, His Majesty's Minister in Morocco, in regard to the suggestions contained in your letter of the 30th May last.

Mr. Lowther has consulted with the French Minister on the subject, and they are agreed that the present is not a favourable moment for approaching the Moorish Government in the direction suggested by your Committee. Mr. Lowther thinks that your Committee will doubtless concur that a representation of the nature proposed would be more likely to be efficacious if it were postponed until some approach to order has been arrived at in Morocco. No effective control appears to be possible under the present management of the custom-houses, and any measures for regulating the introduction of liquor would inevitably meet with the same disregard as is paid to regulations prohibiting the introduction of arms and ammunition.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) E. GORST.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Fez, July 3, 1905.*

YOUR telegram No. 40 of the 28th ultimo.

M. Saint-René Taillandier is without information with reference to his leaving Fez; a messenger, bearing instructions, is expected to arrive here on about the 9th or 10th.

Should a Conference be agreed upon, the French Minister and I are of opinion that the Makhzen will look upon our withdrawal in the light of a retreat, but if the instructions which he is awaiting sanction the delivery by him to the Makhzen of a decided statement of the views of the French Government, M. Saint-René Taillandier considers that there would be no reason against our departure.

I expect Count von Tattenbach will endeavour to insist upon being the last to leave. Since I was the last to reach Fez, he should leave before me. An Agreement to this effect might possibly be arrived at in Europe.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Madrid, July 7, 1905.*

I WAS confidentially begged by the Minister of State to ascertain, if it were possible, the subjects which will be submitted to the Conference for discussion, as an understanding in regard to this matter with His Majesty's Government was desired by the Spanish Government. I replied that as soon as the discussions with Berlin were terminated full communications would presumably be made from Paris; but he asked me to communicate with your Lordship on the matter, although I told him that I doubted if the Conference would be held before the autumn.

The Spanish Government are nervous, as I can see, that they should not be accorded an opportunity until matters are practically decided between Great Britain, France, and Germany of expressing their views; and if I could convey some message to reassure them from your Lordship it might be well.

I was asked by his Excellency not to mention his having spoken to me on this subject to any of my colleagues.

*Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 9.)*

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, July 9, 1905.*

FOLLOWING communiqué was made to press late last night:—

"Le Prince de Radolin a été reçu aujourd'hui à 6 heures par M. Rouvier. Le Président du Conseil et l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne se sont entendus définitivement sur la rédaction des communications à échanger entre les deux Gouvernements. Les communications seront portées probablement à la connaissance du Parlement dès Lundi. Elles sanctionnent un accord de vues sur les questions Marocaines qui, sauvegardant les intérêts de la France, a amené son adhésion à la Conférence."



## No. 27.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 162.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 26, 1905.*

COUNT TATTENBACH yesterday informed the Sultan that all the Powers had now practically decided to attend the Conference, at which His Majesty expressed himself as well pleased.

His Majesty's present idea of the probable action of the Conference is somewhat as follows:—

The Conference, after considerable discussion, will decide that such and such reforms are to be introduced by His Majesty and that the financial question being the principal one, the Powers will also undertake that all their subjects and all the Moorish subjects under foreign protection shall pay taxes. The Moorish Government is to be protected from the aggression of any one Power by a guarantee on the part of some of the Powers represented at the Conference. What benefit the guaranteeing Powers are to obtain for their liability does not enter into His Majesty's calculation, nor is there any stipulation to be made in the event of His Majesty not carrying out the reforms which will be proposed by the Conference.

My informant, who told me of these views of the Sultan, said His Majesty did not seem very clear as to how the payment of the taxes would be enforced, as none of the tribes would, under present circumstances, pay; but seemed to think that His Majesty contemplated the building up of a military force under the supervision of different Powers, His Majesty being as unwilling to be controlled in this one branch by one Power as much as he is in all matters of reform.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

## No. 28.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 163. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 26, 1905.*

IN the course of conversation to-day with the French Minister, I mentioned that it had reached my ears that some of his staff in Tangier were supporting the foolish theory put forward by some German newspapers that the prompt reply given by Great Britain to the Moorish Government to the invitation to the Conference was causing the French Government considerable embarrassment. I added that I would not have mentioned the fact had I not got it from a fairly reliable source, and I trusted that such language did not correspond with his views or meet with his approval. His Excellency replied that he felt absolutely convinced that there must be a mistake; it could not be possible that any of his staff could put forward such an "idiotic" theory.

When I had announced to him on the 9th instant that I had verbally communicated your Lordship's reply to the Moorish Government, he had been delighted, thinking that it would materially strengthen his position, and when I had suggested that it would perhaps be advisable for me to postpone my written reply until the French answer had been received, he had begged me not to do so unless I saw any special advantage in it. M. Delcassé's resignation had altered for the moment the situation, but the attitude of the British Government and its Representative here had certainly not caused any embarrassment to the French Government.

His Excellency added that he was very anxious about the position. If the German interpretation of Article XVII of the Madrid Convention were accepted, which he regarded as practically impossible, not only Germany but all the other Signatory Powers of the Madrid Convention would come forward with pretensions of their own, and the contemplated Arrangement with Germany would have to be extended to all the other Powers, and thus create an impossible situation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.



No. 29.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 164.)

My Lord,

Fez, June 28, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch I have received from Mr. Consul Maclean, inclosing a letter addressed by the British residents of Mazagan to the British Vice-Consul, complaining of the insecurity of life and property in that port; and Mr. Maclean adds that they begged him to represent the advisability of a ship of war being sent to Mazagan, not as a menace, but as a demonstration that the security of British subjects was a matter of interest to His Majesty's Government.

The picture drawn by the signatories of the letter and Mr. Maclean is a very sad one, but one which I fear at this moment applies to the majority of towns in Morocco.

I have called the attention of the Moorish Government to the general condition of insecurity, and a similar representation has already been made by some of my colleagues, but without result.

With regard to the dispatch of a ship of war to make a demonstration, I venture to submit, with all deference, my opinion that no useful purpose would be gained thereby. The tactics generally employed at Mazagan appear to be that the malefactors come in bands from the neighbourhood, commit their murders and thefts, and return to the country, the authority of the Local Government and the force at its command being insufficient to check these depredations.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

*Consul Maclean to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 71.)

Sir,

Mazagan, June 23, 1905.

THE inclosed letter was handed to Mr. Vice-Consul Spinney before my arrival here.

It is from the British residents in Mazagan, who complain of the general insecurity to life and property.

The gentlemen who signed the letter came to see me on the 20th instant at this Vice-Consulate. There is no doubt that the whole of the population, native and European, have been much scared by the murder of Mr. Madden.

The occurrence has brought home to them the fact that each household depended upon itself for safety to life and property.

There appear to exist several gangs of bad characters who terrorize the rest of the community. Serious and petty crimes are committed, and the offenders are not punished.

The Governor is handicapped because the alleged ringleaders of these gangs are under foreign protection. The evil characters from the surrounding tribes come to the houses of these men, and they escape back to the country. There is no authority over the tribes.

The British residents have become slightly reassured since my arrival here, but it is only because they observe that the Governor and officials are being persuaded to make some show of energy.

They begged me to represent to you their view of the present situation, and they prayed that a British war-ship might visit this port, not as a menace, but as a demonstration that their security was of interest to their own Government.

I replied that I would submit their views to you.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

*Mazagan Merchants to Vice-Consul Spinney.*

Mazagan, June 10, 1905.

Sir,

THE undersigned British merchants, traders, and residents in Mazagan, being alarmed at the brutal murder of the late Mr. Madden and at the general state of insecurity of life and property in this town and neighbourhood, beg respectfully to lay before you their views on the situation, asking you to be good enough to transmit the same to the proper quarter.

In the first place we are convinced that the steps you are now taking, if followed up by bringing pressure to bear on the Local Government, will lead to the arrest and condign punishment of the real criminals. It is more as to the necessity for endeavouring to prevent a repetition of such crimes that we have the honour to address you, this being a matter which concerns every individual in the community. The experience of some of the signatories to this letter extends back to considerably over twenty years in this town, and never before in their recollection, nor in that of those who preceded them, has there been such a state of semi-anarchy, involving danger to life and property. Murder succeeds murder, robbery is almost of nightly occurrence, the real culprits escaping punishment, innocent persons being often incarcerated simply as scapegoats, no efficient check on crime being imposed by the authorities.

It is well known to everybody that an organized band of thieves has been formed in the suburbs of the town, composed partly of residents, and reinforced on occasion by similar characters from the country, who are thoroughly well armed, and who show plainly that they are prepared to commit murder even when no opposition is offered to their nefarious work.

Owing to the increase of population the house accommodation in the town has been taken up, and British subjects as well as others have provided for themselves residences outside, which have now become more or less unsafe unless a larger measure of protection is afforded by the Government.

The service of guards is at present of little use and requires reorganization. Guards are often sent by the Governor either without arms or with rifles without cartridges.

In civil matters in which British subjects are concerned it is almost impossible to obtain a decision from the Cadi; he will tell you verbally that your claim is just, but that he is vetoed by the Governor.

Our present Kaïd is a weak, nerveless man, afraid of the above-mentioned gang, thoroughly venal, and guided in all he does by bad counsellors who simply serve their own interests.

We are strongly of opinion that the proper remedy for the grievances complained of is the appointment of a man of good repute as Governor.

With a firm man to rule the town the present disorder would cease, particularly if he had influence with the neighbouring Kabilas of Dukala, as was the case in the time of Kaïd Benandonia.

We are, &amp;c.

(Here follow 31 signatures.)

No. 30.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 165.)

My Lord,

Fez, June 28, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 161 of the 25th June, I have the honour to inclose a copy of a further report by Mr. Maclean on the investigation into the murder of Mr. Madden.

It reveals a dreadful state of affairs, but the Governor appears to be doing all that lies in his power.

At the same time, I have been informed by the Moorish Government that they have received news from the Governor that the suspected persons in the town have been arrested, with the exception of one Yusfi, who has taken refuge in the house of his brothers, a German semsar and a German mokhalat. When an attempt was made



to arrest him at their house, they refused to give him up, and, after a heated discussion, shots were fired, the Khalifa of the Kaïd-el-Meea being dangerously wounded.

I asked the German Minister if he would give instructions to his Vice-Consul at Mazagan to allow the suspected man to be removed from the house of the German-protected subjects, and this his Excellency consented to do, provided Ben Sliman made a request to this effect in writing. This I have asked the latter to do.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 30.

*Consul Maclean to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 3. Separate.)

Sir,

*Mazagan, June 23, 1905.*

THE local Oomana confirm my view that the Governor is aware who murdered Mr. Madden.

Yesterday his Excellency again repeated to me that the crime was instigated by those who desire his removal, and the thieves, murderers, and Governors are so mixed up, and are even identical, it seems to me that he might be right.

I reminded the Governor that more than a fortnight had elapsed since the crime, and most of the individuals suspected were still at large, and it would be necessary for me to report to you that we were not making satisfactory progress.

The Governor recapitulated all that he had done, and the amount of money from his own pocket he had expended to obtain clues and to secure the persons of those suspected.

He begged me to have patience for a few days more, as he had news that a Kaïd Erha, with letters from the Makhzen, was on his way from Fez. On his arrival everything would be made clear to me, and all the suspected people would be seized.

His Excellency's position is so seriously threatened that it seems reasonable to believe in his sincerity. I am of opinion that to act energetically he requires the authority and support of the Makhzen. The Governors in the country do not respond to his repeated requests for suspected individuals whom he names to be sent in to town. They are unable or unwilling to conform with his requests.

I think there are some grounds for complaint against the Fez Government, as the Governor and officials here have not yet received a word on the subject of the crime from the Court, although your representations were made as long ago as the 11th instant. You will judge if such a delay is excusable.

I do not know if the Governor is rightly informed about the Kaïd Erha being on his way from Fez, but I am sure it is necessary that some able native official with no friends and enemies in Mazagan should be charged with the mission to inquire into and clear up this case, and to secure the persons of criminals. It is not a difficult task, as, although anarchy has destroyed authority, money is still powerful.

With reference to my Separate despatch No. 2, it is stated by the Italian Consular Agent that on the day after the murder Mrs. Madden informed him that when she expostulated with the assassins one of them replied to the effect that they had come for the purpose of murdering her husband. Yet Mrs. Madden informed me on her oath that not a word was spoken to her. It is always possible that there is something behind which has not been disclosed. The point is not of great importance; its only value is that if what is hidden were disclosed it might give a clue to the motive which instigated the crime.

There is some mystery about a document—a security for an old debt due to Mr. Madden from the father of the Ben Yusuf family. The liability upon it has been discharged, with the exception of the trifling sum of 15 dollars, but the security was still for the whole sum. The current theory is that Mr. Madden may have attempted to squeeze the Ben Yusuf heirs, and thus attracted their enmity. A second theory is that the Governor, who called on Mr. Madden a few days previous to the murder, may have tried to buy this paper, and hold it over the heads of his enemies, the Ben Yusufs, and that the latter, getting news of this, tried to secure the paper, or wreak vengeance on Mr. Madden for parting with it.

I sounded the Governor, but he denies that he ever spoke on the subject, and the widow, who was present during the Governor's visit to her husband, corroborates his denial.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

No. 30<sup>o</sup>.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 126. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Madrid, June 29, 1905.*

I HAVE had opportunities of some conversations with Señor Montero Rios and Señor Sanchez Roman, respectively President of the Council and Minister of State, in regard to the future line of policy of the new Spanish Government, and they both assured me that the Government would loyally observe the engagements which preceding Governments had undertaken, and that their desire was to live on good and friendly terms with all Powers. They both stated, in practically identical terms, that, while scrupulously observing the above-mentioned engagements, Spain, as they expressed it, had not "abnegated her personality," and was free to take any course in matters outside the Franco-Spanish Agreement as might be dictated by her interests. Señor Sanchez Roman expanded the above somewhat quaint phrase by intimating that Spain did not desire to act as a satellite of France in all matters.

Both Señor Montero Rios and Señor Sanchez Roman reiterated more than once that the chief aim of their foreign policy was to be on specially intimate terms with Great Britain, and to strengthen as far as possible the good understanding at present existing. The latter gentleman said that he wished the relations could become "fraternal" and perfectly frank and loyal; but he begged that this desire, which was shared to the full by his Sovereign and the Prime Minister, should be considered as communicated confidentially.

I reciprocated the friendly feelings they evinced, and inquired whether they had been placed in possession of the substance of an informal conversation which your Lordship had held with M. de Villa Urrutia in London. Neither of them had cognizance of it, and I therefore sketched in broad outline the tenour of your Lordship's remarks. I told both the President of the Council and the Minister of State that I made the communication in strict confidence, and with no desire that they should give me an immediate reply. On the contrary, I wished merely to acquaint them with the suggestion which had occurred to your Lordship, and which doubtless they would desire to take into consideration and reflect upon. It was, I remarked, a proposal which might be seriously treated later, and which was, I submitted, of mutual advantage to both parties. I asked for no expression of opinion at present.

It seemed to me advisable to prepare the ground at this early date, as it will be a proof of the sincerity of our friendly disposition towards Spain, and also be evidence of the importance we attach to Spain maintaining intact the possessions she holds outside of the peninsula. I venture to think that this is a point which should not be neglected in present circumstances. Both Ministers appeared to receive the suggestion in a friendly spirit, but agreed that it was a question which required consideration, and which could be discussed when a solution had been found to more pressing questions.

Señor Sanchez Roman asked whether I did not consider that the proposed Conference on Morocco, if it were held, would not be a mere form. I told his Excellency that, in my personal opinion, little practical result so far as regards an improvement in the condition of Morocco was likely to ensue from an International Assembly. The Sultan was penniless and powerless, and the tribes exceedingly turbulent and independent of authority. An International Assembly could, perhaps, formulate several admirable proposals for re-establishing order and introducing security for life and property, but I did not quite see in what manner or by what means these proposals were to be carried into execution. It would, however, be advisable to await the result of the negotiations between France and Germany.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.



*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 127. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Madrid, July 1, 1905.*

M. CAMBON, the French Ambassador, returned here yesterday from Paris, and informed me last night that he had had an interview with the new Minister of State, Señor Sanchez Roman, during which the conversation naturally turned to Morocco and to the attitude of Spain in connection with that question.

M. Cambon told me that he had considerable difficulty in comprehending all his Excellency said, owing to the somewhat superficial acquaintance which the latter has with the French language; but that he gathered generally that the Spanish Government would adhere to the engagements to which they were bound under the Franco-Spanish Agreement. M. Cambon stated to me that, although the language of Señor Sanchez Roman was satisfactory, so far as it went, on this point, he was under the impression that his Excellency was disinclined to go beyond the strict letter of the Agreement, and that the cordiality of fulfilling the engagements and in acting frankly in accord was not so marked as was the case with his Excellency's immediate predecessor. Señor Sanchez Roman had employed to M. Cambon the same phrase which he had used in his conversation with me to the effect that Spain would not "abnegate her personality," and he understood this to mean that the new Government considered that they had perfect liberty of action in all matters lying outside the strict limits of the Franco-Spanish Agreement. Señor Sanchez Roman, M. Cambon added, had casually mentioned that he had had daily interviews with the German Ambassador, and on being asked to communicate generally the subjects which had been discussed at these interviews, his Excellency had replied that he considered it would be advisable not to mention to one Representative what passed between him and another Representative.

M. Cambon, I could see, was not satisfied with the result of his first interview, and was a little perplexed by the caution and reserve observed by the Minister of State.

I told M. Cambon that the disinclination on the part of Señor Sanchez Roman to be expansive as to what passed between him and the German Ambassador was, in a sense, a good sign, as it showed he was anxious to be discreet and reserved. I added that I had received assurances both from Señor Montero Rios and from the Minister of State that they would loyally act in concert with us, and as they had only recently taken office at a delicate juncture, I thought we should, in any case for the present, remain satisfied with these assurances.

As I had been requested by both the above gentlemen not to mention their desire to be on specially intimate terms with Great Britain, I said nothing in regard to that point. As to what was passing between the German Ambassador and the Spanish Government I said I had no information, and did not propose to inquire. I think it would be undesirable to exhibit the least anxiety on the subject, as I have no reason to fear that either King Alfonso or his Government will be led into any course which may be embarrassing, or which may seriously affect the relations of Spain with France or Great Britain. At the same time I told M. Cambon that I understood that the general opinion in Madrid was that Germany had recently scored a diplomatic success, and I doubted not that the German Ambassador would not be disposed to endeavour to modify that opinion.

I would venture to remark that I think that the general feeling among political circles and the Press in Spain might at this moment be summarized as follows:—That there is a disinclination to blindly follow France in questions of an international character, and that Spain should exercise independence in her treatment of foreign affairs; that though the Franco-Spanish Agreement in regard to Morocco is not universally approved, it is considered obligatory to faithfully observe its provisions; and that there is a strong and general desire to remain on the best possible and most intimate terms with Great Britain.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 128.)

My Lord,

*Madrid, July 4, 1905.*

I HAD the honour of a private audience of the King of Spain yesterday, and in the course of conversation His Majesty said that he had heard that the Conference in regard to the Morocco question was to be held at Madrid.

I told His Majesty that I had received no information on the subject, and that I doubted if the locality of the Conference, supposing that it was held, has as yet been settled. I added that if a Conference were to take place, I hoped that Spain would act in accord with Great Britain and France. His Majesty replied that his earnest desire was to act strictly in accord with Great Britain; and added, with a smile, that he hoped we should be able to secure some practical concession to Spain. He continued by saying he was at a loss to understand what object the German Emperor had really in view, as he could not believe that German interests in Morocco were the sole objects of solicitude. His Majesty asked what line we had adopted in respect to the negotiations between France and Germany? I said I understood that our line had been a perfectly frank and clear one; and that we desired to loyally abide by our engagements with France, and to act in accordance with her wishes.

His Majesty said he hoped that a very clear and intimate understanding would be established between Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal, as it was to the interests of both of the latter countries to be able to rely on the trustworthy support of Great Britain. I ventured to express my entire concurrence with these views.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1905.*

MOROCCO Conference. Your telegram No. 50 of yesterday.

Up to the present no list of subjects has been put forward by either France or Germany, although these two Powers have discussed certain reservations necessitated by the position of the former as the immediate neighbour of Morocco. We shall be careful in the future to avoid committing ourselves without previously consulting Spain.

You will remember that the proposal that Conference should discuss reforms of local administration and manner of providing for their cost, originally made by the Sultan, has the support of Germany.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 9.)*

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Madrid, July 9, 1905.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 49, the substance of which I communicated to Minister of State, I was requested by his Excellency to convey the best thanks of the Spanish Government, and also to say that they would not, without first consulting His Majesty's Government, commit themselves.

The Under-Secretary of State said, on my subsequently speaking to him on the subject, that, as he told me confidentially, the Spanish Government were inclined to interpret in the most limited sense possible the Franco-Spanish Agreement, owing to their fear lest they might in any way indispose German feeling; he was therefore glad to hear of the interchange of assurances. Neither the Minister for Foreign Affairs nor



the Prime Minister, in fact, approved of the Agreement personally; they felt, however, bound to observe it, and he thought consequently that a continued interchange of views was most desirable between Great Britain and Spain as well as a cordial and frank understanding between the two countries.

## No. 35.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 166.)

My Lord,

*Fez, June 28, 1905.*

I ASKED the German Minister to-day whether he had any news as to the negotiations which were reported to be proceeding between Paris and Berlin, but his Excellency said he was not kept informed of these negotiations. For his part, he could not believe that they would have any result.

If an arrangement was made between France and Germany as to a limitation of the discussions in the proposed Conference, every other Power might likewise claim to insist upon a similar limitation, and he felt very strongly that such arrangements could not be made behind the back of the Sultan.

After explaining to me again the position of Germany in the matter in much the same terms as he had used in my conversation with him at Tangier, as reported in my despatch No. 78 of the 28th April, but in more forcible and uncompromising language, he gave me clearly to understand that what he desired the Conference should do would be to bring about an amendment of the Anglo-French Convention of the 8th April, 1904.

His Excellency said that Germany had no intention of allowing France to assume a Protectorate over this country in any shape or form.

The Declaration of the Government of France contained in Article II, to the effect that "it had no intention of altering the political status of the country," might have held good on the 8th April, 1904, but had no binding effect on the following day.

Germany was being excluded from the different parts of the world by preferential tariffs, and she desired a field for her activity here.

Turning to the matter of reforms, his Excellency said that he was convinced that the Sultan earnestly desired them. The Sultan would not, of course, under the altered condition of our relations with His Majesty, speak to me as openly as he did to him, but he had acquired the conviction that His Majesty was most anxious to introduce these reforms, and was only prevented from doing so by the fact that the number of foreign-protected subjects was so great that His Majesty could not possibly exact taxation from the few who were not under some foreign protection. The system of protection, Count Tattenbach said, had been fearfully abused. The Germans themselves had, of course, held strictly to the Convention of 1880, and had, consequently, lost much influence in the country, but by the system foreign Governments had directly obstructed all reforms.

I told Count Tattenbach that I was convinced that no Power desired to encourage this irregular protection, and would be quite prepared to see all taxed alike; but they must have some guarantee that these taxes were applied to the purposes for which they were said to be levied, and as long as the Sultan and his Government had the complete and unfettered control of the money, it would inevitably be squandered. That reforms in this country could ever come from within was a proposition that I regarded with much misgiving. If he had, as he said, a strong conviction that this could be done, I was equally convinced to the contrary. It was self-evident that the remnant of the army was completely out of control, and the people having now got accustomed to the non-payment of taxes, payment would eventually have to be exacted by force; but for this a previous reorganization of the army would be required, and this was one of the reforms to which the Sultan had shown the greatest opposition.

Various other points were discussed between us, and it was evident that Count Tattenbach's idea was that the proposals to be put forward at the Conference would include distinct understandings regarding the integrity of the Sultan and his kingdom, and an international control of all the administration of the country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

## No. 36.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 130.)

My Lord,

*Madrid, July 7, 1905.*

THE Minister of State requested me to come and see him yesterday, and said that he had been desired by the Prime Minister to speak to me on a matter which was causing some perplexity to the Spanish Government.

They had gathered, he said, that it had been practically decided that a Conference should be held in regard to the Morocco question, but they had no information as to what would be the nature and scope of the questions which would be submitted to the Conference. The Spanish Government, as he had previously intimated to me, were desirous of scrupulously observing the engagements which they had undertaken, but they did not wish either to assent to, or to take part in, a Conference without previously being placed in full possession of the matters with which it was proposed to deal at that assembly. Spain, he said, did not feel disposed to subscribe blindly to arrangements which might have been made between two other Powers, and she desired, while loyally upholding her engagements, to preserve an independent voice in all matters affecting Morocco. He desired, therefore, confidentially to inquire of me whether I could give him some enlightenment as to what subjects were to be submitted to the Conference, as the Spanish Government wished previously to consult with His Majesty's Government as to the course to be pursued. He begged me not to mention to my French or other colleagues that he had spoken to me on the subject.

I told Señor Sanchez Roman, while thanking him for his frank and friendly statement, that I presumed, when the pending negotiations between Paris and Berlin had been concluded, that full communications would be made to other Powers, and, as I doubted if the Conference would meet before the autumn, there would be ample time for an interchange of views. Beyond the fact that I understood that the negotiations were approaching a conclusion, I was afraid that I had no specific information to give him, but I would, if he so desired, communicate with your Lordship.

Señor Sanchez Roman said that he would be most grateful if I would do so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

## No. 37.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 10.)*

[Sent from Tangier, July 10, 1905.]

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Fez, July 6, 1905.*

THE dispatch of a special Mission to Berlin is, I am told, being considered by His Shereefian Majesty.

If possible, a promise in writing will be procured that the Emperor William will prevent any violation of the independence of Morocco; that Germany will accept nothing in exchange for modification of her situation in Morocco, nor will she make Moroccan affairs a subject of barter with other nations.

Having settled these items, Morocco will always consider Germany as her guardian and her friend. Notwithstanding, she will not put herself under German protection.

This had not come to the knowledge of M. de Saint-René Taillandier, nevertheless he considered it to be most probable.

In spite of the fact that, owing to the probable opposition thereto on the part of Count von Tattenbach, it is improbable that such a Mission will be dispatched; it affords, however, striking evidence of the Sultan's uneasiness.



## No. 38.

*Sir F. Bertie to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, July 10, 1905.

THE Chamber received the Ministerial statement on the subject of Morocco coldly.

The House, which seems to resent France having been obliged to agree to the Conference, awaits further and fuller information regarding M. Rouvier's policy, and what it may entail, before expressing approval.

## No. 39.

*Papers communicated by the French Ambassador, July 11, 1905.*

*M. Rouvier, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à son Altesse Sérénissime le Prince Radolin, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris.*

LE Gouvernement de la République s'est convaincu par les conversations qui ont eu lieu entre les Représentants des deux pays tant à Paris qu'à Berlin, que le Gouvernement Impérial ne poursuivrait, à la Conférence proposée par le Sultan du Maroc, aucun but qui compromet les légitimes intérêts de la France dans ce pays, ou qui fût contraire aux droits de la France résultant de ses Traités ou Arrangements et en harmonie avec les principes suivants :—

Souveraineté et indépendance du Sultan ;

Intégrité de son Empire ;

Liberté économique, sans aucune inégalité ;

Utilité de réformes de police et de réformes financières dont l'introduction serait réglée, pour une courte durée, par voie d'accord international ;

Reconnaissance de la situation faite à la France au Maroc par la contiguïté, sur une vaste étendue, de l'Algérie et de l'Empire Chérifien, et par les relations particulières qui en résultent entre les deux pays limitrophes, ainsi que par l'intérêt spécial qui s'ensuit pour la France à ce que l'ordre règne dans l'Empire Chérifien.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement de la République laisse tomber ses objections premières contre la Conférence et accepte de s'y rendre.

Paris, le 8 Juillet, 1905.

*Le Prince Radolin, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris, à M. Rouvier, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.*

Le Gouvernement de la République acceptant de se rendre à la Conférence proposée par le Sultan du Maroc, le Gouvernement Impérial m'a chargé de vous confirmer ses déclarations verbales, aux termes desquelles il ne poursuivra à la Conférence aucun but qui compromette les légitimes intérêts de la France au Maroc, ou qui soit contraire aux droits de la France résultant de ses Traités ou Arrangements et en harmonie avec les principes suivants :—

Souveraineté et indépendance du Sultan ;

Intégrité de son Empire ;

Liberté économique sans aucune inégalité ;

Utilité de réformes de police et de réformes financières dont l'introduction serait réglée pour une courte durée par voie d'accord international ;

Reconnaissance de la situation faite à la France au Maroc par la contiguïté, sur une vaste étendue, de l'Algérie et de l'Empire Chérifien, par les relations particulières qui en résultent entre les deux pays limitrophes, ainsi que par l'intérêt spécial qui s'ensuit pour la France à ce que l'ordre règne dans l'Empire Chérifien.

Paris, le 8 Juillet, 1905.

## Déclaration.

Le Gouvernement de la République et le Gouvernement Allemand conviennent :

1. De rappeler à Tanger simultanément leurs Missions actuellement à Fez, aussitôt que la Conférence se sera réunie ;

2. De faire donner au Sultan du Maroc des conseils par leurs Représentants, d'un commun accord, en vue de la fixation du programme qu'il proposera à la Conférence sur les bases indiquées dans les lettres échangées sous la date du 8 Juillet, 1905, entre le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, et l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris.

Fait à Paris, le 8 Juillet, 1905.

(Signé) ROUVIER.  
RADOLIN.

## No. 40.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Madrid, July 11, 1905.

PROPOSED Conference on Morocco.

Correspondence between French Government and German Ambassador will be communicated to Spanish Government to-day by M. Cambon under instructions from his Government.

I anticipate an inquiry from the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the views taken by His Majesty's Government of the Conference being arranged between the French and German Representatives at Fez and the Sultan ; also as to whether His Majesty's Government proposes now to accept Conference in principle and to reply to that effect to the German note, reserving the details of the programme for future consideration.

An article published to-day in the journal which is supposed to reflect official views intimates that the matter is being settled without reference to Spain or Great Britain, both being disregarded, and favours an understanding with Great Britain. This, I think, represents fairly well the view of this Government.

## No. 41.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 11.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, July 11, 1905.

M. DE BUISSERET tells me that the Belgian Government have forwarded their acceptance of His Shereefian Majesty's invitation to participate in the Conference.

To-morrow a reply to this effect will be handed to Sid Torres at Tangier.

## No. 42.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 459 A.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 11, 1905.

THE French Ambassador informed me to-day that the French and German Governments had come to an agreement as to the bases on which a Conference for the discussion of the question of reforms in Morocco might be held in compliance with the invitation issued some time ago to that effect by the Sultan. His Excellency left with me three documents, of which copies are attached to this despatch,\* containing the text of the correspondence exchanged between the two Governments.

The urgent necessity of the reform of the administration has long been apparent. The domestic condition of the country has for many years past been such as to

\* See No. 39.



threaten on the one hand the stability of the Sultan's Government and, on the other, the interests of all foreigners having business relations with the country. Life and property are insecure, even in the immediate neighbourhood of Tangier, and the resources of the State have been dispersed in fruitless efforts to put down an insurrection mainly due to long-continued misgovernment. Within the last few weeks a British subject holding the office of Vice-Consul for two European Powers has been brutally murdered on the outskirts of a Moorish city.

It is therefore clearly to the advantage of all countries interested in the welfare and prosperity of North-West Africa that this state of affairs should be improved. When, however, the idea of a Conference was first proposed, His Majesty's Government had grave doubts whether this method of procedure would be the best calculated to achieve the object in view. The proceedings of a Conference are necessarily of a somewhat dilatory character, and, in this case, it seemed to His Majesty's Government that they would be rendered more so by the participation of a number of Powers, a large proportion of whom have no interests of importance in Morocco. His Majesty's Government had, moreover, recognized that for geographical reasons France, as the Power whose dominions were conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, was in a position of peculiar advantage for furthering the necessary reforms, and although they were fully prepared to admit that the work of amelioration thus undertaken should be carried out in such a manner as to involve no injustice to others, they were strongly of opinion that no Power was better qualified for this important task. Nor would the assumption of this rôle have involved any denial of the rights of other Powers. It was, indeed, distinctly set forth in the Anglo-French Declaration that there was no intention of altering the political status of Morocco, and that the two Governments were equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco.

Any rights which other countries may have to most-favoured-nation treatment in Morocco would not, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, preclude the possibility of a privileged position being in certain respects accorded to France in her dealings with the Moorish Government. Most-favoured-nation treatment is variously interpreted in different countries. But no Power has, I believe, ever contended that the obligation to give such treatment debar one country from invoking the assistance of another in improving its domestic administration, and it is obvious that such assistance can be most conveniently and effectually given when the Power which affords it is the immediate neighbour of that which receives it, nor was there any desire or intention on the part of France to deprive other Powers of the rights and privileges to which they were justly entitled under Treaty.

The preliminary explanations which have taken place as to the scope and object of the Conference have gone far towards removing the original objections which His Majesty's Government felt to the proposal. There is now a reasonable hope that its deliberations may lead to useful results, and the Moorish Government have accordingly been informed that His Majesty's Government are willing to accept in principle the proposal to participate in it upon the understanding that they are consulted as to the subjects which are to come under discussion, and as to the time and place of meeting, and that a satisfactory settlement of these points is attained.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSLOWNE.

No. 43.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 167.)

My Lord,

Fez, June 30, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 157 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to inclose copy of some notes made by Captain Malcolm, D.S.O., of a conversation he has had with the Chief of the French military Mission on the subject of Borj Saida and the possibilities of constructing a port there.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 43.

*Notes by Captain Malcolm on Borj Saida, from a Conversation with Commandant Farian, who was there on a Visit of Inspection some years ago.*

BORJ SAIDA is separated from the French Settlement of Port Say by the Wad Kiss, a quite unimportant stream, which can be forded without any difficulty except after very heavy rain.

The place has no natural advantages, and could not be made into a commercial or naval port without very great expense. A small steamer from Oran, of about 200 tons, used to call occasionally to take in a cargo of grain, but had to anchor about 100 metres from the shore. A vessel of 1,000 tons would probably have to anchor 400 to 500 metres out. There is no shelter of any kind, and in bad weather ships simply have to leave.

A range of hills, some 200 metres in height, runs parallel to the sea-shore. Between the sea and the hills is an open plain, about 500 metres in breadth, and in this plain, 100 metres west of the Wad Kiss, is the Moorish fort. This fort is merely a square inclosure, about 150 metres square, with crenelated walls, containing a few houses for the Kaïds of the garrison.

The French have built a small post on the hills east of the river, which completely dominates the Moorish fort. The garrison usually consists of twenty or twenty-five spahis, whose duty is to protect traders and to maintain order. The numbers may have been increased recently, owing to the disturbed condition of the country.

It will be observed that the above information agrees with that recently obtained by Mr. Macleod.

No. 44.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 169.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 2, 1905.

A REPORT has reached me that the Sultan has quite recently made overtures to Bu Amama with a view to enlisting his assistance against the Pretender and eventually capturing him.

As your Lordship is aware, Bu Amama has until now thrown in his lot with the Pretender. He at present controls a large number of tribes round the Ulad Sidi Sheikh Gharba district on the Algerian frontier.

To the proposal he has replied that he will lend his assistance to His Majesty on condition that he be placed under the protection of some foreign Power, and that that Power should not be France. Indeed, I understand that he has suggested that Germany should give him her protection, and that this proposal meets with the approval of His Majesty and his Government. It is unnecessary to point out how inconvenient and distasteful such a solution would be to France, and I have no information as to how Germany would be likely to receive such a suggestion, but some time ago when Bu Amama's son signified his intention of leaving his father's cause and supporting the Sultan, and it became probable that he would journey to Tangier and Fez, the German Minister is said to have intimated to him that he would extend his protection to him if he required it.

A full description of Bu Amama and his career has at various times been furnished to your Lordship.

The French have never considered Bu Amama as a Moorish subject, but as a renegade Algerian, but for a long time past he has not given them any trouble.

Too much importance must not be attached to this report of Bu Amama's latest intentions to assist the Sultan. Offers of a similar nature have been previously made by him, and in return he has received sums of money from the Court, but no tangible proofs of his *bona fides* have been forthcoming.

The idea of his placing himself under German protection seems, however, to be a new development.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.



No. 45.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 170. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 3, 1905.

I HAD some conversation yesterday with my French colleague as to the possibility of the Missions being withdrawn from Fez, but he said that in the absence of all instructions he preferred to reserve his opinion.

When the French programme for reforms was first refused by the Moorish Government and the invitation issued to the Conference, he had privately informed M. Delcassé that he thought the usefulness of his Mission had ceased, for his word no longer carried any weight with the Makhzen.

Then came the fall of M. Delcassé, and the whole question entered upon a new stage. He had received a private intimation that the instructions of his Government were on the way, but as they were coming from Paris by a special messenger, Major Gambetta, he could not hope to have them in his hands until the 9th or 10th of this month.

To effect a dignified withdrawal his Excellency was of opinion that three conditions were essential:—

1. That the Conference should be abandoned.
2. That some arrangement should be come to with Germany.
3. That he should be authorized to speak with considerable authority to the Makhzen; for instance, that he should place in their hands the complete programme of reform with a very earnest request that they should give it careful attention—"réfléchir sérieusement" was the expression his Excellency used.

His Excellency hoped that the instructions he might receive would sufficiently fulfil these conditions to enable him to make some arrangement for leaving, but they might require some modification or addition.

At the present moment he did not see that any steps could be taken towards withdrawing his Mission.

We agreed that as long as the French and English Missions were here Count Tattenbach would not budge, and we also were of opinion that he would probably leave if we both left, though that must depend to a great extent on the effect produced on the Moorish mind by the actual state of the question at that moment.

At present the Makhzen seems to be in rather a despondent and suspicious mood, and not to like the negotiations which are proceeding between Paris and Berlin.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 46.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 171.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 3, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 165 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith translations of the correspondence which has passed between the German Minister and the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs, with reference to the two German protégés supposed to be implicated in the murder of Mr. Madden at Mazagan.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 46.

*Sid Abdelkrim-ben-Sliman to Count Tattenbach.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Fez, 25 Rabia II, 1323 (June 28, 1905).

THE affair of the murder of the British subject Mr. Madden and the anxiety of the Makhzen to elucidate the affair and discover the culprits are well known to your Excellency. With a view to investigating the matter the Government have ordered a

33

Secretary, a Kaïd-er-Raba, and a body of cavalry to Mazagan to support the Governor there and take the necessary steps.

The Governor of Mazagan now reports that suspicion has fallen upon Abderahman-ben-Yusuf, among others, and his brother Hadj Ahmed. The former, Abderahman, was a Portuguese protégé, but his Consul has withdrawn the protection.

When the Governor wished to arrest him he joined his brother Hadj Ahmed, one of the accused, and Abdallah, the former being a semsar and the latter a mokhalat of a German firm; they summoned their people together and opposed the officials sent by the Governor with fire-arms, wounded the Khalifa of the Commander of the soldiers, killed his horse, and wounded another, thus escaping arrest. The Governor thereupon wrote to the German Consul, who replied that he would not allow them to be arrested.

His Majesty the Sultan, my noble master, has commanded me to inform your Excellency of the above, and to add the request that the Consul may be instructed to hand over the above-mentioned persons to the Governor with a view to their arrest, together with the other individuals accused. Your Excellency might then investigate the criminal action that they have committed. We are convinced that you will not approve of these actions and will cause the necessary steps to be taken.

Greeting.

(Signed) ABDELKRIM-BEN-SLIMAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 46.

*Count Tattenbach to Sid-ben-Sliman.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

German Legation, Fez, June 30, 1905.

I HAD the honour yesterday to receive your Excellency's note of the 28th instant, in which you inform me that a suspicion existed that a certain Abderahman-ben-Yusuf Djedidi, and his brother, Hadj Ahmed, were implicated in the murder of the British subject, Mr. Madden. The former, your Excellency stated, was under Portuguese protection, but this had already been withdrawn from him by the Consul. As, however, the Governor wished to arrest him, he, with his brother, Hadj Ahmed, and Abdallah, and other persons, resisted by force, and the representative of the Commander of the troops was wounded.

Your Excellency adds that Hadj Ahmed is a semsar, and Abdallah a mokhalat of a German firm in Mazagan, and you inform me that the German Vice-Consul had replied to the Governor of Mazagan, in a written representation, that he could not accede to the request for the arrest of these two persons. Your Excellency finally requests me to direct the Consul to hand over the two individuals—namely, the semsar Hadj Ahmed and the mokhalat Abdallah—to the Governor, with a view to their imprisonment in the same way as the rest of the accused, and then to inquire into their actions.

I have the honour to reply to the above that I deeply deplore the murder in Mazagan, and that the German Government is obviously ready on their side, in conjunction with the Shereefian Government, and in conformity with the stipulations of the Treaties in force, to do all in its power for the capture, delivery, and punishment of the culprits.

As regards Abdallah, who is described by your Excellency as mokhalat of a German firm, he does not as such enjoy the privilege of a German-protected subject, and there is no objection to his capture and punishment by the Moorish authorities.

The semsar Hadj Ahmed is, on the other hand, a German-protected subject, and the regulations which govern such persons must be applied in his case. For this purpose the examination and responsibility of the judgment by the German Consul in Casablanca must follow. This latter will take eventual action, but in the meantime I declare that I agree to the immediate arrest by the Moorish authorities of the semsar Hadj Ahmed, that he be kept in safe custody and placed at the disposal of the German Consul, who will proceed to Mazagan.

The German Government will eventually decide, according to the result of the inquiry, whether they will themselves punish the said Hadj Ahmed or whether, finding him unworthy of German protection, they will hand him over to the Moorish authorities for punishment.

(Signed) TATTENBACH.



No. 47.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 12.)*

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

PROPOSED Conference on Morocco.

*Madrid, July 12, 1905.*

I was asked to-day by Minister for Foreign Affairs what reply His Majesty's Government thought should be sent to the Sultan's invitation in view of the Agreement between France and Germany. He informed me that he had yesterday expressed to the French Ambassador the satisfaction of the Spanish Government at the solution of the difficulties with Germany, and their willingness to raise no objection to the Conference, and that he had added that his Government wished, however, to know what instructions as to the programme to be submitted to the Conference would be sent to the French and German Representatives who were to advise the Sultan on this point, to which he gave me to understand he attached much importance. The Spanish Government are anxious to take the same line as His Majesty's Government in the matter.

I replied that I would refer the matter to your Lordship, and reply as soon as possible.

The place of meeting of Conference had, he said, also been discussed by the French Ambassador. Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to me to be strongly opposed to Tangier and inclined to favour Madrid.

No. 48.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 463.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 12, 1905.*

THE French Ambassador called at this Office yesterday and left the three papers, of which copies are attached to this despatch, relating to the proposed Conference as to the affairs of Morocco.

His Excellency came to see me this morning, and told me that, after all that had happened, M. Rouvier was more convinced than ever of the necessity of maintaining a close understanding with this country. It was, in his view, essential that the two Governments should treat one another with the fullest confidence, and that no further steps should be taken without previous discussion between us. While holding this opinion, M. Rouvier thought it desirable to proceed with caution in dealing with the German Government, and thought we should avoid parading a desire to run counter to them.

His Excellency told me privately that the events of the last few weeks had had the effect of opening M. Rouvier's eyes with regard to the policy and intentions of Germany. He had been led to suppose that with M. Delcassé's retirement all traces of German irritation against France would disappear. He had been rudely undeceived, for within six hours of the announcement of M. Delcassé's resignation the German note had been presented. The subsequent negotiations had added to M. Rouvier's disenchantment. He had found Prince Radolin difficult to deal with, and by no means trustworthy.

I told his Excellency that I was sure he would admit that His Majesty's Government had given the French Government their loyal support throughout these occurrences, and we had no intention of withdrawing it. At the same time I was bound to tell him that the apparent sacrifice of M. Delcassé in the face of German pressure had created an unfavourable impression in this country, and I therefore thought there was a good deal to be said for M. Rouvier's view that it would be as well to avoid any action calculated to bring about fresh complications.

We then had some conversation with regard to other points connected with the Conference. His Excellency said that the French Government had come to the conclusion that upon the whole it had better not take place at Tangier. Tangier would, in the first place, be too much within the influence of Moorish intrigues, in which the German Government was but too likely to participate. In the next place, the climate would be almost unendurable, and the Representatives would have to submit to great discomfort. I asked his Excellency what he thought of some place in Spain. He said that Madrid would also be open to objection for climatic reasons, but that he thought the Conference might be held at San Sebastian. I observed that there was a great deal

34\*

No. 46\*.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 12, 1905.*

AS the French and German Governments have now come to an understanding in regard to the bases on which the Conference may be held, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that, in view of the importance of British interests in Morocco, they should be represented. You are therefore authorized to inform the Moorish Government that His Majesty's Government are ready to avail themselves of the invitation to participate in the Conference, provided that the programme as to which His Majesty's Government expect to be consulted be satisfactorily settled, as well as the question of the time and place of meeting.



34°

No. 47 A.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 12, 1905.*

IN event of any inquiry being made by Spanish Government as to His Majesty's Government's attitude, as anticipated in your telegram No. 52 of yesterday, you can inform Spanish Government of my reply to Moorish Government on subject of Conference (see telegram to Mr. Lowther No. 42 of to-day's date). I have said in Parliament that we shall be prepared to take part in Conference on suitable terms. I think it essential that British and Spanish Governments should confer freely, and have informed the Spanish Ambassador that I will keep him fully informed.

My discussions with French Ambassador tend to satisfy me that French Government have every intention of consulting Spain and Great Britain as to programme of Conference.

No. 47 B.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 12, 1905.*

AS the French and German Governments have now come to an understanding in regard to the bases on which the Conference may be held, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that, in view of the importance of British interests in Morocco, they should be represented. You are therefore authorized to inform the Moorish Government that His Majesty's Government are ready to avail themselves of the invitation to participate in the Conference, provided that the programme as to which His Majesty's Government expect to be consulted be satisfactorily settled, as well as the question of the time and place of meeting.



to be said in favour of holding the Conference somewhere in Spain, and that I felt sure that such a decision would be agreeable to the Spanish Government.

I told his Excellency that we should, of course, expect to be consulted as to the programme, and he at once said that, in his view, it should be submitted to us before any decision was arrived at with regard to it. It would presumably be based upon the original invitation issued to the Powers by the Sultan. It was, however, a question whether the Representatives of the Powers at Tangier should be themselves deputed to take part in the Conference. His Excellency approved my suggestion that I should tell the Spanish Ambassador that the French Government would certainly communicate the draft programme both to Great Britain and Spain before any decision was come to with regard to it.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

## No. 49.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 84.)

*Foreign Office, July 12, 1905.*

Sir,

I HAD some conversation with the Spanish Ambassador to-day upon the proposed Conference as to the affairs of Morocco. I told his Excellency that we should expect to be consulted as to the programme of the Conference, which I thought concerned the Spanish no less than the British Government. His Excellency would therefore find me fully prepared to communicate to him any information which I might receive on the subject, and to consider with the utmost attention any suggestions which the Spanish Government might desire to offer. His Excellency expressed his entire concurrence in what I had said, and undertook to communicate with me from time to time upon the subject.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

## No. 50.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 13.)*

My Lord,

*Tangier, July 7, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that M. von Kühlmann, the German Chargé d'Affaires, informed me last night that the Dutch Government, which is represented here by the German Legation, had sent a reply to the Sultan's invitation to attend a Conference of the Powers at Tangier, to the effect that Dutch Plenipotentiaries would attend, provided that, by the presence of the Representatives of all the Great Powers, a satisfactory result of such a Conference should be rendered possible.

The reply was, I understand, presented yesterday to the Sultan's deputy Commissioner here for transmission to Fez.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

## No. 51.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 131.)

*Madrid, July 10, 1905.*

My Lord,

I CALLED on the Minister of State yesterday and informed his Excellency that I had communicated to your Lordship the substance of our conversation held on the 6th instant, and that I was in a position to inform him that His Majesty's Government would consult with the Spanish Government before taking any decided step in regard



to the Conference. I added that I understood that no programme of the subjects to be submitted to the Conference had been drawn up, although if the proposal of the Sultan of Morocco were adopted the Conference would probably occupy itself with projects for the reform of the Administration, and the ways and means to carry them out.

Señor Sanchez Roman begged me to convey his best thanks to your Lordship for the communication which I had been authorized to make to him, and he could assure me that the Spanish Government would on their part be happy to exchange views with that of His Majesty before coming to any decision. His Excellency again repeated to me his sincere desire that a perfectly frank and cordial intercourse should be established between the two Governments, as he thought it was to the interests of both countries that an intimate understanding should exist between them. He added that it was pleasant for him to reflect that his personal predilections could conscientiously harmonize with his duties as Minister of State and with his care for the foreign interests of his country.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

## No. 52.

*Sir F. Bertie to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 256.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 11, 1905.

MOST of to-day's Paris papers discuss M. Rouvier's declaration in the Chamber yesterday regarding the arrangements made with Germany in connection with the proposed Conference on the affairs of Morocco, which I had the honour to forward to your Lordship in my despatch No. 254 of yesterday's date.

The "Figaro," after recapitulating the various stages of the negotiations, congratulates M. Rouvier on having kept peace with honour. It is for the Conference to decide the details of the Morocco question. Europe will recognize France's confidence in its spirit of justice, and will be grateful to her for having spared it the horrors of a general war. It remains for Germany to show that she had no ulterior designs, and that her intentions are as honest as those of France.

The "Gaulois," in an article entitled "Le Cataplasme," disapproves M. Rouvier's declaration, but is unable to see how the Minister for Foreign Affairs could have made, in the circumstances, a more favourable arrangement. France, it maintains, has sacrificed her fishing rights in Newfoundland and her claims in Egypt to the recognition of her right (which was never contested) to defend effectually her Algerian frontier.

M. André Mevil, in an article in the "Écho de Paris," admits that Germany has scored two successes: she has caused France to part with a Minister who stood in her way, and to take part in a Conference for which she is responsible. But Germany's main object, according to M. Mevil, was to bring about the rupture of certain understandings between France and other countries which she considered dangerous, such plans being particularly favoured by the weakening of Russia. The loyal support afforded to France by Great Britain defeated this object. France, desiring peace, was forced to make concessions; but the *entente* with England remains firm, and the incident has rendered service by turning the attention of Frenchmen from futile and demoralizing internal squabbles to the vital external interests of the country.

He hopes his countrymen will profit by their hard lesson, and warns them that, "pour éviter la guerre, il ne suffit pas de n'en point vouloir."

M. Clémenceau, in the "Aurore," congratulates M. Rouvier on the skill with which he extricated the country from a difficult situation.

M. Jaurès, in the "Humanité," is satisfied with the arrangement.

I have, &c.  
(For the Ambassador),  
(Signed) J. L. BAIRD.

## No. 53.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 13.)*

[Sent from Tangier, July 13, 1905.]

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Fez, July 9, 1905.

MY telegram No. 74, the 6th July.

Moorish Envoy to Berlin.

Shereefian Government have apparently given up this project.

The Franco-German understanding, as reported here, seems to be causing them anxiety.

## No. 54.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Madrid, July 13, 1905.

MOROCCO: proposed Conference.

Your Lordship's telegram No. 52.

I am informed by the Minister of State that similar instructions to those which have been given to Mr. Lowther, respecting the reply he should make to the proposals of the Moorish Government for a Conference, will be sent to the Spanish Minister at Tangier to-morrow.

Both on his own behalf and that of the Prime Minister, the Minister of State wishes to express his best thanks for the frank and friendly communications which your Lordship has made to him.

## No. 55.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 469.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 13, 1905.

THE French Ambassador told me to-day that he had received a further despatch from M. Rouvier upon the subject of the Morocco question. M. Rouvier had had an interview with Prince Radolin, who had said that the German Government desired to arrive at an understanding with the French Government as to the programme and objects of the Conference.

M. Rouvier was anxious to act with us in the matter, and would communicate to us his ideas as to the programme. He was inclined to limit it so as to confine the deliberations of the Conference to questions of police and finance, taking as a basis the proposals which had already been submitted by M. Saint-René Taillandier to the Moorish Government. As soon as M. Rouvier had come to an understanding with us he would consult the Spanish Government, and would then go to the German Government.

I told M. Cambon that I should be glad if he would let me have in writing an outline of the French proposal. As at present advised I saw no objection to limiting it to the points which he had mentioned. I thought the proposals should be as simple and uncontroversial as possible. His Excellency told me that M. Saint-René Taillandier had proposed a scheme of military reorganization, involving the appointment of French instructors who were to hold office for two or three years, at the end of which time they would presumably have completed the work of reorganization. I suggested that the military question should be, so far as possible, treated as one of police, and his Excellency said that the object of M. Saint-René Taillandier's "military" proposals had been merely the maintenance of order.

With regard to the financial proposals, his Excellency said that there were two



main points: The establishment of a "banque Marocaine" and that of bonded warehouses ("magasins généraux"). As regards the bank, he saw no reason why the participation of other powers should not be allowed, and the use of the bonded warehouses would be open to every one. There was, therefore, no monopoly involved.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 56.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 14.)*

[Sent from Tangier, July 14, 1905.]

(No. 76.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Fez, July 10, 1905.

MY telegram No. 61 of the 9th June.

Count von Tattenbach having brought considerable pressure to bear on the Sultan, His Majesty on the 8th again pledged himself to grant to a German firm the erection of a mole and storehouses at Tangier.

The Ministers, who have been ordered to enter into an Agreement with Count von Tattenbach, although they all prefer the French projects and estimates, will now be obliged to submit.

No. 57.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 14.)*

(Separate. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, July 14, 1905.

I HAVE been told in great confidence by Sid Hadj-el-Mehdi-el-Menebli that, aided by Count von Tattenbach at Fez, His Shereefian Majesty is occupied in arranging a loan with one British and two German firms for 4,000,000l. at 4 per cent. interest.

An offer from His Shereefian Majesty of all the Government estates situate at the coast ports was accepted by the combined firms as a partial security, but by way of further guarantee they have pressed for a tobacco monopoly, and also the receipts resulting from the gate and market dues.

A portion of this loan will be employed to discharge the French debt.

I am told that Count von Tattenbach is actively supporting the carrying out of this transaction, which, lest it might violate any agreement previously arrived at with the French, he is desirous should not be called a loan.

No. 58.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 14.)*

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Madrid, July 14, 1905.

MOROCCO Conference.

This morning the Minister for Foreign Affairs read to me the instructions which are being addressed to the Spanish Minister at Tangier by his Excellency, and he told me that he had also read them to the French Ambassador, and that M. Cambon had entirely concurred with them.

They are similar to those which your Lordship has sent to His Majesty's Minister at Fez.

No. 59.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 15.)*

[Sent from Tangier July 15.]

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Fez, July 12, 1905.

YOUR telegram No. 40 of the 28th June.

M. de Saint-René Taillandier informs me that his despatches contain no sign of the possibility of his leaving at an early date, and that he has received no directions as to his departure.

No. 60.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 66.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 15, 1905.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 164 of the 29th ultimo, transmitting a Petition from the British inhabitants of Mazagan on the subject of the general insecurity of life and property in that town.

I request that you will convey to the petitioners an assurance that their Petition will be borne in mind.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 61.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 16.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, July 16, 1905.

THE Spanish Government has replied to the invitation of His Shereefian Majesty to attend a Conference, that Spain will be represented thereat, provided that her opinion is sought beforehand with reference to the programme.

Sid Mohammed Torres was handed this reply yesterday.

No. 62.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 173.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 5, 1905.

IN my despatch No. 150, Confidential, of the 20th ultimo, I reported the withdrawal of facilities which had hitherto been granted by the Algerian Government to the Moorish Government, which enabled them to send troops, arms, and ammunition to Oujda via Nemours. A few days later came the news that the prohibition had been withdrawn by the Algerian Government, and I understand that that Government has explained, through the French Minister here, that the facilities were only withdrawn pending the settlement of a claim for 45,000 fr. for the robbery of an Algerian caravan, and that this money was paid at once. The occasion was also taken of furnishing assurances, together with some evidence, to prove that the Algerian Government in no way had come to the assistance of the Pretender—a charge which has frequently been put forward by the Makhzen.

Some 950 soldiers and about 100 horses have now been sent to Oujda during the past month from Tangier, though of this number a considerable percentage can hardly be of much use, as they were recruited from the poor population of Tangier and had



no training, and of those that were actually dispatched I understand that several deserted immediately they landed at Borj-Saida. Some 500 more men are being sent from here via Tangier, of which probably about half may be expected to arrive.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 63.

*Question asked in the House of Commons, July 17, 1905.*

*Mr. Disraeli.*—To ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether His Majesty's Government have yet received a proposal to enter into a Conference with other foreign Governments in regard to the affairs of Morocco; and, if so, whether he can state if such proposal has been accepted, and upon what conditions.

*Answer.*

His Majesty's Government have been asked by the Moorish Government to join in a Conference, and we have intimated that, subject to a satisfactory settlement of the programme, and of time and place of meeting, we shall be prepared to take part in the proceedings.

No. 64.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 17.)*

(Separate.)  
(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, July 17, 1905.*

MY telegram Separate of the 7th July.

French yacht "Aigle."

I am informed by British Vice-Consul at Mogador that the yacht arrived on the 5th and was to make a stay of eight days.

Members of her party, amongst whom are a hydrographer and three sailors lent by the French Government, occupied themselves in making maps of the country round Mogador and a chart of the bay.

The Vice-Consul writes that the local authorities complained that the officers came ashore by moonlight; the French Consul answered that the yacht was only on a scientific cruise.

No. 65.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 174.)  
My Lord,

*Fez, July 5, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received information that the Moorish Government some fifteen days since sent instructions to Tangier for the temporary suspension of the delivery of the Moorish coinage ordered in Europe. I understand that of the two orders given in France there still remains about a half undelivered, but of those given in England and Germany very little remains for delivery. In the French contracts a stipulation was made to the effect that delivery could be suspended should the price of silver advance in Europe. Another factor that may have influenced the Makhzen is the fact that from the 1st July the payments of 60 per cent. of the customs revenues, on account of the French loan, have been resumed, and this will throw a large amount of Moorish coin on the market, as the interest being payable in francs, the Moorish coin taken in the custom-houses will have to be converted into that currency. Should the deliveries from Europe continue, this will almost certainly

cause a further decline in the value of the Moorish coinage, which is already over 30 per cent. below that of Spanish money, or about 75 per cent. below that of English and French.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 66.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 177.)  
My Lord,

*Fez, July 7, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that some years ago a French subject brought an action in the German Consular Court at Tangier against Herr Rottenburg, a German military engineer in the employ of the Moorish Government, to obtain possession of the house occupied by the defendant, of which the plaintiff claimed to be the proprietor.

The German Consular Court at that time, seeing that the case was one involving a question of ownership of real property, declared itself (under Article XI of the Madrid Convention of the 3rd July, 1880) incompetent to decide the case, and referred it to the Shraa, Islamic Law Tribunal, before which the case dragged on at considerable length, and was eventually stopped by Baron von Busche, the then German Chargé d'Affaires, as he considered that the plaintiff was acting unfairly.

Recently the case was again brought forward, when the plaintiff, through his lawyer, objected to taking proceedings before the Shraa on the ground that the decision of that Tribunal was not binding on German subjects, basing his contention on the ground that, by the law of the German Constitution, no Treaty whereby the existing condition of things, as regards persons, is changed can become legally enforceable unless it has been submitted to and accepted by the Reichstag. It would appear that this has not been done by the Germans, nor by the French, whose constitutional law on this point is similar.

On this objection being raised, the German Chargé d'Affaires referred the case to the Supreme Court at Leipzig, whose decision he is now awaiting. In the meantime, a similar attitude is being adopted by lawyers both in the German and French Courts. The German Chargé d'Affaires stated that in actions of this nature brought before the German Court, the consent of both parties must be obtained before the case can be referred to the Shraa, when they would be bound to accept its decision, but in the event of one or both refusing the case would have to stand over until the Leipzig decision is made known.

This decision of the German Consular Court, which practically amounts to a declaration that the Madrid Convention has no legal force against German subjects, is interesting in view of the interpretation given by the German Government to Article XVII of the same Convention, and the point made by that Government of the latitude of that Article.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 67.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 132. Confidential.)  
My Lord,

*Madrid, July 10, 1905.*

AFTER my interview yesterday with the Minister of State, I called on M. de Ojeda, the Under-Secretary of State, and gave him in general terms an account of what had passed. M. de Ojeda expressed his pleasure that an interchange of views had been arranged in regard to matters pertaining to the Conference, as he had been a little uneasy as to the line his Government might adopt. He would speak to me quite frankly as an old friend, but he begged that I would consider his remarks strictly confidential.

[1566]

M



It was, he said, necessary to understand that Señor Montero Rios, President of the Council, had been from the first an opponent of the Franco-Spanish Agreement, and had, he thought, impressed his views on the Minister of State. Although, therefore, they felt bound to accept the Agreement, it would be simply as a matter of honour, and they would, he thought, not wish to go a hairsbreadth beyond its strict letter. The recent intervention of Germany might in a sense be interpreted, assuming that her efforts were successful as making a breach in the Morocco portion of the Anglo-French Agreement, of which the Spanish accord was a corollary. The Spanish Government might, consequently, conclude that they had resumed a certain liberty of action, and might take a line which might be embarrassing. He could tell me that since the advent of the new Government to office the German Ambassador has been exceedingly active, and though he was unaware of what actually passed between Señor Montero Rios and M. de Radowitz at the several interviews which had taken place, the latter had told him that he was now perfectly satisfied with the attitude of the Spanish Government; and it was, therefore, to be presumed that M. de Radowitz had gathered that Spain would interpret her Agreement with France within the strictest possible limits.

At this moment, M. de Ojeda continued, both the President of the Council and the Minister of State were anxious, in view of the approaching visit of the King of Spain to Germany, to do nothing which could indispose German feeling towards them; and he was anxious as to how far they might be induced to yield to the pressure which had been brought to bear by the German Ambassador.

He was, therefore, gratified to hear that an interchange of views would take place between our two Governments before any decisions were come to in regard to the Conference.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

No. 68.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 133.)

My Lord,

Madrid, July 12, 1905.

I SAW the Minister of State this morning, and he informed me that the French Ambassador had communicated yesterday to him copies of the documents which had recently passed between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and the German Ambassador in Paris.

Señor Sanchez Roman said that he had expressed to M. Cambon the great satisfaction he felt on receiving the news of the termination of the differences which had arisen between France and Germany. He added that M. Cambon had inquired whether Spain would now participate in the Conference, and had hinted that probably she would like to consult with Great Britain on the subject. Señor Sanchez Roman replied that Spain would raise no difficulties in regard to taking part in the Conference, but he considered it important that beforehand the Spanish Government should be informed what advice the French and German Representatives would offer to the Sultan as to the programme which was to be submitted to that assembly. He told M. Cambon that the Sultan was a "man of straw," and could be left out of account; but he wished to know, as he had expressed it, to what music Spain was to play. She was asked to join in the orchestra, but no musical scores had been distributed to her. M. Camdon, he said, had given him to understand that he would communicate with Paris on these points.

Señor Sanchez Roman said that the above was the substance of his conversation with the French Ambassador, and added that he had refrained from replying to the suggestion of M. Cambon that he should consult with His Majesty's Government, as he did not wish it should be thought that Spain could not take a decision on her own initiation. As a matter of fact, he was, however, anxious to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government and adapt his action accordingly. He and his colleagues in the Government were desirous, he repeated, of acting in close harmony with Great Britain, and, though the assembly of the Conference must be accepted as a fact, he considered that some information should be accorded as to what subjects the Sultan, on the advice of the French and German Representatives, would submit

for discussion. He thought that the time had now arrived for replying to the invitation of the Sultan, and he would wish to learn from your Lordship the form and substance of the communication which His Majesty's Government might be disposed to convey to His Shereefian Majesty.

I told Señor Sanchez Roman that I would telegraph to your Lordship and communicate the reply when I received it.

Señor Sanchez Roman said that M. Cambon had also spoken in regard to the locality where the Conference might be held, and had mentioned that some place in Switzerland might be selected. Señor Sanchez Roman gave me to understand that he had a preference for Madrid, and was most strongly opposed to Tangier. I agreed with him in this last view, but said I had no information as to what place would be proposed. It seemed to me that the difficulty in regard to Switzerland was that that country was not signatory to the Madrid Convention, and had no Representative in Morocco. She could hardly take part in a Conference, and in that case there might be a little difficulty as to who should preside at the sittings.

Señor Sanchez Roman exhibited some little annoyance at what he described as the patronizing airs of France towards Spain, and the manner in which Spanish interests were ignored in recent negotiations. Spain, he said, was, in a sense, limitrophe to Morocco by reason of her possessions, and though she did not wish in any way to intervene in differences between France and Germany, still, when those difficulties had been mutually removed, she considered that in matters concerning Morocco alone she should be taken into the full confidence of a Power with whom she had contracted engagements in regard to that country.

This view is being reflected in some journals inspired by the Government, and there is, I notice, a growing impression that little remains standing of the Franco-Spanish Agreement, as the whole conditions of the Morocco question have undergone a radical change. Señor Sanchez Roman concluded his conversation by remarking that France had taken Germany into partnership in Morocco, and seemed to expect that other Powers should follow in their wake. He begged me to understand that in making these observations he had no wish to modify in any way the intimate and friendly relations between France and Spain, but he did not desire that his country should be treated as a cipher in affairs which so closely interested her.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

No. 69.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 134.)

My Lord,

Madrid, July 13, 1905.

I CALLED on the Minister of State this morning and communicated to him the instructions which your Lordship had conveyed to His Majesty's Minister at Fez, in response to the invitation of the Sultan of Morocco to a Conference. I also told Señor Sanchez Roman that your Lordship was most desirous of a free interchange of views between the two Governments, and that you had intimated to the Spanish Ambassador that he would be kept fully informed; and I added that your Lordship was satisfied that the French Government had every intention of consulting with both His Majesty's and the Spanish Governments in regard to the programme of the Conference. I therefore personally expressed the hope that the Spanish Government would feel themselves at liberty to send instructions to their Minister at Tangier which would be similar in character to those with which Mr. Lowther had been furnished.

Señor Sanchez Roman said that the views of your Lordship entirely coincided with those of the Spanish Government, and that he would communicate without delay with the President of the Council in regard to the instructions to be sent to the Spanish Representative in Morocco. Later in the day Señor Sanchez Roman sent me word that instructions practically identic with those of Mr. Lowther would be telegraphed to-morrow to the Spanish Minister, and that he hoped they would arrive almost simultaneously at Fez with those from your Lordship. He desired me to convey to



your Lordship, in his own name and that of the President of the Council, their high appreciation of the frank and friendly communications which had been made to them.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

No. 70.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Madrid, July 18, 1905.

I AM informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Spanish Government are being strongly urged by the German Ambassador to accept Tangier as the place of meeting of the Morocco Conference, and that the Italian Government have already signified their acceptance of it. In the view of the Spanish Government, Tangier offers many objections, but they fear that the majority of the Powers may be won over to the proposal, and that then a refusal would be difficult.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that Madrid would be a suitable place, but it would be difficult for the Spanish Government themselves to propose it, and his Excellency asked me to inquire of your Lordship whether His Majesty's Government could not make the suggestion. It is, in his opinion, most desirable that no time should be lost in putting forward some counter-proposal to that of Tangier.

No. 71.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 19.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

Tangier, July 12, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that M. de Buisseret informed me yesterday evening that he had just received the answer of the Belgian Government to the Sultan's invitation to the proposed Conference of the Powers.

The reply states that since the majority of the other Powers had expressed their intention of taking part in the Conference, Belgium would also be represented.

Count de Buisseret told me he would hand a communication to this effect to-day to the Sultan's Acting Commissioner here, for transmission to Fez.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

No. 72.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 19.)*

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Fez, July 19, 1905.

REFER telegram Separate of the 14th July from Mr. Wyldbore Smith.

I have no information as to any quite recent renewal of the negotiations for a loan which I reported to your Lordship in my No. 52, Telegraphic, and to which I think Mr. Wyldbore Smith's telegram refers.

No. 73.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 487.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 19, 1905.

I TOLD the French Ambassador to-day that a report had reached us from Fez that the Sultan had renewed his promise to give the construction of the mole and warehouse at Tangier to a German firm. We had also heard through El Menebhi that

the Sultan was negotiating a loan of 4,000,000*l.* with two German and one British firms. I could not help thinking that it would be most desirable if it could be arranged that, pending the result of the Conference, all the Powers should abstain from exhibiting special activity in these matters.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 74.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Whitehead.*

(No. 174.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 19, 1905.

I HAD a few moments' conversation with the German Ambassador to-day upon the subject of the Morocco Conference. He told me that he believed that negotiations were still proceeding as to the time and place. As to the time, he imagined that the sooner the Conference could be got together the better. As to the place, the German Government leaned towards Tangier, partly because they desired that the proceedings should be given a local character, and partly because it would be impossible to dispose of some of the points without expert assistance, which would not be readily available except in Morocco. I asked whether discussions were not also proceeding as to the programme to be laid before the Representatives of the Powers. He replied that he supposed the programme would be that originally suggested by the Sultan, who, if he remembered rightly, had proposed that the Powers should consider what reforms were necessary and from what sources the expenditure which such reforms would necessitate might be derived.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 75.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 20.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

Tangier, July 14, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the French yacht "Senta" arrived here on the 2nd instant from Dar-al-Baida, and left for Oran on the 3rd.

This yacht has been engaged on behalf of "La Compagnie Marocaine," of Paris, in surveying the ports of Tangier, Saffi, and Dar-al-Baida, with a view of submitting tenders to the Moorish Government for the carrying out of improvements at the above-mentioned ports.

The operations have been carried out under the direction of a French engineer named Renaud.

An estimate was presented by the Company some few weeks ago to the Moorish Government for the construction of a mole, with store-houses and cranes to be erected thereon, at the port of Tangier. The price for the proposed undertaking amounts to between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 fr.

On his return here from Saffi and Dar-el-Baida, M. Renaud reported that surveying operations at those ports had been greatly facilitated by the courtesy extended to him by the Moorish officials.

I understand that his plans for proposed improvements at these two ports are almost completed, and will be dispatched to Fez from Paris.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.



## No. 76.

*Sir H. Howard to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 127. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*The Hague, July 18, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 76, Confidential, of the 4th May last, I have the honour to report that M. de Weede told me this afternoon that the Netherland Government had accepted the proposal of the Moorish Government to take part in an International Conference on the affairs of Morocco, provided the Powers most interested do likewise.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HENRY HOWARD.

## No. 77.

*Question asked in the House of Commons, July 20, 1905.*

*Sir John Leng.*—To ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether, as one of the principles on which France and Germany have agreed to take part in the Conference relative to Morocco is economic liberty without any inequality, this is understood to imply the open door for foreign trade; and whether His Majesty's Government will, in conformity with that principle, suggest the revision of the Convention between France and Britain, so far as it arranges for the monopoly of the trade of Morocco by France at the end of thirty years.

*Answer.*

The principle of the open door for foreign trade in Morocco has always been recognized by the French Government, and there can be no question of revising the Anglo-French Declaration which does not contain any provision susceptible of the interpretation placed upon it by the honourable Member.

## No. 78.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1905.*

MOROCCO Conference. Your telegram No. 56 of the 18th instant.

The French Ambassador is unable to say anything definite as to the place of meeting of the Conference, but expects to receive instructions shortly.

Until we know what the French want, we can hardly answer the Spanish Government.

## No. 79.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 495. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1905.*

THE French Ambassador gave me to-day a draft of the programme which the French Government propose to place before the Morocco Conference.

It is as follows:—

(A.) Organization of the police outside the frontier region, that is to say, outside the districts where it is regulated by a Franco-Moorish Agreement.

1. Creation of bodies of Moorish troops for police duty at Tangier, Larache, Rabat, and Casablanca.

2. Control and suppression of the smuggling of arms by sea.

## (B.) Financial reforms.

Financial assistance to the Maghzen by the institution of a State Bank, with the privilege of issuing notes, intrusted with Treasury operation, and making arrangement for the coinage of money, the profits on which would belong to the Maghzen.

The State Bank would proceed to put the currency on a sound footing. The credits granted to the Maghzen would be affected to the pay and equipment of the troops employed on police duty and to certain urgent public works, notably the improvement of the ports and their material.

Engagement by the Maghzen not to alienate any of the public services for the purpose of favouring private interests.

Principle of open tenders for public works without distinction of nationality.

I caused his Excellency to be informed that I was prepared to accept it, and presumed that the Spanish Government were also being consulted on the subject.

I observed that the question of taxation, and notably that of foreigners, as to which some Regulations were accepted in November 1903 by the Powers represented at Tangier, was not included in the programme, and I suggested, for the consideration of the French Government, whether this question might not usefully be added to the subjects for discussion. It was evident that it was one which would, in any case, require the assent of the Powers interested, and the Conference seemed to offer a convenient opportunity for arriving at a satisfactory settlement of the matter.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE

## No. 80.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 21.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, July 21, 1905.*

IN reply to the invitation of the Sultan, the Russian Government state that Russia will attend the Conference as, although her interests in Morocco are nil, this invitation has been accepted by the majority of Powers.

## No. 81.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 179.)

My Lord,

*Fez, July 9, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 136 of the 12th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the German Minister has again been very urgently pressing the Sultan to give the contract for the improvement of the port of Tangier and for the building of warehouses to the German firm of Borgeaud and Reutemann, and yesterday, after a lengthy interview, succeeded in inducing the Sultan to repeat the promise he had given his Excellency to that effect a month ago. Tenders were put in by the above-mentioned firm and by the Compagnie Marocaine and have been for a month past under the consideration of the Moorish Government. I understand that the French plans met with much more favour in the eyes of the so-called experts than the German plans, especially as they provided for an expenditure of 20,000*l.* less than the latter.

The German Minister appears to attach an almost exaggerated importance to the granting of the concession, and on the same day that he obtained the promise he saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to the drawing up of the contract, instructions to this effect having been given by the Sultan.

It is very indicative of the influence of Count Tattenbach at this moment that he should have been able to obtain this promise, for the Ministers, in reply to his pressure, had always returned the obvious answer that, as the Conference was about to be held, this would form a suitable matter for discussion.

Acting on your Lordship's approval contained in your despatch No. 49 of the 24th May, I submitted to the Moorish Government the request of Mr. Moses Pariente to "faire les études" of the port of Tangier, and spoke about it on more than one occasion.



but met with no encouragement, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the Government had sufficient material to go on with the two tenders. I urged that I was asking no favour, and that a British subject is as fully entitled to tender as a French or German, but the only reply I have been able to obtain is that the matter will be again referred to the Sultan.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 82.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 22.)*

(Separate and Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, July 14, 1905.*

I WAS confidentially informed this afternoon by Sid Hadj-el-Mehdi-el-Menebhi that he had seen a letter from the Sultan addressed to Mr. Isaac Abensur, a British subject and banker here, respecting a loan which His Shereefian Majesty was anxious to negotiate with a British and two German firms which were represented in this affair by the said Mr. Abensur.

Sid-el-Menebhi informed me that Count von Tattenbach had proposed this loan, which is to be for 4,000,000*l.* at 4 per cent. interest, but he could not tell me the names of the firms concerned.

It appears that His Shereefian Majesty has offered as security for the loan all the Government properties situate at the coast ports, which Sid-el-Menebhi estimates at a value of 2,000,000*l.*

These properties were accepted by the combined firms interested as a partial security, but they have insisted on being granted, as an additional security, a tobacco ("kiff" and snuff) monopoly, and also the receipts from the gate and market taxes in all towns and markets where taxes can be collected from both of which sources, Sid-el-Menebhi estimates, a total sum of about 100,000*l.* should be forthcoming.

No answer has, as yet, been received here from Fez as to the granting of this additional security.

The Sultan, it seems, is anxious that the transaction should be considered more in the light of a mortgage than a loan, in order that it may not be said to clash with previous arrangements made with the French Government as to the contracting of loans.

Should the loan be ultimately effected, Sid-el-Menebhi tells me that he understands that, by the advice of Count von Tattenbach, His Shereefian Majesty intends to deposit in London a sum sufficient to pay off the French loan, and thus free the 60 per cent. of the customs receipts hypothecated to the guarantees of the French loan for due payment of the annual interest thereon, the remainder of this new loan being devoted to the carrying out of reforms, maintenance of the army, &c.

Sid-el-Menebhi was unable to tell me when the loan is to be repaid.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

No. 83.

*Mr. Whitehead to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 187.)

My Lord,

*Berlin, July 16, 1905.*

THE departure from Berlin of both Prince Bülow and Baron von Richthofen on their annual holiday appears to indicate that the recent difficulties with France respecting the Morocco question have, for the moment, in their opinion at any rate, been satisfactorily solved.

According to a paragraph which appeared yesterday evening in the "Berliner Neueste Nachrichten," translation of which I have the honour to inclose,\* the recent

\* Not printed.

labours of the Chancellor have evoked an exceptional sign of approval from his Imperial Master, who took the opportunity of an interview at Schwinemünde to accord to Prince Bülow a reception with unprecedented honours.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) J. B. WHITEHEAD.

No. 84.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 140.)

My Lord,

*Madrid, July 19, 1905.*

THE Minister of State asked me to call upon him yesterday, and said that he wished to inform me that the German Ambassador had been pertinaciously pressing the Spanish Government to declare themselves in favour of Tangier as the locality where the Conference in regard to the affairs of Morocco should meet. He had, he continued, given guarded replies to M. de Radowitz intimating that it was a question which required some consideration, but he had stated that if the majority of the Powers expressed a preference for Tangier, the Spanish Government would raise no objection. He had received a telegram that morning from the Spanish Ambassador at Paris stating that the Italian Government had accepted the proposal that the Conference should meet at Tangier, and he heard that other minor Powers might follow that example, and a majority be obtained in favour of the German proposal. The Spanish Government were strongly opposed to the selection of Tangier, as for several reasons they considered it to be unsuitable for the purpose, and they were desirous that the Conference should meet in Madrid, as had been the case in 1880. It was, however, difficult for the Spanish Government to suggest their own capital, and he would be glad if I would inquire of your Lordship whether His Majesty's Government would be disposed to propose Madrid as the place of meeting. He was of opinion that some alternative locality to Tangier should be submitted to the Powers as soon as possible: otherwise that port might secure the assent of the majority who would have no other choice placed before them.

I may mention that after the middle of September the climatic conditions of Madrid would be quite favourable, and I presume the preliminaries to a Conference could hardly be concluded before that date.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

No. 85.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 22.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, July 22, 1905.*

REPORTED negotiations for a loan.

I have no doubt, after further conversation with Menebhi, that the loan which Mr. Lowther reported in his No. 52, Telegraphic, is the one to which I referred in my telegram of the 14th instant.

Menebhi was informed last night by the agent at Tangier of the interested firms that the reply of the Moorish Government with reference to the security to be offered had not yet arrived.

No. 86.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Fez, July 22, 1905.*

THERE are no signs of any negotiations here at present respecting the reported loan referred to in my telegram No. 78 of the 19th instant.

Government properties on the coast as security would be very dangerous.

[1566]

O



It is most improbable that so large a sum would be taken by the Shereefian Government from one group; the British firm concerned, if there is one, would most likely be that of Messrs. Forwood Brothers.

No. 87.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 23.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

MOROCCO Conference.

Tangier, July 23, 1905.

M. de Chérissey tells me that M. Rouvier has requested the German Ambassador at Paris that instructions may be sent to Count von Tattenbach not to deal separately with the Sultan, but to act in conjunction with M. Saint-René Taillandier.

In despatches forwarded to Fez from here yesterday, M. Rouvier directed the French Minister to inform him, so far as he could, as to the wishes of His Shereefian Majesty respecting the programme.

In order to avoid, as much as possible, long discussions with the Sultan, M. Rouvier is of opinion that the wording of the programme should be brief, and composed, as far as is practicable, in conformity with the doctrines expressed in the original invitation of His Shereefian Majesty to the Powers.

No. 88.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 23.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, July 23, 1905.

I AM informed by the British Vice-Consul at Mogador that the French yacht "Aigle," mentioned in my telegram, Separate, of the 17th July, was still at that port on the 19th instant.

The expedition, which is engaged in making a survey of the whole of the Moroccan sea-board, will continue operations to the south of Mogador, and possibly as far as Cape Juby.

It will probably be a year before the survey is completed.

No. 89.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 181.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 12, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 171 of the 8th ultimo, respecting the murder of Mr. Madden at Mazagan, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship the following further information on the subject:—

Mr. E. P. Carleton, British Consular Agent at Alcazar and brother-in-law of the murdered man, recently proceeded, with my authorization, to Mazagan, in order to investigate the matter and discover, if possible, the assassins.

With the assistance of a secret agent he discovered a native, from whom, on the offer of a sum of 500 dollars (about 55*l.*) and British protection, certain important facts were elicited.

The gist of this man's evidence, which was duly taken before the local Moorish authorities, and which would appear to amply prove the complicity of the persons accused, is as follows:—

He heard from a woman, Fatma, that the behaviour of a certain Mehemmed-ben-Mesoud-ben-Mehemmed had given rise to suspicion; he therefore watched the man, and, suspecting him of having hidden some things under a certain tree, dug in that spot and found there a gold watch, which was produced before the official who took the deposition, and was recognized without doubt as having belonged to the murdered man. He had also heard that Ben Mesoud had in his possession several other

European articles, and he said that Ben Mesoud confessed to him in conversation that he had been present at the murder at the instigation of one Abderahman-ben-Yusef.

The woman Fatma also gave evidence that she had heard Ben Mesoud confess this to two Moors, Cid Mohammed-ben-Wali-el-Abadi and his step-son Boushaib.

Ben Wali admitted on examination that Ben Mesoud had confessed his participation in the murder, and that of Abderahman-ben-Yusef.

With regard to Mr. Carleton's promise of British protection to Bubker the informer, this is obviously irregular, though common in this country, and the evidence could probably not have been obtained without it.

When the men are in prison, if they should prove to be the culprits, it will no doubt be easy to make some agreement with the Moorish Government, by which Moorish protection will be extended to him, instead of a character sufficient to protect him from the vengeance of the family of the accused.

I have transmitted to the Makhzen copy of the document containing the evidence given before the authorities at Mazagan.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 90.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 182.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 12, 1905.

SOME time ago the son of Bu Amama, one of the Pretender's principal adherents, of whom I dealt in my despatch No. 169 of the 3rd instant, left his father's cause and camp and became a supporter of the Sultan. In order to give expression to his loyalty he made an effort to proceed to Fez, but failed in obtaining the Spanish or German protection he sought, as the Algerian Government stated that he was a French citizen of Algerian origin.

He therefore remained at Oujda, and was loaded with honours.

Whether he was merely acting as a spy is not clear, but a few days ago he attempted to escape therefrom, and was arrested and thrown into prison.

There has been some desultory fighting near Oujda, the Government troops having some slight successes, though the Pretender's troops recently captured some 3,000 sheep. This may give some advantage to the Pretender's cause, as, although his following has been latterly increasing, I understand that there is a considerable dearth and scarcity in his camp. His lieutenants are now very active in collecting reinforcements, and he is said to be contemplating a movement on Fez, but has not yet been able to obtain the assistance of the tribes he requires.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 91.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 183.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 13, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 179 of the 9th instant, I took occasion to-day to mention to Ben Sliman, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that I had heard that it had been practically decided to give the contract for the mole and warehouse works at Tangier to a German firm, and I asked his Excellency if this was the case. He said it was so, and that the details of the contract proposed were now being gone into by the Makhzen and the German Minister, and, if found suitable, would be accepted, but, if not, the matter would be open.

I took the occasion of repeating what I had already told him under your Lordship's instructions, namely, that if His Majesty the Sultan was to distribute concessions other Powers besides Germany, including England, would expect a share, and I added that I had not been able to explain to myself why the request of an English firm to "faire



les études du port" had been ignored, seeing that it would only be to the advantage of the Moorish Government to have several plans before them from which to choose.

His Excellency explained that the English request had been submitted after the Sultan had promised the German Minister to accept the plans of the German firm, were the proposals acceptable, and that consequently it had been impossible to accede.

This is no doubt the case. His Excellency added that he quite appreciated the point of view of the British Government, that no doubt other works would be undertaken when the general system of reforms was inaugurated, and that then British firms would have an opportunity of tendering.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

## No. 92.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 184.)

My Lord,

*Fez, July 13, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 181 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that I have received a despatch from Mr. Consul Maclean at Mazagan, in which he reports that he is of opinion that the Governor of that town is not able to cope with the Madden murder case, and he added that many of the relatives of the Governor are mixed up in the affair. I therefore immediately called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with the intention of requesting that that functionary might be suspended until all those in any way connected with the murder shall have been arrested.

His Excellency, in reply, assured me that from information he had just received from the Governor and from the Special Commissioner sent from Fez to investigate the case he was confident that the Governor was doing his utmost, and that there was no need to suspend him, as the matter had been practically placed entirely in the hands of the Commissioner, who, in this case, is acting as Governor, and of whom Mr. Consul Maclean speaks very highly. His Excellency added that Sultan's letters had been dispatched yesterday to all the country Kaïds and the Governor of the town of Azimor to arrest any persons who might have sought refuge in their districts against whom any suspicion might lie in connection with this case, and that further instructions had also been sent at the same time to the Sultan's relative Moulay-el-Abbas, the Commander of the Government force in that district, to furnish the Governor of Mazagan with every assistance for which he might apply to him to maintain order in the town.

In view of these reiterated assurances, and seeing that the Government is sparing no effort to discover and arrest the criminals, I considered it better not to make the request for the suspension of the Governor, who, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said, had a good reputation for honesty.

Mr. Maclean, in his despatch, reports that a clue was obtained, which resulted in strong evidence of the complicity of a Moor named Ould Mesod-el-Abadi, who is now in prison. Three other Moors, against whom there is strong suspicion, have been traced, one of them being under observation and the whereabouts of the other two are known. The Moorish authorities on the spot profess themselves powerless to find or secure these persons, but I trust that the orders which have now been sent will enable them to act with more energy than they have shown hitherto. Their object in acting thus would appear to be a desire to avoid exciting the people.

Mr. Maclean also informs me that the Governor has arrested Hadj Hamed-ben-Jusef, a German semsar, mentioned in my despatch No. 171 of the 8th July.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

## No. 93.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Fez, July 25, 1905.*

SHOULD the Conference take place elsewhere than at Tangier, Sid-ben-Sliman considers that considerable delay would be occasioned, owing to the fact of the Moorish Government not being in possession of cyphers. He has expressed himself to me strongly in favour of the Conference being held at Tangier.

## No. 94.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 25.)*

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Fez, July 25, 1905.*

COUNT VON TATTENBACH remarked to me this morning that, having regard to their contract respecting the French loan, the Moorish Government were prevented from acquiring a loan on advantageous terms with another Power.

M. Saint-René Taillandier has heard a rumour that the German Government have agreed to advance the Makhzen the sum of 1,000,000l. without guarantee. I have not been able to verify this rumour, which I report for what it is worth.

## No. 95.

*Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 26.)*

(No. 467.)

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, July 23, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an official communication from the Agence Télégraphique de Saint-Petersbourg, which appeared in the "Journal de Saint-Petersbourg" of to-day, stating that the Russian Representative in Morocco has been instructed to inform the Sultan that the Russian Government will take part in the International Conference, as soon as the time and place of meeting of the Conference and the programme of its labours are known.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

*Inclosure in No. 95.*

*Extract from the "Journal de Saint-Petersbourg" of July 10 (23), 1905.*

LE Gouvernement Russe a prié son Représentant au Maroc de transmettre au Sultan son consentement à prendre part à la Conférence Internationale, dès que le temps et le lieu désignés pour la convocation de cette Conférence, ainsi que le programme de ses travaux, seront connus.

## No. 96.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 26.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, July 26, 1905.*

I HAVE received a Report from the British Vice-Consul at Mogador informing me that the survey operations executed by a party from the French yacht "Aigle," mentioned in my telegram, Separate, of the 23rd instant, had angered the natives, and that on the 18th instant a number of Moorish boys had stoned some of these Frenchmen without, however, doing any damage.

In the course of a conversation I have just had with M. de Chérisey, he mentioned  
[1566] P



the above reported incident, of which, except for a somewhat exaggerated account which appeared in the "Times" of the 24th instant, he was unaware.

M. de Chérissey informed me that he had directed M. Dyé not to land at Agadir, nor to try to carry out surveying operations on land; he added that this expedition was a private, scientific undertaking, with which the French Government had nothing whatever to do.

No. 97.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 27.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, July 27, 1905.*

THE tender put forward by a German firm for building a mole and warehouses at Tangier has, I am informed on good authority, been definitely accepted.

No. 98.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lowther.*

No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1905.*

MOROCCO Conference. His Majesty's Government have approved the French programme, which is briefly as follows:—

Open tenders for public works, without distinction of nationality.

Institution of a State bank.

Non-alienation of any public services in favour of private interests.

Organization of police outside regions to which existing Franco-Moorish Agreement applies.

Control of smuggling of arms by sea.

No. 99.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1905.*

MOROCCO Conference. You should inform the Spanish Government that His Majesty's Government have approved the French programme. I understand that it has already been communicated to the Spanish Government.

No. 100.

*Señor Polo de Bernabé to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 28.)*

(Translation.)

My Lord,

*Spanish Embassy, London, July 21, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Government of the King, my august Sovereign, have made known to that of the Sultan of Morocco that they are ready to take part in the Conference proposed by the latter provided that, as is natural, the Spanish Government is previously made acquainted with, or is consulted with regard to, the programme of the Conference as well as the date and place of meeting.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) L. POLO DE BERNABÉ.

No. 101.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 28.)*

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Madrid, July 28, 1905.*

MOROCCO Conference, the subject of your Lordship's telegram No. 62.

The French programme was yesterday communicated to the Spanish Prime Minister at San Sebastian by the French Chargé d'Affaires. The communication was telegraphed by M. Montero Rios to Minister for Foreign Affairs at Madrid for his views. M. Sanchez Roman concurs with Prime Minister as to the acceptance in principle of the programme, but the point regarding the reform of the monetary system in Morocco causes the Spanish Government uneasiness, and they will desire explanations in regard to it. Spanish Government fear that the effect would be ruinous to Spain if the reform means the displacement of Spanish silver currency in Morocco.

They also see difficulties respecting one or two other points.

I told his Excellency that it would be best to accept the programme in principle, and to reserve details for discussion at the Conference, and I think that they will do this.

As regards the monetary question, I explained to Minister for Foreign Affairs the problem of the Moorish coinage, and said that it was possible that the reform only applied to it. His Excellency begged me to speak to your Lordship, and to solicit the assistance of His Majesty's Government, as regards the monetary question and other points.

I said that on reaching England next week I hoped to see your Lordship, and that I was prepared to return, should it be thought desirable, with His Majesty's Government's views on the various points on which he had spoken to me.

No. 102.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1905.*

MOROCCO Conference.

We do not think Tangier would be a suitable place of meeting, and you may join your French colleague in making a representation to the Sultan to the above effect, and suggest some other place, such as San Sebastian.

You may also join your French colleague in protesting against the granting of any concessions or privileges to foreigners until the Conference has had a full opportunity of considering in all their bearings the concession of Tangier mole and warehouse to Germans, and other questions of a similar kind.

No. 103.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1905.*

MOROCCO Conference. My telegram No. 62 of yesterday.

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes that you should stay at San Sebastian on your way home and communicate to the Spanish Prime Minister directly our approval of French programme. Unless there are special difficulties in the way you should arrange to do so.



No. 104.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Madrid, July 29, 1905.

I WILL stop at San Sebastian to see Spanish Prime Minister, although I understood from the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Madrid that the communication of the French programme, alluded to in your Lordship's telegram No. 64, had already been made to the Prime Minister by the French Chargé d'Affaires.

I think, however, that owing to hesitation and doubts on the part of the Spanish Government respecting the programme, it would be advisable for me to see M. Montero Rios.

No. 104<sup>a</sup>.*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(No. 67.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1905.

WE wish you to communicate our approval of the French programme to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, not the programme itself. My telegram No. 64 appears to have been incorrectly telegraphed.

No. 105.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Madrid, July 29, 1905.

DOES your Lordship see any objection to my seeing French Minister for Foreign Affairs on my way through Paris?

M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Madrid, at present in Paris, expresses himself as anxious I should do so in a letter which I have just received from him.

No. 106.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Nicolson.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 30, 1905.

I HAVE no objection to your seeing the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on your way through Paris.

No. 107.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 186.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 18, 1905.

IN Moorish circles, even the best informed persons were hardly prepared to find that Germany and France would so readily come to an arrangement regarding the conditions upon which the latter should attend the proposed Conference to discuss reforms in this country.

The wide divergence of views between those Powers, as made known to them here by the Representatives of those two Powers, indeed augured ill for any arrangement, and it was not without some surprise that the news reached the Makhzen.

The exceptional position of France in Morocco, which is admitted by Germany in the note addressed by Prince Radolin, and the fact that the Anglo-French Convention, and the Franco-Spanish Convention, and other Treaties and arrangements not only remain intact, but are confirmed by the present exchange of notes, came as rather a blow to many of the Makhzen, who had hoped that the Conference would restore the "status quo ante, 1904."

Some consolation they find in the reassertion of the principle of the independence of the Sultan, and the integrity of his empire, and this point has been much accentuated by my German colleague, though I cannot but think that the Moors had been latterly gradually brought to believe that there was but little danger on that score.

The pro-reformers in official circles, of whom there are few, nurse the hope that something in the direction of reform may be done. The anti-reformers, of whom there are many, foster the idea that much discussion may yet occur, and many obstacles may yet be put in the way before the Conference can meet, and that, although the playing off of one Great Power against another has in this instance not been entirely successful, many opportunities may yet present themselves for employing the same means of obstruction, and that thus the unhappy day, when honesty and order shall reign supreme, may yet be deferred.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 108.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 187.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 19, 1905.

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 13th instant, I have addressed a note to Cid Mohammed Torres, the Moorish Commissioner, informing His Excellency of the decision of His Majesty's Government to attend the Conference which it is proposed to hold to discuss the subject of reforms in Morocco, and specifying the conditions under which His Majesty's Government will be represented.

A copy of this note is inclosed herewith.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 108.

*Mr. Lowther to Cid Mohammed Torres.*

(After compliments.)

WITH reference to your Excellency's notes of the 30th May and the 21st June, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Government of France and that of Germany having arrived at an understanding as regards the bases upon which a Conference might be held to discuss the reforms it is considered advisable should be introduced into this country, the Government of His Majesty the King, considering the large British interests in Morocco, deem it desirable to be represented at such a Conference.

I am therefore instructed to inform your Excellency that if a programme for the Conference is arranged to the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government they will cause a Representative to be sent to it. But I should observe that in the settlement of the programme, and in the decision as to the place and date of meeting His Majesty's Government will expect to be consulted.

Fez, July 19, 1905.

No. 109.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 188.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 19, 1905.

TWO days after the text of the bases of the Agreement arrived at between the French and German Governments on the subject of the proposed Moroccan Conference reached here, the Sultan sent for Count Tattenbach and inquired his opinion on it.

As far as I have been able to ascertain, the German Minister's language was somewhat as follows:—

Germany has been as good as her word, she promised the Sultan that the

[1566]

Q



Conference should be held, although France objected, and she has obtained it. It is true that in the exchange of notes there is some general recognition of the preponderating position of France in Morocco, but this need not be taken too seriously. The notes speak of the international approval that is to be given to the reforms to be introduced, but in the Conference itself it will be easy to stretch this into a permanent international control as regard finance, the army, &c.

The German Minister's language seems to have had a very soothing effect upon the Sultan, and to have convinced His Majesty that there is no immediate danger, and that he will now be left in his somnolent attitude for some years to come.

In the meantime the French Minister has received no instructions to communicate the text of the arrangement to the Makhzen, and has only endeavoured to modify the impressions produced by Count Tattenbach's language by some very guarded and moderate appreciations of the arrangements, which he has communicated in a purely unofficial manner.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 110.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 189.)

My Lord,

*Fez, July 20, 1905.*

I UNDERSTAND that a German firm, supported by the German Minister, has preferred a request to the Makhzen to be allowed to carry out the harbour works at Daralbaida which are in contemplation, but I am unable to ascertain whether the matter has been pressed by the Minister since the arrangement was concluded between Germany and France in Paris on the 10th instant.

The negotiations with the German Minister regarding the Tangier harbour works are progressing satisfactorily, and may be signed at any moment.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 111.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 190. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Fez, July 20, 1905.*

IN view of the undertaking given by Germany in Prince Radolin's note of the 8th instant, to the effect that Germany would not at the Conference pursue a policy contrary to the rights of France resulting from her Treaties and Arrangements with Morocco, it may be of interest to record that the French Minister has informed me in confidence that before negotiations with the Moorish Government regarding reforms were broken off he had actually obtained from the Minister for Foreign Affairs the acceptance in writing of that Government of the Army Scheme proposed by France.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 112.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 144.)

My Lord,

*Madrid, July 28, 1905.*

I CALLED this morning on the Minister of State to inform him that His Majesty's Government had accepted the programme which the French Government had put forward as a basis for discussion at the approaching Conference on Moorish affairs, and I inquired of his Excellency whether any communication had been made to his Government on the subject.

Señor Sanchez Roman said that he had just received a telegram from the President

of the Council, who is at San Sebastian, and of which he proposed to give me confidential information.

The President of the Council telegraphed that the French Chargé d'Affaires had just communicated the programme of the subjects which the French Government proposed should be discussed at the Conference. The telegram then recapitulated the several subjects, which I need not repeat, as your Lordship is already acquainted with them, and the President of the Council desired that the Minister of State should telegraph his views especially as to the points regarding the reform of the monetary system and the suppression of contraband trade by sea.

In regard to the reform of the monetary system, Señor Sanchez Roman said that he feared that this meant the displacement of the Spanish silver currency in Morocco, and this was a very grave matter for Spain. As I was aware, there was a very large quantity of Spanish silver in Morocco, and if a gold or other currency were established in that country this would lead to the return of all this silver to Spain, which would completely upset the exchange, and render still more difficult the execution of any projects which the Government might contemplate for the improvement of the exchange in Spain. Moreover, if a gold currency or standard were introduced into Morocco, and customs duties were made payable in gold, a decisive blow would be given to Spanish commerce with that country.

I told Señor Sanchez Roman that I had no knowledge as to what measures were contemplated in order to reform the monetary system in Morocco; that I quite appreciated the objections which he had indicated; but that I thought it possible that it was intended simply to regulate the native silver, or Hassanie coin, of which large quantities had been minted abroad, and on which there was an agio when I was at Tangier of about 20 per cent. as compared with Spanish silver.

He said this might be so, but he begged me to mention the matter to your Lordship, as it was of the most serious importance to Spain, and he trusted that His Majesty's Government would give due weight to and support Spanish interests. I replied that I would not fail to meet his wishes, and that I quite understood the importance of the question to Spain.

His Excellency then mentioned the suppression of contraband trade by sea. This was a very delicate question, and he foresaw many difficulties ahead on this subject, such as the right of visit and confiscation, and many other cognate points. I replied that undoubtedly the question was a delicate one, but, as the prohibition of contraband was an essential step towards the re-establishment of order in Morocco, it would be necessary to consider it, and this, I presumed, would be a matter for a Conference to discuss.

Señor Sanchez Roman then referred to the organization of police forces at the several ports, and inquired of me what my opinion was. "Would it not," he asked, "be advisable to have native material, but officered by Europeans, and in that case Europeans of what nationality?" I replied that this was eminently a question for the Conference to decide. It was clear that some police forces must be instituted, and my personal opinion was that the subordinate officers and privates might very well be natives, but that I thought the Chief of Police in each port should be an European. Otherwise I was confident no results would be obtained.

His Excellency said he had no observations to make on the other points of the programme, beyond presuming that the board or council of the proposed bank would be international, or in any case with representatives of the countries most interested.

I have given your Lordship a very rapid summary of a lengthy conversation, but I do not think I have omitted any important points. I told Señor Sanchez Roman that I was going home on a short leave of absence, and that I trusted to see your Lordship next week, when I would be able to fully explain the points which his Excellency had raised. I added that I presumed I should be correct in telegraphing to your Lordship that the Spanish Government would accept the French programme in principle, reserving the right of discussing details. Señor Sanchez Roman replied that I might do so, and said that he was glad I should have an opportunity of personally speaking to your Lordship, as the Spanish Government were anxious in regard to one or two points of the programme, and would be glad to know the views of His Majesty's Government with respect to them.

His Excellency subsequently made some observations in regard to the general attitude of the Spanish Government, which I reserve for another despatch.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.



No. 113.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 31.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, July 31, 1905.*

THE representative of the German firm here and Sid Mohammed Torres signed the contract this morning for the construction of the mole and warehouses at Tangier mentioned in my telegram, Separate, of the 27th July.

No. 114.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 31.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) \* P.

*Tangier, July 31, 1905.*

THE United States of America and Portugal have accepted, unconditionally, the Sultan's invitation to attend a Conference on Morocco.

The respective Ministers informed me that these intimations arrived, and were handed to Sid Mohammed Torres here this morning.

No. 115.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*San Sebastian, August 1, 1905.*

I HAVE communicated to the Spanish Prime Minister His Majesty's Government's approval of the French programme for the Morocco Conference, and told his Excellency that I understood that Spanish Government had similarly signified their concurrence.

His Excellency stated, in reply, that he had verbally communicated their acceptance of the programme to the French Chargé d'Affaires, at the same time expressing the hope that Great Britain, Spain, and France would arrive at an understanding on the points respecting monetary reform, suppression of contraband by sea, and the organization of the police forces at the ports, before the Conference met. I informed his Excellency that within the next few days I expected to see M. Rouvier and your Lordship, and that I could explain the views which the Spanish Government held on the points in question. Señor Montero Rios told me that the French Chargé d'Affaires had informed him that the French Government would support the proposal that the Conference should meet in Spain if the Spanish Government suggested it. His Excellency hesitated to formally propose Madrid or San Sebastian, but he is strongly opposed to Tangier. He cordially assented when I inquired if I might tell your Lordship and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that it would gratify the Spanish Government if the Conference were held in Spain. As regards Great Britain, France, and Spain working in agreement respecting Morocco he was satisfactory to a far greater extent than Señor Sanchez Roman in Madrid. I pointed out the perfect loyalty and good-will which the French Government had displayed by the fact of their having communicated the programme to, and asked for the views of, the Spanish Government before they addressed themselves to Germany and the other Powers.

I propose leaving San Sebastian on the morning of the 3rd instant.

No. 116.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 1.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, August 1, 1905.*

WITH reference to my telegram, Separate, of yesterday, respecting the mole at Tangier, I am told that a report is being spread by the German Legation here that, as part of the compensation exacted for the murder of a German subject at Fez in March of last year, the Sultan promised M. von Kühlmann last autumn that the concession for any work that might be carried out for the improvement of the harbour at Tangier should be accorded to a German firm.

No. 117.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Whitehead.*

(No. 187.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1905.*

DURING the course of a desultory conversation with Count Metternich on the 29th ultimo, I mentioned to him that I had heard that efforts were being made to obtain for a German firm a concession for the construction of a mole at Tangier. I had also heard that the Sultan was to be offered a German loan upon favourable terms. I asked Count Metternich whether he did not think it would be better that, pending the meeting of the Conference, all the Powers should desist from efforts of this kind. Count Metternich replied that, so far as he was aware, there had never been any reason for which a concession to construct public works in Morocco might not be given to German, or, indeed, to any other applicants. He could not, therefore, see why the fact that a Conference was about to be held should be an obstacle to such an arrangement. I observed that, if other Powers were to follow suit, and to insist upon equivalent concessions, a state of things would be produced not very likely to facilitate the deliberations of the Conference.

Count Metternich, during the course of the discussion, let fall that the German Government had obtained a copy of M. Saint-René Taillandier's original proposals to the Sultan's Government, which, he said, were of a very far-reaching and exclusive character, and of a kind to justify the German Government in their suspicion that France desired to oust all other Powers from Morocco. I asked Count Metternich whether these proposals did not refer especially to that part of Morocco which was immediately contiguous to the Algerian frontier. His Excellency did not seem to be fully informed upon this point.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 118.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 2.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, July 23, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch, Separate, of the 14th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I had some further conversation yesterday with Sid-el-Mehdi-el-Menebhi respecting the proposed Anglo-German loan.

Sid Menebhi informed me that no reply has, as yet, been received from Fez with reference to the request put forward by the three firms interested in this loan, that the Government properties situate in the coast towns, and also the gate and market dues throughout the country, should be given as an additional security for the loan; and, moreover, Sid Menebhi told me that he did not think it probable that this request would be granted.

He further informed me that M. Abensur, the Tangier agent of the combined firms had, on the previous evening, told him that these negotiations had been in progress since last May, when M. Abensur went to Madrid to discuss the affair with the representatives there of the three commercial houses concerned.

It would appear, therefore, that this is, without doubt, the identical loan mentioned in Mr. Lowther's telegram No. 52 of the 22nd May last.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.



*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 2.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, July 27, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch, Separate, of the 17th instant, reporting the arrival at Mogador of the French yacht "Aigle," I have the honour to inform your Lordship that M. de Chérissey told me yesterday that he had received telegraphic instruction from Paris to send details as to an incident, which was reported in the "Times" of the 24th instant as having occurred at Mogador, when some members of a party from the "Aigle" were attacked by Moors.

M. de Chérissey said that as he had received no report from Mogador as to this occurrence, he would be grateful for any information I could give him on the subject.

I told him that the British Vice-Consul at Mogador had reported that the Moorish population there seemed annoyed at the survey operations which were being conducted by the members of this expedition, and that on the 18th instant, while some of the Frenchmen were watching some powder play, which was being executed by some mounted tribesmen on the beach, they were pelted with stones by a crowd of native boys and had to retire into the town, no one being hurt.

M. de Chérissey remarked that it was most foolish of them if they had attempted to carry out surveys on land, and that he had especially warned M. Dyé, the leader of the expedition, to be careful to refrain from any such action for fear of arousing the suspicions of the natives, and, he added, that he had told the expedition that they must not attempt to land at Agadir.

This expedition was, M. de Chérissey assured me, entirely a private undertaking, and although he understood that there were some French naval officers on board, they were all on extended leave of absence, and were acting in absolutely private capacities, and the French Government had nothing whatever to do with the cruise of this yacht, which was being undertaken for scientific purposes.

M. de Chérissey went on, however, to observe that if, at any future date, the construction or improvement of ports on the Morocco coast should be open to international tenders, the information now being obtained by this expedition would, he imagined, be at the disposal of any French firm desirous of undertaking such work.

I hear that the Moorish authorities at Mogador were alarmed at the rigging of a mast on Mogador Island by M. Dyé, for the purpose of measuring the rise and fall of the tides, it being imagined that this mast was to be used for telegraphic purposes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 2.)*

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Fez, July 30, 1905.*

GERMAN Legation is surprised that, under present circumstances, the concession for a mole at Tangier mentioned in my telegram No. 76 of the 10th instant, which has now been settled in favour of a German firm, should arouse hostile criticism, and affirms that several weeks ago it was virtually settled.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 522.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1905.*

ON the 28th ultimo the French Ambassador communicated to me a Memorandum to the effect that M. Rouvier would be glad if Sir Arthur Nicolson, who was leaving Madrid on the 30th and intended to proceed direct to Paris, could be asked to stop at San Sebastian in order to inform Señor Montero Rios of the adhesion of His Majesty's

Government to the programme which the French Government had put forward for the Morocco Conference.

As regards the meeting place of the Conference, M. Rouvier suggested that it would be advantageous that His Majesty's Government should insist on their objections to the Conference meeting at Tangier, in order that, as a compromise, the French Government might propose that the opening of the Conference, perhaps the first meeting, should be held at Tangier, and that the meetings should be transferred to some other town—for example—San Sebastian, immediately afterwards.

Lastly, if His Majesty's Government were prepared to protest against the concession of the Tangier harbour works, the French Government would be disposed to join in such a measure.

I caused M. Cambon to be informed, in reply, that I had communicated to Sir A. Nicolson M. Rouvier's suggestion that he should stop at San Sebastian on his way home and inform the Spanish Prime Minister of the adhesion of His Majesty's Government to the programme proposed by the French Government.

With regard to the question of the place of meeting of the Conference, I said I was not prepared to take the initiative in objecting to Tangier, but I had authorized Mr. Lowther to join his French colleague in making a representation to the Sultan to that effect, and in suggesting some other place, such as San Sebastian.

Similarly, as regards the concession of works in the port of Tangier, the German tender for which had, we were informed, been definitely accepted, I told his Excellency that Mr. Lowther had been instructed to join his French colleague in pointing out the impropriety of granting concessions or privileges to foreigners until the Conference had had a full opportunity of considering these and other allied questions in all their bearings.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 3.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, July 28, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a Shereefian letter arrived here yesterday addressed to Sid Torres, instructing him to summon nine of the principal local officials, and with their aid to make a careful survey of all Government land situate at Tangier. They were further to assess the value of the rentals to be derived therefrom.

I have not yet been able to discover who is the author of this measure, or what is the reason which has dictated its execution at the present time. It is certain that it will be most unpopular among the populace, especially among those who may be occupying sites on Government land, and who, if the measure is acted upon, will have to pay rent for their tenements.

In a conversation which I had this morning with the German Chargé d'Affaires here, he referred to this measure, and observed that he supposed that the Government wished to assess the value of their properties in order to be able to offer them as security for a loan should it be necessary.

I do not know whether he was thinking of the loan reported in my despatch, Separate, to your Lordship of the 14th instant, when he made this observation.

I have not yet heard if the authorities at the other coast ports have been instructed to carry out a similar measure.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.



No. 123.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 4.)*

(No 191. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 21, 1905.

MAJOR OGILVY, D.S.O., the British Instructor of Cavalry to the Moorish forces, an officer who has taken a keen interest in the military conditions of Morocco, has been good enough, at my request, to furnish me with a short Memorandum dealing with the present state of matters generally connected with the army, together with suggestions as to the reforms which should be introduced, and the manner of their introduction.

This Memorandum, which I am confident will be found of interest, may eventually serve a useful purpose for the British Representative at the proposed Conference, when the question of reform of the army and the establishment of a proper police force is under consideration.

I beg that this document may, for obvious reasons, be regarded as confidential.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 123.

*Notes and Suggestions on Military Reform in Morocco.*

## I.—Recruiting Sources.

RECRUITS may be obtained from three sources—

- (a.) Contingents from the "Geesh" or Makhzen tribes.
- (b.) Contingents from Naiba tribes, i.e., tribes other than Geesh owing allegiance to the Makhzen.
- (c.) General recruiting.

(a.) *The Geesh.*—Up to the time of the present Sultan's grandfather, the whole military force of the Sultan was recruited from the Geesh. The "Mesachreen"—the true cavalry of Morocco—is still drawn entirely from this source. Of the five so-called tribes of Geesh, the "Buacher" and the "Alil Sus" are the most under the control of the Makhzen, from the fact that their Settlements are within the towns of Mekinez and Marakkesh respectively. Next in this respect comes "Sheraga," with Settlements round about Fez, and lastly the "Ourdaya" and the "Sherarda."

The "Mesachreen" are drawn entirely from the first three, and have never been submitted to European training. The last two provide men for the artillery and infantry trained by the French Military Mission.

(b.) *The Naiba Tribes.*—The method employed by these is for the Sultan to call on each tribe for a contingent of so many men. Custom has limited the length of service to six months, and even for this period the men usually receive a bounty from their tribe in addition to the pay they draw from the Makhzen. When in the beginning of 1903 it was decided to train a cavalry force under an European instructor, it was with men drawn from three of these tribes that the experiment was made. The tribes were Abda, Duckala, and Showiza, and the material at first was excellent. The attraction of horses, the interest known to be taken in the experiment by the Sultan, and the good regular pay that resulted therefrom all operated in its favour. The method of forming each unit exclusively from the men of one tribe was undoubtedly a sound one so long, but so long only, as the tribe remained loyal to the Makhzen. Both the quantity and quality of the contingents varied directly with the loyalty of the tribe. Even under these favourable circumstances, however, it was found impossible to induce more than a very small minority to remain over the customary six months, and a sprinkling of new faces in the ranks soon became an almost daily observance.

(c.) *General Recruiting.*—By "general recruiting" is meant obtaining recruits in the

open market as opposed to forming units from the contingents of certain tribes. This is the sole method available at the present time. The recruits are mostly men who for some reason find it advisable to absent themselves temporarily from their tribes, together with a few personal followers of the Kaids. These are supplemented locally by a few unfortunates whose physical disability to compete in the labour market is not marked in a sufficiently revolting manner to insure a successful appeal to charity.

## II.—Relative Advantages of the above Sources.

(a.) *The Geesh.*—It is my firm conviction that the first attempt to form a cavalry force in this country should be made with the Mesachreen. They are, as above said, the true cavalry of Morocco, and inherit a hereditary feeling of loyalty to the Sultan. Though their numbers have necessarily declined, sufficient men for a few squadrons could easily be obtained. I understand that at the present moment there are some 300 Mesachreen of the Ekl Sus in Fez, and I would suggest that a model squadron be formed out of them, with possibly another from the Buacher, these two being the tribes over which the Makhzen has most effective control. These squadrons could, of course, only be trained at the seat of Government, but if the experiment succeeded they would form a model for the organizing of others.

(b.) *The Naiba Tribes.*—The question of Naiba contingents is scarcely a practical one at present; but even were they available, excellent cavalry material though they be, I would not recommend their employment. It is thought by some that, with good pay, quarters, and food, they would be induced to serve for a term of years, but I am not of that opinion myself. It was for this reason—their objection to continuous service—that all musketry instruction was prohibited in the Moorish army, and that my innovation in this respect was looked on with disapproval by so undoubted an authority as Kaïd Maclean. It seems difficult to admit this view without extending it to its logical sequel of prohibiting all training whatsoever. Whether it might be possible to employ some of them as coast police at the ports adjacent to their tribes—analagous to the small force of Rifians in Spanish employment at Ceuta—I am not qualified to judge.

(c.) *General Recruiting.*—Though the material obtainable by this means must, under any conditions, be inferior, for mounted troops at least, to that of tribal contingents, I have no doubt that, with regular pay, quarters, and food, the great difficulty of obtaining continuous service could be overcome, and in time a useful force, even of cavalry or mounted infantry, formed out of it.

## III.—Reforms considered necessary.

(a.) *Control of Pay.*—The first requisite for any reforms, beyond doubt, is European control of the pay. Each instructor should be given, and made accountable for, the pay of his men. By this means he would have some chance of reforming abuses, while the fact of his being looked on as paymaster would greatly increase his influence. Although each rank has a nominal pay, the whole matter is in the hands of the Kaïds, some of whom have told me that they would not stay a week if they only received the pay of their rank. The irregular way in which pay is issued effectively defeats all attempts at reform. The present Minister of War is honestly attempting to reform this and other abuses, and to a certain extent is succeeding. The issue of pay, however, is not in his hands, and he has no power over the outlying Mekallahs, where the most wholesale robbery takes place.

(b.) *Barracks, Cost of Food, Pay, &c.*—Another necessity is barrack accommodation, not only for disciplinary reasons, but also to facilitate the regular provision of food for the men. This last would prove a greater attraction than its mere money value in the form of pay, would improve the physique of the men, and at the same time act as an aid to the enforcement of discipline.

*Cost of food, &c.*—It is difficult to estimate exactly its cost, but from inquiries made at Fez, where prices now are abnormally high, I do not think it could be done, at any rate during winter, for less than 5 greesh (7d.)<sup>\*</sup> per head per day. This would be feeding the men well, and a further greesh (1½d.) per day, with a rise after eighteen months' service, and a certain small addition for efficiency and good conduct, would, I have reason to believe, attract a class of recruits worth training.

The total pay, including food of a squadron such as I recommend (141 of all ranks), would amount to about 52 dollars (6l.) per day. This, of course, exclusive of clothing or keep of horses, &c.

\* Approximate value at present rate of exchange.



(c.) *Presence of Instructors.*—Little practical result can be expected in the field till the instructors accompany their men on expeditions. An ounce of practice of this kind would be worth a large pound of theory in Morocco. It could, I think, be obtained on a small scale without much risk, especially in the case of coast police.

I doubt if a single Kaïd or soldier looks upon our drill as anything more than a European fad of the Sultan's, and about as useful for actual war as proficiency at lawn-tennis. The best-trained troops will revert to their old ways once they are out of sight of their instructor. I was complimented once on the behaviour during an expedition of some squadrons I had trained, but had to modify any satisfaction I felt on learning later that on no single occasion had these men been dismounted to fire. To the impressing on them the importance of this most of my energies had been directed.

(d.) *Training Organization, &c.*—The tastes of the inhabitants, the price of horses, and, to a certain extent, the nature of the country all favour the formation of a mounted force in Morocco. For actual cavalry, as I have said, I recommend commencing on a small scale with the true cavalry of Morocco, the Mesachreen. The vague ideas of military duties possessed by the Moors, and, above all, their dislike to continuous service, do not warrant the expense that a large experiment of this kind would entail. It must be remembered that any Government work, such as building barracks, &c., carried out under Moorish control, is bound to entail an expense quite out of proportion to the work done. For defence of the coast towns, on the other hand, a mounted police force could be established and maintained much cheaper, and would not only, I venture to think, be the most effective kind of defence, but also at most places attract the best material as regards organization.

I attach great importance to its being based on small sectional commands of eight to twelve men each. In addition to the known advantages of the system it will bring to notice the most capable men, from among whom eventually the higher ranks will probably have to be filled.

(e.) *Equipment.*—(1.) *Saddles.*—A Moorish-made saddle is absolutely impossible for military purposes. If it be thought advisable to retain the outward appearance, a serviceable European copy of it can be made for about 8*l.* a-piece, or less than the price of an ordinary Moorish one.

(2.) *Rifles.*—It must be remembered that the Moor has not the most elementary idea of "care of arms." The method employed on expeditions is to bury them in the ground during a halt to prevent their being stolen.

If good weapons are provided great supervision will be necessary over their care.

(3.) *Boots.*—It is scarcely necessary to point out that the Moorish slipper is not an ideal foot gear for a mounted soldier, whatever it may be for a dismounted one. Boots and putties would be necessary.

(f.) *System of Drill, &c.*—The fact of the employment of European words of command, and the want of any laid down system of drill, is probably responsible to a certain extent for that entire want of appreciation of the advantages of drill to which reference has already been made. Both of these defects should be remedied.

(g.) *Proportion of European Instructors.*—The minimum I put at one officer to 300 mounted or 500 dismounted men, with a non-commissioned officer to every 100 in either case. For a police force a larger proportion of non-commissioned officers would be necessary—at any rate, at first.

#### *Training of Moors in Europe.*

The sending annually of a few selected Moors for training in Europe would be of more use than a large increase of instructors.

In this connection I should like to make a suggestion. The late Sultan sent a considerable number of young Moors to Europe to be educated. I am not referring to the men sent to Gibraltar for military training, but to those sent to France, Germany, and Italy, and other countries for general education. These men on returning to their country were seldom employed, and several of them, I believe, could still be found. I myself got hold of one. Even if not suitable as warriors, they would prove of great assistance to an instructor in a non-combatant capacity.

#### *Conclusion.*

In conclusion, I think it will be found that the difficulties a would-be reformer in Morocco will have to contend with will not be any lack of intelligence on the part of the

Moors, but rather (1) a general resistance to any reform throughout the country; (2) the universal experience that honesty is bad policy; last, but by no means least, the sublime conceit inherent in every Moor.

(Signed) ANGUS OGILVY, Major,  
Instructor of Cavalry to Moorish Forces.

Fez, July 19, 1905.

No. 124.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.*—(Received August 4.)

(No. 192.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 24, 1905.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 50 of the 26th May, and to my despatch No. 138 of the 12th June, I have the honour to transmit herewith reports regarding the condition of the prisons at Tangier, Dar-al-Baida, Mazagan, Saffi, and Mogador.

Considering the deplorable condition of the country in every other direction, it cannot from these statements be said that the prisons in the coast towns present a specially distressing picture.

There are indications in these Reports of some inquiry having been recently made into the condition of the prisons, probably in consequence of a conversation I had some time ago on the subject with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 124.

*Memorandum regarding present State of Prisons and Treatment of Prisoners at Tangier.*

THERE are three buildings used as prisons at Tangier:—

1. A large gaol for Moorish men.
2. A smaller prison for men, one corner room of which is used for Jews.
3. A small building, consisting of a patio and three rooms, with accommodation for six female Moorish prisoners. The present number of occupants is two.

The total number of prisoners now in custody in all three of the above-mentioned prisons (exclusive of soldiers in temporary confinement to prevent desertion) is 112. Of these, seventy-four, being friendless, are supplied with food at the expense of the Moorish Government—viz., two loaves per day and water.

The rest, thirty-eight, are provided for by their respective families or friends.

The prisons, at present, do not seem to be overcrowded, and the ventilation is good.

No whitewashing has apparently been done for several months.

There is a good supply of drinking water, which is contained in a large trough within the building, to which the water is conveyed by a pipe from outside, into which it is poured by the water-carriers.

The drainage is most primitive, and the water-closets have a most offensive smell.

The prisoners generally clothe themselves; some are completely destitute.

Some wear fetters or chains of greater or less weight, according to the gravity of the charge against them.

The rest are unbound and free to move about.

By the custom of the place each prisoner has a spot where he sits and lies at night, and which is respected by his companions, but there are no separate cells, with one exception, which a Kaïd, who has just died, had occupied for the last three or four years.



## Inclosure 2 in No. 124.

*Consul Maclean to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 7. Separate.)

Sir,

*Dar-al-Baida (Mazagan), July 11, 1905.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 12th ultimo from Fez, I have the honour to transmit herewith the reports I have received on the state of prisons and prisoners in this Consular district.

From the information received, and from my knowledge of the normal conditions of life of free Moors, I arrive at the following conclusions:—

1. Life in the prisons in the coast towns is not attended by any particular hardships to the prisoners. They lead a free life within the walls, and can receive their friends and women-folk.

2. The prisons are not overcrowded, and, with the exception of the one in Dar-al-Baida, the sanitary conditions are not worse than is the case in most of the native houses.

3. There is no proper register of prisoners' names, the reason of their incarceration, and the term of their sentences.

4. There is no system of supplying food regularly to those who are not in a position to feed themselves, and it is within my knowledge that some prisoners are almost starving.

In the case of the murder of Mr. Madden, I found that one of the prisoners, simply a witness, who if allowed freedom would run away, had nothing to eat for three days.

5. Men are sent to prison at the caprice of Governors, frequently for purposes of extortion.

6. There is no prison discipline of forced labour, but the gaolers and warders live on what they can fleece from prisoners and their friends.

7. There is no proper superintendence of prisons and prisoners; no regular inspections are made.

The above observations apply to prisons for males in coast towns only.

Females are in separate prisons, presided over by an Arifa, and most of the prisoners are of loose character, who are in prison to be squeezed.

Other female prisoners are women who have been deposited for safe keeping during the absence of their husbands.

The prisons in the Kasbahs of the interior are stated to be horrible beyond description. There has never been, to my knowledge, any superintendence of country prisons.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 124.

*Memorandum on the Moorish Prison and Prisoners at Dar-al-Baida.*

THE Moorish prison at Dar-al-Baida consists of an inner or lower prison, roofed in, about 36 feet by 21 feet, and an outer prison, or courtyard, of about 45 feet square, on one side of which are three rooms and on the other side an opening leading into the lower prison.

The inner prison is three steps below the level of the courtyard, and is dark, damp, and dirty. For ventilation it has three small windows (unglazed), high up in the walls, and for flooring the bare earth.

Out of the total of ninety-seven prisoners forty-eight are confined in the inner prison, but those of them who can afford it are allowed, on the payment of a gratuity to the guards, to come out by day into the open courtyard, but are huddled back again at night. No beds or bedding are provided by the prison authorities.

The three rooms in the outer prison are occupied by prisoners of means. One room has twelve occupants, another room sixteen, and the third (which is also used as a mosque) is tenanted by six political prisoners in irons. Besides these rooms in the courtyard are two sheds, put up by the prisoners themselves, to keep the sun off by day and the dew off those who sleep under them by night.

The Jewish prisoners number eight, most of whom are lodged in the inner prison. The general condition of the prison is dirty and the sanitary arrangements of the most primitive kind. A well in the courtyard provides water for drinking, washing clothes, and ablutions.

The administration of the prison has undergone a change since last Ramadan. Before that time the Makhzen had a specially appointed Amin, Si Hashem-ben-Tweemy, and two Adools to look after the prison and distribute the "moona"—i.e., a loaf of bread—every day to prisoners who were in for a long term. The rule was to call the roll on the first of every month; "moona" was then allowed to all those prisoners who were not in receipt of outside relief. Prisoners who were incarcerated after the roll had been called received no Government "moona" until the next roll-call, and in the meantime had to live as best they could—on the bounty of their more fortunate fellow prisoners, or on private charity, or on what they could steal or snatch. Some made baskets or plaited rope.

The present administration is in the hands of the Custom-house officials, who have delegated an overseer called Si Bennisur Regragy-el-Fasy, who is supposed to look after the wants of the prisoners, but of whom it is said that he distributes the "moona" to others than the unfortunate prisoners, whose lot is worse than before.

Almost the whole of the prisoners now in prison are said to have been incarcerated by the present Governor. The six political prisoners seem to be the only ones who have been in prison for any length of time.

(Signed)

R. H. BROWNE,

*Acting British Vice-Consul.**Dar-al-Baida, June 29, 1905.*

## Inclosure 4 in No. 124.

*Mr. Spinney to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 36.)

Sir,

*Mazagan, July 3, 1905.*

IN reply to your Circular despatch of the 27th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the Administrators of Customs have orders to inspect the prison bi-monthly, and to send one of their employés daily to see if the prisoners are properly treated.

At the present moment the sanitary arrangements are very bad, but I have heard to-day that the Administrators are having them attended to.

The Administrators have no orders to feed the prisoners, so it goes very hard with those who are poor and have no relations here.

Some years ago an Amin was appointed to the prison, whose duty it was to take down in writing the name of each prisoner, the nature of his crime, and the term of his imprisonment, but this is not the case at present.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed)

T. G. SPINNEY.

## Inclosure 5 in No. 124.

*Vice-Consul Hunot to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 22.)

Sir,

*Saffi, June 29, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Circular despatch of the 27th instant, requesting a report on the present state of prisons and the treatment of prisoners in this district of Saffi.

In accordance with your directions I have made inquiries, and find that the Umana visited the prison here yesterday and took note of the names of the prisoners confined therein. At present there are about ninety-five prisoners, only twenty-two of whom are supplied by the Umana daily with two loaves each. Some of the others receive food from their own people—amongst them are several well-to-do men.

The town prison is resorted to by the provincial Kaïds for the safe confinement of influential and dangerous characters. Of course, it is not to be compared with the prisons in the interior, which are known to be in a deplorable condition, and where the confined are most cruelly treated. The town prison is kept in fairly good condition. The visit of the Umana yesterday—a very unusual occurrence—I attribute to fresh orders being very recently received from head-quarters.

[1566]

T



Generally the prisoners in town here are not treated badly. Until recently there were serious complaints made by the prisoners of insufficient and inferior food. Evidently the Umana have now been suddenly awakened to attend to their duty in this matter.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GEORGE P. HUNOT.

Inclosure 6 in No. 124.

*Report on State of Prisons and Treatment of Prisoners in Mogador.*

THE present condition of the prison and of prisoners appears to be on the whole satisfactory. The prison, a large open space where the sun penetrates, with rooms on the ground and first floors, contains eighty-five prisoners, and is reported to me to be clean. There is abundance of water, and two Moorish loaves of bread are supplied daily by the Government to each prisoner; the value of this ration of bread is approximately 1½d. One shirt, costing about 1s. 3d., is supplied yearly to each prisoner. This year it has not yet been given out, but I am assured it is about to be distributed.

Two years ago a special prison Ameen and scribe arrived from Fez to report on the case of each prisoner and the reasons for the imprisonment. It is believed this was carried out, but after a time the new officials went away and nothing more was ever heard of them. The prison is now managed by a deputy of the Custom-house Ameens. The late Kaïd of Mogador, Kaïd Ayad-el-Menebbi, had the shackles taken off nearly all the prisoners; but recently all but the elder in age prisoners were shackled again. The real reasons for this measure are not quite clear: some say that a conspiracy to break out of the gaol was discovered among the prisoners; others that it was due to the zeal of a new captain of the prison, who wished to stand well with the Town Governor.

The shackles are, I believe, not very tight, but, nevertheless, they make it more difficult for the prisoners to earn a little money by basket- and mat-making than when they were without them.

All kinds of prisoners—political, thieves, murderers—are in the same prison. One murderer has been there for twenty-two years. Women and children relatives of the prisoners can enter freely and take them food, &c., and can have meals with the prisoners. Recently a prisoner was married in the gaol. A prisoner's wife can practically live with her husband in the gaol, but the grant of such favours is in the discretion of the gaol captain.

There were at a former time as many as 1,500 prisoners in this same prison. They were for the most part alleged to have taken part in the southern rebellion. The state of the prison then was very bad. Funerals were of daily and constant occurrence from this mass of humanity cramped up, badly fed, and exposed to the elements, and hundreds died. There was, luckily, no epidemic, but the general symptoms which caused death were swelling of the arms and legs with disease of the heart supervening.

Three years ago, however, His Majesty the Sultan, by an act of clemency, caused about 500 so-called political prisoners to be released, and smaller batches followed. There are still some, but not many, of this category of prisoners left.

In consequence of this clearance the condition of prisoners can now be said to be fairly satisfactory.

There is also a second prison, a small one, called the Governor's prison. Only two persons are at present detained there.

(Signed) A. M. MADDEN,  
*His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul.*

July 6, 1905.

P.S.—Since writing the above, six Sultan's prisoners, disguised as Government soldiers, escaped from the prison last night about midnight. They made their way through a hole pierced in the prison wall into the Grand Mosque. On being challenged at the intramural gates they declared themselves soldiers and were passed through, whence they gained the town walls and escaped.

A. M. M.

No. 125.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 193.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 25, 1905.

BEN SLIMAN ABDELKRIM sent for me yesterday and said that, by direction of the Sultan, he desired to make a communication to me and to my French and German colleagues, which he classified under three headings:—

1. Latterly foreigners had been dressing as Moors and entering mosques and saint-houses, which was absolutely forbidden by the religious law of the country.
2. Foreigners had photographed mosques, streets, and the persons in the streets.
3. Foreigners were selling liquor to Mahomedans.

His Majesty feared that these acts might at any moment incite the population to violent acts, which might have disastrous results, and His Majesty was consequently invoking the assistance of the three Ministers present in Fez to put a stop to these practices.

In reply, I said to Ben Sliman that, as to complaints (1) and (3), I fully agreed that such acts, if they had really occurred, were most reprehensible, and I felt convinced that no member of the British Mission or no British subject since I had been here could be charged with such indelicate actions, and I felt convinced that his Excellency was fully aware how careful Englishmen were in all Mahomedan countries to avoid doing anything to wound the susceptibilities and prejudices of the people of the country. As regards No. (2), I thought that the seriousness of this offence was rather exaggerated.

We certainly must plead guilty to the charge at any rate of photographing streets and figures, and from a personal observation I judged that so far from the natives resenting being immortalized by a kodak they appeared rather to appreciate it. Moreover, I understood that His Majesty himself was a great photographer, so that it could hardly be considered a serious offence, especially as I believed that the wise men in nearly all Mahomedan countries had accepted photography, and did not any longer consider it against the teaching of Mahommed.

His Excellency replied that the people themselves had no objection, but the Ulema could not be brought to see it in the same light; that it was strictly opposed to Mahomedan law; and that the Ulema, feeling so strongly as they did about it, could easily arouse the population. I promised his Excellency that I would enjoin care on the members of the Mission and the British subjects to avoid anything that might give rise to offence or lead to disturbance.

On inquiry I find that, as a matter of fact, all the charges were really directed against French citizens. One Martin, in no way connected with the Mission or the Consulate, had entered the mosque of Muley Dris, and the French Minister promised to do what he could to stop a repetition of this injudicious step. Captain Schneider, of the French military Mission, had been guilty of indiscretion in the matter of photography, and the French Minister referred the Minister to the Head of the military Mission.

A French citizen has recently opened a liquor shop in the Jewish quarter of the town. The French Minister is doubtful how far he is justified in interfering with their business, though he appreciates the inconvenience of it, and has promised to give the matter very careful attention.

It is worthy of remark that, while during the past few months, when a large number of Christians have been here, no anti-Christian demonstration, or indeed any indication of any anti-Christian feeling, now, when there are few foreigners left, the Makhzen should suddenly develop the symptoms of nervousness.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.



No. 126.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 194.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 25, 1905.

I SAW Count Tattenbach this morning, and, speaking of proposed Conference, he said that it was very remarkable that the French Minister had made no communication to the Makhzen to the effect that France had agreed to join that Conference.

His Excellency understood that when M. Saint-René did make a communication in that sense he would probably add to it a general exposé defining clearly the attitude of France in this country.

His Excellency added that he thought it was absolutely necessary that the Conference should be held at Tangier, and he saw no reason to anticipate any difficulty in inducing the Sultan to accept the programme, provided it were moderate in its scope. France should, in the first instance, confine herself to a very limited programme of reform, and, as she had already made great strides here during the last ten years, there was no reason to doubt her being able to carry out gradually a general reform.

Count Tattenbach was good enough to ask for my personal views as to the reform dealing with the army and police, and after I had pointed out to him the obvious disadvantages of an international organization in this matter, he replied that if it was to be purely French, the whole country might as well be handed over at once to that Power. The financial control was already theirs, for under the contract of the 1904 loan they had an option in any future loans.

Count Tattenbach's general language to me this morning was, however, in such a very different strain from that previously held by him to me, and yet so little in conformity with his present action here, that it is perhaps worth recording.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 127.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 195.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 24, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 184 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further report I have received from Mr. Consul Maclean regarding the steps which are being taken to trace and arrest the persons suspected of complicity in the murder of Mr. Madden.

On receipt of this despatch I yesterday afternoon called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and pointed out to his Excellency the desirability of removing the present Governor of Mazagan from his post, as suggested by Mr. Maclean, but his Excellency again assured me, in the strongest terms, that that official was doing everything possible in the matter, and that he had great hopes that the murderers would shortly be discovered and arrested. In support of this opinion his Excellency adduced the fact that the Governor of Mazagan had already succeeded in arresting the brothers Ben Yusef, which his Excellency evidently looks on as no mean feat, as he was at great pains to impress me with the idea that all Mazagan, including the Governor, stood in great fear of these men, who appear to have terrorized the town for some time past.

As regards the arrest of the German semsar Hadj Ahmed-ben-Yusef, which, I understand, the Governor effected entirely on his own responsibility, I have the honour to report that, on the receipt of Mr. Maclean's despatch, I called upon Count Tattenbach to lay before his Excellency the reasons brought forward by Mr. Maclean in favour of the continued detention of that individual until such time as his release may be advisable. Count Tattenbach replied that he had received a very full report from the Consul he had sent down to Mazagan to make a judicial inquiry, the result of which was that there was absolutely no evidence against the man, so that, however much he might desire to be agreeable to me, he had no power to order the man to be detained in prison any longer.

As, however, some time must elapse before his Excellency's orders for Hadj Ahmed-ben-Yusef's release reach Mazagan, some further evidence inculcating others may still be extracted from the man.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 127.

*Consul Maclean to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 8. Separate.)

Sir,

Mazagan, July 18, 1905.

RELATIVE to the murder of Mr. Daniel Madden, I have the honour to report that M. Igen, my German colleague in Dar-al-Baida, left here on Saturday evening, the 15th instant.

He informed me that his task here was to inquire whether there were sufficient grounds of suspicion to justify the detention in prison of the German semsar Hadj Ahmed-ben-Yusef.

My colleague did not give a decision before he left, and I believe his intention is to report the conclusions he has arrived at to Count Tattenbach.

I gathered that M. Igen has in his mind decided in favour of Hadj Ahmed, and would recommend that he should be released.

I told him frankly that in the interest of justice I should regret this course.

My duty has not been to make a judicial inquiry myself, but to urge on the Moorish authorities, and to assist them by any proper means to detect the culprits.

Boo Ashum, the Secretary sent down by Sid Abdelkrim-ben-Sliman, cannot be accused of prejudice, and he is of opinion that Hadj Ahmed should be detained in prison until further light has been thrown on the case.

My colleague's inquiry was judicial rather than judicious. He heard a great number of witnesses, but has not the local knowledge to enable him to sift the truth from the false.

No representative from the Moorish authorities, or from this Consulate, was invited to be present during the inquiry.

On the other hand, the German Consulate soldier is father of one of those who is suspected of being concerned in the murder, and is father-in-law of Abderahman-ben-Yusef.

This soldier is really an employé in the business of the German Vice-Consul, who is a British subject. The man receives no pay, and only acts as soldier on special occasions.

The talib who took down the evidence is also unpaid, and although registered as a scribe in the local German Vice-Consulate, does not reside here, but lives in Azimur, and cannot be considered an impartial person.

No native who was afraid of the Ben Yusefs would give evidence against them in the presence of these people.

I asked M. Igen to hear some of the witnesses in this Vice-Consulate, but he declined to do so. It was difficult for me to impress upon him that to gather truth from Moors it is first necessary to inspire confidence. I pointed out to him that he was not trying Hadj Ahmed for murder, but only endeavouring to find out whether there were sufficient grounds to justify his detention until the case had been developed.

The following are the reasons I advanced to justify the man's detention:—

People here speak of the Ben Yusefs. They comprise Hadj Ahmed, Abdallah, and Abderahman, three brothers, who are joint owners and occupants of premises which are the head-quarters of bad characters from Ulad Ferj and elsewhere.

Thefts have constantly been traced to their premises. Well-known thieves have been seen there. The family, one or other of them, is known to have forcibly ravished a girl, to have cut about and maltreated women, to be constantly employed in drunken debauchery.

One brother, Hadj Ahmed, may be an angel among devils, but he is the eldest of them and the head of the house, and has himself to thank if he is misjudged.

The late father of the Ben Yusefs was imprisoned for the murder of a woman and her daughter, who were British subjects.

Thus it is shown that the family has a bad history, yet this fact does not necessarily implicate them in the present murder.

[1566]

U



But on the night of the crime the Ben Yusefs were engaged in a drunken orgie, at which notorious women were present. They and their friend were the only people seen out on the night. The dancing girls who were with them have disappeared. I have heard no evidence, excepting the statement of one native, that Hadj Ahmed was present at this particular orgie.

Others who attended have fled. Bu Ali and Ben Naami, who both appear to answer the description of one of the murderers given by Mrs. Madden, were said to have been with them. These men have fled.

Another man named Birra, a notorious character and friend of the Ben Yusefs, has also fled.

I consider that these are sufficient grounds of suspicion to justify Hadj Ahmed's detention. The Sultan's Commissioner agrees with me.

Supposing the motive of the murder were robbery, these are the people one would suspect, and it is possible that the wine previously drunk led to the committal of the murder, when only the robbery was intended.

Another point of view is that of the Governor's. This official believes that the murder was instigated by Bu Ali-ben-Edris, who wishes to replace him.

This Bu Ali-ben-Edris was at the Ben Yusefs' house a few days previous to the occurrence.

Thus it seems whichever clue is followed it leads to the Ben Yusefs' house, although later it may be demonstrated that the family had nothing to do with this particular crime.

One witness, whose story appeared to me to be worth remembering, informed me that a robbery of Mr. Madden's house was proposed to him by a friend of the Ben Yusefs, and on behalf of Abderahman-ben-Yusef.

The dragoman of the German Consulate was present when this Moor told me this. I asked the native to give his evidence to M. Igen, and in the evening I learnt that he had run away.

Since then he has returned, and is now employed in searching for some of the effects which were taken from the murdered man's house.

The real reason I have for wishing the detention of Hadj Ahmed is that I am convinced that many people will give information when all rumours of his approaching release cease to be spread about.

We are pushing our inquiries in other directions, but the state of the country and absence of authority renders the truth difficult. It will be of great advantage if the present Governor of Mazagan is promptly removed.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

No. 128.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 196.)

My Lord,

*Fez, July 24, 1905.*

I UNDERSTAND that the Makhzen has sent orders to the Governors of Larache and Borj Saida to show every attention and to give every facility to engineers representing the German firm of Richter who are shortly proceeding to those ports with a view to making surveys.

The interest recently taken by German firms in these three northern ports of Morocco is not without interest.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 129.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 197.)

My Lord,

*Fez, July 25, 1905.*

A CONTRACT is under discussion between the German Minister and the Sultan's Government for the purchase by the latter from Germany of two steamers. These would presumably be used for the transport of troops and munitions of war to Saida, the Sultan being very desirous of freeing himself from the necessity of being under an obligation to the French Government in the matter of troops or being allowed to pass through Algerian territory.

Steamers for the above purpose are not always available at Tangier when they are required.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 130.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 198.)

My Lord,

*Fez, July 22, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Lordship's notice the following case, in which a British naturalized subject, Hadj Taleb Lazrac, brings a claim for 11,298 dollars (about 1,300*l.*) against the Moorish Government for damage done to his standing crops and olive trees by Moorish soldiery. The damage claimed for was committed some two years ago by troops who were collected at the Seboo Bridge, about 2 miles to the east of Fez, ostensibly to defend the city of Fez in the event of an attack by the forces of the Pretender, the troops being camped there for some months.

Some correspondence ensued between this Legation and the Moorish Government on this subject, and Mr. Vice-Consul Macleod was instructed to endeavour to obtain suitable compensation for Hadj Taleb Lazrac, but the Moorish Government put forward the plea that, the damage having occurred in the course of measures taken for the defence of the town and in the public welfare, it was not liable by Moslem law to make compensation, that many others had suffered similar damage, though in none of the other cases did the sufferer enjoy foreign protection, and therefore, if compensation were given in this case, it would have to be given in the others, which was beyond the means of the Moorish Government.

In answer to these arguments it was pointed out that the damage was not the result of military operations, but was the outcome of mere unrestrained robbery on the part of the Government troops, and that therefore the claim should be paid out of the public funds, and further that the damage caused to the properties of Moorish subjects was purely a matter between them and their Government.

I have again brought this claim to the notice of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but he still maintains his former contention, although Hadj Taleb Lazrac had some time since professed his willingness to pay his share of any special impost on the city of Fez to compensate those who suffered by the action of the troops, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had admitted this was a fair proposal.

The Moorish Government subsequently suggested that the claim should be referred to Shraa for a decision, but Hadj Taleb Lazrac considers that proposal impossible of acceptance, as he fears that no Kaïd would or could even be expected to give judgment against the Sultan.

In March of this year Hadj Taleb Lazrac offered to withdraw his claim if the Moorish Government would make up his losses in some other way, which would not compromise them as regards the claims of others, and proposed to take over certain lands formerly belonging to El Mehedi-el-Menebhi, of which the Government is disposing, in satisfaction of his claim, but to this the Moorish Government would not agree.

At the time the damage was done an expert was deputed by the Government to go to the spot to examine into and assess the amount of the damage, and a document was in due course drawn up by him, a copy of which was handed in to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.



At the Moorish Government's suggestion this course was followed instead of sending notaries and several valuers, as the Moorish Government did not wish it to be known to others that the Government contemplated compensating Hadj Taleb Lazrac. It was done through the Governor of Fez, Kaïd Abderrahman-ben-Abdessadok.

I fear I have gone into this case at some length, but is my object to place your Lordship in possession of as many of the details as possible, and I have the honour to request that I may be furnished with instructions as to what further action I should take in this matter, as this is not an isolated case, there being some other small claims of a similar nature for pillage and damage to property of British subjects by Government troops in the neighbourhood of Tangier during the disturbances there in January 1903, which were duly reported to your Lordship by Sir A. Nicolson. In that instance also the Moorish authorities took no steps to protect the property of Europeans or natives, nor did they make any attempt to recover the property looted by the troops, which was disposed of openly by the latter in the Tangier market.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 131.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 199.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 26, 1905.

THE question as to where the proposed Conference on Morocco reforms is to be held, is now beginning to exercise public opinion, although, both officially and privately, it is generally taken as a matter of course that it should meet at Tangier.

I venture to submit a few considerations for and against Tangier being chosen.

In the first place the Sultan would be flattered, and his people likewise, at the idea of his having been able to call a Conference of all the Great Powers on his own soil, and, indeed, some think that he would decline to take part in it at all if held outside Morocco.

Some days would be gained in the taking of decisions on the various points, as the Moorish Government possess no cypher, and will certainly not give full powers of any kind to their Delegate or Delegates.

The population is suspicious about this Conference, of which it understands but little, but this suspicion regarding it would be much reduced did it take place in Morocco.

The climatic conditions in the autumn and early winter are excellent.

As reasons against holding the Conference at Tangier, and under the conditions proposed by His Majesty, the obvious and most important one suggests itself—namely, that the Powers would thus be debarred from selecting their own Delegates. Tangier is full of Spanish anarchists, and, as your Lordship is aware, there is practically no police control. Stories of all kinds would fill the air as to the proceedings of the Conference, which would inevitably be exaggerated, and possibly produce a bad impression in the country, whereas if the Conference is held outside, the public here will very likely ignore its existence altogether. Lastly, the Representatives of small Powers, who have no axe of their own to grind, and who are not disinclined to over-appreciate the artistic lethargy of the country, will possibly fail to realize the advantages of reform, and will be inclined to support the Moorish Delegate where such action does not clash with their interests.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 132.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 200.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 26, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that during a conversation I had yesterday afternoon with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Excellency in speaking of the recent Government success at Oujdah, said that the Government troops had latterly been constantly

harassing the Pretender's forces, which were mostly composed of men from the southern provinces, bordering on and in the Sahara, all of those attacks being more or less successful. These constant defeats would appear to have so dispirited the Pretender's partisans that after the last battle, which it seems was of a more serious nature than usual, they decided to abandon him and return to their homes in the south. The Pretender thereupon retired westwards with a small following of about 200 men to Aïoun Sidi Millouk, and Bou Amama has also retired southward with the remnant of his force.

The son of Bou Amama, I am told by Sid Abdelkrim-ben-Sliman, who was thought for a time to be sincere in his adherence to the Government cause, having been discovered in treachery, has been arrested and imprisoned at Oujdah, as reported in my despatch No. 182 of the 12th instant.

His Excellency also referred to an article in an Oran paper which had been contributed by a M. Delbrel, a French adventurer in the service of the Pretender, in which the latter gives as a reason for the withdrawal of the Pretender from Oujdah his intention of attacking Fez, but as the force with him is so reduced in numbers, there is small probability of any such attempt being made.

The article his Excellency informed me also contained a statement to the effect that letters had reached the Pretender from Fez, assuring him that he would be well received by the townspeople, who would tender him their allegiance, and that amongst those letters was one from the Shereef Kitsani, mentioned in my despatch No. 140 of the 14th ultimo.

It is clear that the Government troops on this last occasion missed another opportunity of finally crushing the Pretender, and thus will succeed in being still supported for some time at Government expense, which would not occur were the Pretender and his supporters finally suppressed.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 133.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 4.)*

(No. 201.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 26, 1905.

SHORTLY after my arrival at Fez I took the occasion to call the attention of Ben Sliman to the effect that some conditions of the arrangement under which Sid-el-Menebhi was to leave this country remained unfulfilled by the Moorish Government, and pointed out that as long as this was the case I could not recommend his departure.

These points were the following:—

1. One house in Morocco city had not been handed to his agent for the delivery of his private effects.
2. His wife had been detained at Fez.
3. The most important part of his personal effects at Morocco city had disappeared.
4. The brothers and nephews who were to be allowed to go with him have been deprived of their property.
5. The agent appointed by him to attend to the wants of the family has been ordered to hand over the money to the Government.

Ben Sliman replied that all these were trumped-up charges by a man who had no honour and no regard for truth, but I told his Excellency that I had no desire to discuss the man's character, but merely wished to see the arrangement faithfully carried out, and begged him to cause the necessary inquiries to be made.

A few days ago I received a pressing message in the name of the Sultan requesting me to hasten Menebhi's departure, and yesterday Ben Sliman sent for me and repeated the request, urging upon me the great importance of the question. His Excellency stated that most of the points I had mentioned he regarded as merely unfounded charges brought by Menebhi in no way affecting the agreement. With regard to his wife having been influenced to refuse to join her husband, his Excellency stated that she had acted of her own free will and from the first had declared her intention of appealing to Shraa against being forced to leave Fez. Considerable discussion ensued on this point, I, on my side, maintaining that, just as much as the Makhzen had insisted on his mother leaving when Menebhi desired her to remain, so should his wife be

[1566]

X



compelled to go even if she did not so desire it, otherwise the agreement fell through. This view Ben Sliman declined to accept, and I said that without reference to your Lordship I could not alter my view. The other points required some further elucidation, and I had already made the necessary inquiries.

Ben Sliman, who was very importunate and evidently very anxious about the matter, declared that, if I so desired it, the whole matter would be settled in ten days, but if not it could be made to drag on for years. I assured his Excellency that His Majesty's Government and myself were most desirous to see the arrangement faithfully carried out to the letter, but that I had no authority to depart from the spirit and letter of the arrangement at the desire of the Moorish Government, and would not do so without reference to your Lordship.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 134.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 202.)

My Lord,

*Fez, July 28, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 192 of the 24th instant, on the subject of the administration of prisons in Morocco, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a report of the prisons at Rabat drawn up by the British Vice-Consul in that town.

Owing to Mr. Neroutsos being on leave of absence he was unable to furnish me with this report in time to be transmitted to your Lordship in my above-mentioned despatch.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 134.

*Vice-Consul Neroutsos to Consul Maclean.*

(No. 42.)

Sir,

*Rabat, July 18, 1905.*

WITH reference to your Circular of the 27th ultimo, asking for information regarding the Rabat prisons, I have the honour to report that I find, after careful inquiry, that the Regulations some time ago laid down with a view to the better care of the prisoners are still in force, and that the condition of prisoners has in no way deteriorated of late.

There existed three prisons here three or four years ago or less—viz., the Dar-el-Barood or powder magazine, overlooking the sea, which had been converted by order of the late Vizier Hamed-ben-Musa into a terrible place of confinement for political prisoners; (2) there was, and still is, a prison in the Kasbah of Adaia; and (3), lastly, the town prison, used chiefly as a place of confinement for local offenders in civil matters.

Dar-el-Barood has long been reconverted into a barracks.

The Adaia prison is empty. The town prison has rarely more than ten or twelve prisoners of recent years, and generally under sentence of three to four days. Lately, however, about forty Zair tribesmen have been incarcerated, among them a noted highwayman, for robbery, plunder, and murder on the roads. These latter are all in chains, and I do not suppose receive very mild treatment, but the ordinary prisoners are always allowed to see their friends, buy what they may require, and dwell in a sort of entrance to the prison.

Two Amins were appointed to look into the treatment of the prisoners, both men of high standing and refinement. One of these Amins, Hadj Benashir, who was also Administrator of Customs, died last year; his colleague resigned. The post of prison superintendent was then transferred to Sid Tahr Zihdi, once a Vizier of Mulai-el-Hassan, and, after that Sovereign's death, for many years in captivity in the Saffi prison,

and could no doubt sympathize. Zihdi, however, also resigned, and the prison is now under the surveillance of a certain Taher Marofi, a respectable man, competent for the duty. On the whole, the Rabat prison may be pronounced to be a tolerable place of confinement.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. E. NEROUTSOS.

No. 135.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 5.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, July 29, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch, Separate, of the 27th instant, respecting the action of members of the "Aigle" expedition at Mogador, I have the honour to report to your Lordship that I hear from trustworthy sources that, as a result of the action of this expedition in carrying out survey operations in the immediate neighbourhood, the tribes of that district, who have lately been paying taxes to their Governors, have now refused to continue doing so, saying that they had only allowed themselves to be taxed since they had thought the money would be devoted to the expulsion of the French from the country, but they now saw that by allowing these Frenchmen to land from the yacht and survey the country at their pleasure the Government had no such intention.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. W. SMITH.

No. 136.

*Sir E. Egerton to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 129.)

My Lord,

*Rome, August 2, 1905.*

I SHOULD mention that, according to what M. Tittoni told me, it was not a true statement of the German Ambassador at Madrid to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Italian Government had accepted Tangier as a place of meeting for a Morocco Conference as reported by Sir Arthur Nicolson to your Lordship on the 18th ultimo.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDWIN H. EGERTON

No. 137.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lister.*

(No. 528.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1905.*

THE French Ambassador, who has been absent from London for some time, called upon me this morning. He left with me a copy of a note, which M. Rouvier had handed to Prince Radolin on the 1st instant, with reference to the Morocco question. A copy of the note is attached to this despatch.

His Excellency told me that on the 29th July M. Rouvier had addressed to Prince Radolin a letter remonstrating at the manner in which concessions were being obtained by Germany, notably in the case of the proposed mole at Tangier. Prince Radolin had thereupon sent a member of his Embassy to offer explanations, which were to the effect that the contract given to a German firm for the construction of the mole had been for a considerable time in contemplation, that it could not be regarded as a concession to the German Government, and that Count Tattenbach had not been instructed to press for it.

M. Rouvier had addressed a further letter to Prince Radolin on the 31st disputing his arguments, and mentioning that there were further evidences of German activity, notably in the case of an attempt to obtain permission to construct a telegraph cable from Tangier to the Atlantic coast. It was this correspondence which had led M. Rouvier to write the letter which his Excellency now brought me.



M. Cambon also told me that he had mentioned to M. Rouvier the suggestion which I had made to him on the 20th ultimo, to the effect that the Conference should be empowered to deal with the question of the taxation of foreigners. M. Rouvier had not thought it desirable to mention this point specifically, as he desired that his proposals should correspond as closely as possible with those which had been made in the first instance by the French Government to the Maghzen, but in M. Rouvier's opinion it was obvious that no reforms affecting the liability of foreigners to taxation could be made without the assent of the Powers, and that the question was one which would naturally be included in that of financial reforms.

With regard to the place of meeting, Prince Radolin had asked for Tangier. M. Rouvier had reserved his opinion, and had suggested to the Spanish Government that they might ask for Madrid or San Sebastian. This idea had, his Excellency believed, found favour with the Spanish Government, who would probably invite us to agree to it. M. Cambon thought that both Sir Arthur Nicolson and M. Révoil, who would represent France, were decidedly opposed to Tangier, and his Excellency attached no importance to the argument that it was only upon Moorish soil that sufficient evidence could be obtained.

I asked his Excellency what would happen supposing the Powers could not agree as to the place of meeting. He replied that an irreconcilable difference of opinion might lead to a breakdown of the proposal for a Conference, and he added that it would not be very difficult to bring about such a breakdown if it were desired, but that, in his opinion, although he personally regretted that any encouragement had been given to the idea of a Conference, it would be a pity that the proposal should now fall through. I expressed agreement, adding that it would, to my mind, be most undesirable that anything should be done which might enable others to say that the failure of the negotiations was due to the conduct of the French or British Governments.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSLOWNE.

Inclosure in No. 137.

*M. Rouvier to Prince Radolin.*

JE vous adresse, conformément au vœu qu'en a exprimé le Gouvernement Impérial, un projet de programme des questions à soumettre à la Conférence, projet dont les deux Gouvernements pourront, après entente entre eux, proposer l'adoption à Sa Majesté Chérifienne.

Nous nous sommes inspirés, pour fixer les éléments de ce programme, des principes posés dans l'Accord du 8 Juillet dernier; nous avons également tenu compte des termes de l'invitation adressée par le Sultan aux Puissances en vue de la réunion d'une Conférence.

Ni les Notables consultés par Sa Majesté Chérifienne sur les projets de réformes que nous lui avons présentés, ni les Plénipotentiaires qu'elle avait désignés pour les discuter, n'ont opposé de sérieuses objections à ces projets. Il n'est donc pas douteux qu'en manifestant le désir de consulter les Puissances sur le mode de réformes qui seraient appropriées à la situation de son Empire, et sur la manière de pourvoir aux frais de ces réformes, le Sultan n'ait eu en vue, comme nous, les mesures à prendre, tant pour garantir l'ordre et la sécurité de son Empire que pour en améliorer la situation financière, en régulariser les ressources et en développer la prospérité économique.

Nous avons intentionnellement condensé les éléments de ce programme sous une forme sommaire, et éliminé des questions à soumettre à la Conférence les détails et les développements dans lesquels étaient entrées nos propositions au Sultan. Sans nous départir des intentions que nous vous avons fait connaître dans nos entretiens, et spécialement dans notre note du 6 Juillet, en ce qui concerne la part que la France compte demander dans l'exécution des réformes, il nous semble que nous devons préjuger le moins possible le résultat des travaux de la Conférence. Cette forme de rédaction sommaire nous paraît la plus propre à établir l'entente entre nous sur les conseils à donner au Sultan—à l'amener à les accepter—enfin à assurer l'adhésion définitive des Puissances à la Conférence.

Toutefois, je crois utile de vous faire connaître, à l'appui de nos propositions, les vues d'ensemble qui les inspirent et les raisons principales qui les ont déterminées.

# 1. Mesures à prendre pour garantir l'ordre et la sécurité :

Il est superflu d'insister sur leur nécessité. Le Gouvernement Chérifien a un intérêt direct à disposer de forces régulières et permanentes dont l'organisation sérieuse et durable et la présence effective sur certains points affermiront son autorité et suffiront à développer l'aire du pays soumis et de la perception aisée de l'impôt. Cette organisation, qui peut être conçue sans porter la moindre atteinte à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté du Sultan, devient d'autre part chaque jour plus nécessaire si le Gouvernement Marocain veut assurer les garanties élémentaires auxquelles les étrangers ont droit et qui sont indispensables aux transactions commerciales.

(a.) Comme il serait téméraire d'exiger du premier coup un trop gros effort du Gouvernement Chérifien, il ne semble pas qu'on doive au début étendre l'organisation de ces forces de police au delà des quatre ports de Tanger, Larache, Rabat, et Casablanca; de ces points, elles pourraient d'ailleurs facilement exercer assez avant dans l'intérieur une action efficace.

Pour les districts frontière voisins de l'Algérie, cette organisation est prévue par des Accords spéciaux entre la France et le Sultan. C'est une affaire qui est commune et exclusive aux deux pays depuis plus d'un demi-siècle, durant lequel la France a prodigué les témoignages les moins équivoques de sa loyauté, de sa modération, de sa patience, et de son esprit de justice.

(b.) Des corps de troupes créés pour la police et qui tiendront garnison à Tanger, Larache, Rabat, et Casablanca, doivent être Marocains, c'est-à-dire, avoir un effectif et des cadres inférieurs Marocains.

Le Gouvernement Chérifien n'aurait à demander à un concours extérieur que les éléments nécessaires à l'instruction de ses troupes, au contrôle de leur administration, à l'aide technique que leur commandement et leur discipline comportent. En ce qui concerne notamment l'administration, il est à peine besoin d'insister sur la nécessité d'assurer la régularité continue de la solde.

La participation ainsi limitée d'un concours extérieur ne peut avoir d'autre effet que de consolider et de rendre plus effective l'autorité que le Maghzen doit conserver sur ses troupes.

(c.) Une des causes, la principale peut-être, des troubles permanents, de l'anarchie en quelque sorte constitutionnelle qui désolent le Maroc réside dans le fait que les tribus peuvent se procurer des armes sans la moindre difficulté.

Pour couper court à cet état de choses il ne suffit pas d'interdictions édictées par un Gouvernement hors d'état de leur donner une sanction effective, il faut que la surveillance de la contrebande des armes soit confiée à des mains capables de la rendre efficace. L'organisation de cette surveillance sera l'une des œuvres les plus utiles de la Conférence. Elle peut, d'ailleurs, être assurée dans des conditions qui, loin de porter atteinte à l'indépendance ni à la souveraineté du Sultan, en deviennent d'une des plus sûres et des plus précieuses garanties.

# 2. Mesures à prendre pour améliorer la situation financière du Maroc :

Après s'être longtemps défendu de recourir au crédit public, le Maghzen avait contracté à l'étranger des engagements dont il s'est récemment libéré au moyen de l'emprunt souscrit à un consortium de banques Françaises vis-à-vis duquel il s'est lié par un contrat. Cet emprunt absorbe une très notable partie des ressources les plus régulières du Maghzen. Il n'est pas douteux que le Gouvernement Marocain doit en outre être obéré par des engagements privés de quelque importance. D'autre part, l'excès de circulation monétaire, la pénurie des récoltes causent dans le pays un trouble qui va s'aggravant. Les conseils que la France avait pris l'initiative de donner au Sultan s'étaient bornés aux nécessités les plus urgentes de la situation financière. La Conférence devrait également se contenter d'étudier les mesures qui, dans l'état présent, ont le plus de chance d'être réalisables et seraient les plus efficaces.

On peut espérer de l'organisation d'une bonne police le retour à une perception régulière de l'impôt et un développement dans la prospérité économique du pays, partant un double accroissement de ses revenus; mais ce résultat doit être forcément escompté pour procurer au Maghzen les moyens de faire face aux dépenses assez considérables de la création et de l'entretien de ses troupes régulières de police. D'où la nécessité de trouver dans l'organisme financier la garantie et la régularité des ressources à affecter au paiement de ces dépenses.

Ce résultat peut être obtenu sans intervenir dans l'administration fiscale du pays, par la création d'une banque d'État pourvue du privilège d'émission qui est la condition essentielle d'une institution de ce genre. La banque dont le Gouvernement



Marocain s'était d'ailleurs engagé, au moment de l'emprunt, à étudier l'organisation avec le Gouvernement Français, exercerait, pour le compte et au profit exclusif du Trésor Chérifien, le droit de frapper monnaie. Elle aurait en outre en matière monétaire un rôle très utile à remplir sans délai. La frappe excessive de la monnaie Chérifienne coïncidant avec la diminution des exportations, du fait de la pénurie des récoltes, a avili la valeur de cette monnaie, et en a fait monter le change à un taux (175 pour 100 fr.) qui aggrave lourdement les charges du Maghzen. La banque prendrait les dispositions nécessaires pour assainir la situation monétaire et stabiliser le cours de la monnaie Chérifienne.

D'autre part, elle pourrait être chargée à la convenance du Maghzen des services de Caisse et de Trésorerie.

Enfin elle effectuerait au Trésor Chérifien les avances dont il aurait besoin, à condition toutefois qu'elles fussent consacrées à des dépenses destinées à avoir une répercussion certaine sur la prospérité économique du pays. Dans cette catégorie de dépenses se rangent celles qu'entraînerait l'application des réformes de police, et d'autre part certaines entreprises urgentes ayant pour effet d'assurer une première amélioration des ports et de l'outillage économique du pays.

La banque d'État servirait, tout naturellement, les intérêts économiques et commerciaux des diverses nations; et il serait aisé, dans la formation et la représentation de son capital, de donner à cette situation une sanction pratique.

3. L'œuvre de la Conférence ne devra pas se borner, selon nous, à la détermination des réformes que je viens d'exposer, et des voies et moyens destinés à en assurer la réalisation. Il sera bon qu'elle fixe en outre et qu'elle fasse accepter par le Sultan quelques principes qui garantissent la liberté économique que la France a déjà stipulée dans ses arrangements avec d'autres Puissances, et sur laquelle nous nous sommes aisément mis d'accord lors de l'échange de lettres intervenu entre nous le 8 Juillet dernier.

Nous avons dans ce but inséré au paragraphe 3 du programme les deux plus importants de ces principes dont la formule est d'ailleurs empruntée aux propositions que notre Représentant au Maroc avait présentées à Sa Majesté Chérifienne.

En s'interdisant de concéder aucun des services publics de son Empire à des intérêts particuliers, le Sultan maintiendrait entre les divers concours qui s'offriront à lui de l'extérieur une parfaite égalité, tout en ménageant son indépendance et en favorisant la formation d'une Administration Marocaine destinée à introduire dans le pays toute la somme de progrès compatible avec son état social.

Le second principe que la Conférence devrait faire prévaloir auprès du Gouvernement Marocain est celui de la mise en adjudication, dans toutes les matières où elle est généralement pratiquée en Europe, notamment pour l'exécution des travaux publics et les fournitures d'État. Le Maghzen réaliserait ainsi dans ses entreprises toutes les économies résultant du jeu de la concurrence. D'autre part, les compétitions rivales qui risquent d'affecter sa liberté d'action et qui ont eu certainement pour effet d'entraver la marche du progrès au Maroc, se trouveraient ainsi écartées, et il en résulterait une garantie de plus pour la liberté économique.

Telles sont les idées qui ont dirigé l'étude et l'établissement du projet de programme que votre Altesse Sérénissime trouvera ci-joint. Elles sont trop conformes aux vues que nous avons échangées dans de nombreux entretiens pour que je puisse douter de l'acquiescement du Gouvernement Impérial à ce projet.

Les deux Gouvernements auront ensuite à le faire accepter par le Sultan. Nous devons donc nous préoccuper dès à présent des conditions dans lesquelles cette tâche commune sera accomplie.

Le Gouvernement Impérial a estimé que la Conférence était le meilleur moyen d'introduire les réformes; il en a reconnu et précisé d'accord avec nous la nécessité; il a stipulé avec nous que nos Représentants donneraient d'un commun accord au Sultan les conseils en vue de la fixation du programme de la Conférence.

Si ce commun accord n'est pas complet; s'il ne répond pas entièrement à l'arrangement intervenu entre les deux Gouvernements, les conseils que nous adresserons au Maghzen n'auront aucune efficacité; l'entente que nous avons souhaitée entre nous, les intérêts de la civilisation et du progrès au Maroc risquent d'être compromis; et l'effort sincère que nous avons fait aboutira à un résultat tout à fait contraire à celui que nous nous proposons.

Les conditions dans lesquelles nos deux Missions s'étaient trouvées en présence à Fez avant l'Accord du 8 Juillet, la tâche nouvelle qui leur incombait ne pouvaient qu'impliquer, dans la pensée des deux Gouvernements, la nécessité pour elles de s'abstenir, une fois l'Accord établi, de toute négociation particulière.

Les démarches du Comte de Tattenbach que je vous ai signalées dans mes lettres du 29 et du 31 Juillet procèdent d'une conception opposée. Il n'est pas à supposer, cependant, que le Gouvernement Impérial ait envisagé la possibilité d'une action commune au cours de laquelle, et simultanément, l'une des parties poursuivrait auprès du Maghzen l'attribution d'avantages spéciaux. Ce serait, en effet, préjuger par avance, et au profit d'une seule Puissance, la solution de questions que le Maghzen avait déclaré ne pouvoir traiter avant la réunion d'une Conférence Internationale; ce serait rendre ainsi au moins pour partie la réunion de cette Conférence, sans objet, par la suppression des garanties en faveur de la liberté économique que l'on attend d'elle, et que nous avons nous-mêmes proposé au Maghzen d'établir en même temps que nous lui soumettions les projets de réformes.

Nous avons la confiance que le Gouvernement Impérial partagera les vues que nous venons de lui exprimer. En ce qui nous concerne, nous sommes prêts à adresser immédiatement sur les diverses données qui précèdent, et d'accord avec le Gouvernement Impérial, les instructions prévues par la Déclaration du 8 Juillet.

Si tel est également le sentiment du Cabinet de Berlin, les Représentants des deux Gouvernements à Fez obtiendront sans doute promptement l'adhésion du Sultan, et la Conférence pourrait alors se réunir dans le plus bref délai.

Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup> Août, 1905.

#### Annex to preceding Despatch.

1. Organisation de la police hors de la région frontière, c'est-à-dire, hors des districts où elle est réglée par un Accord Franco-Marocain:—

(1.) Création de corps de troupe Marocains pour la police à Tanger, Larache, Rabat, et Casablanca.

(2.) Surveillance et répression de la contrebande des armes par mer.

2. Réforme financière:—

Concours financier donné au Maghzen par la création d'une banque d'État, avec privilège d'émission, se chargeant des opérations de Trésorerie, s'entremettant pour la frappe de la monnaie, dont les bénéfices appartiendraient au Maghzen.

La banque d'État procéderait à l'assainissement de la situation monétaire.

Les crédits ouverts au Maghzen seraient employés à l'équipement et à la solde des troupes de police et à certains travaux publics urgents, notamment à l'amélioration des ports et de leur outillage.

3. Engagement par le Maghzen de n'aliéner aucun des services publics au profit d'intérêts particuliers.

Principe de l'adjudication, sans acception de nationalité pour les travaux publics.

No. 138.

Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 292.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 2, 1905.

THERE is no doubt that the feeling of resentment against the attitude of Count Tattenbach at Fez is steadily increasing in France.

M. Louis spoke of it to me the other day with considerable bitterness, and described it as inexplicable. The "Temps," in a leading article entitled "Count Tattenbach," severely criticizes his action. It clings to the hope that he has exceeded his instructions, and recalls the fact that it was for very similar indiscretions that he was removed from Morocco several years ago. Germany has accused France of wishing to make of Morocco a second Tunis, but France does not intend that Germany shall make a Turkey of her. It is all very well for Germany to go on repeating that she is quite indifferent to Morocco, but it is high time that she should disavow the manoeuvres of Count Tattenbach, and give him a further taste of the severity shown him on a former occasion. Several interesting articles in the same strain have also appeared in the "Aurore" from the pen of M. Clémenceau himself, one of which, entitled "No Dupery," is particularly outspoken. M. Clémenceau considers that the



present activity of Count Tattenbach at Fez is only the forerunner of worse surprises in the future. There is little chance of the Emperor remaining satisfied with his first victory. The situation is critical, and M. Clémenceau is of opinion that, while avoiding anything in the nature of a menace, France should give notice that, rather than allow herself to be duped, she will retire from the present negotiations. A few words of warning from M. Rouvier are all that are required, and M. Clémenceau is convinced that if these words were spoken they would have a very calming effect upon Count Tattenbach's attitude.

Copies of the articles from the "Temps" and the "Aurore" are inclosed herewith.\*

I have, &c.  
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

No. 139.

Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 293.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 4, 1905.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that I had some further conversation to-day with the Political Director of the Foreign Office with regard to Count Tattenbach's attitude in Morocco.

M. Louis gave me a brief sketch of what had occurred. It appears that somewhere between the 10th and the 15th July M. Rouvier informed Prince Radolin that instructions had been sent to M. de Saint-René Taillandier to suspend all negotiations with the Maghzen in view of the Agreement of the 8th July, and added that he concluded that similar instructions had been or would be sent to Count Tattenbach. Prince Radolin answered to the effect that that went without saying, but promised to inform his Government of what M. Rouvier had said. The French Government accordingly thought that the question was satisfactorily settled until they were rudely awakened by the avalanche of reports from Fez of Count Tattenbach's activity. They have now remonstrated to the German Government, and have received assurances through Prince Radolin here and through M. de Mühlberg at Berlin that Count Tattenbach has been called upon to hold his hand. M. Louis appeared sceptical as to the statement in the "National Anzeiger" that the only question discussed had been that of the mole at Tangier, and, although the concession was no doubt unimportant in itself, and may have been promised some time ago, he considered that the action of the German Government in obtaining the signature of the Sultan after the Agreement of the 8th July was distinctly disloyal.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

No. 140.

Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Fez, August 2, 1905.

MOROCCO loan. My telegram No. 81 of the 24th July.

The Moorish Government acknowledge the unsatisfactory state of the Treasury, and their obligation to give France the preference of a loan. They are, however, displaying much energy in inspecting and appraising property belonging to the Government.

There exist certain symptoms tending to confirm the belief that means will be adopted to raise money from foreign sources.

\* Not printed.

No. 141.

Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 6.)

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, August 6, 1905.

I AM told by the German Chargé d'Affaires that, since the 3rd instant, instructions have been transmitted to Count von Tattenbach at Fez intimating to him that, until after the Conference, the German Government will refuse any concessions of an economic or administrative character.

No. 142.

Sir M. de Bunsen to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord,

Lisbon, July 30, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 50, Confidential, of the 8th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Portuguese Minister at Tangier was instructed yesterday, by telegraph, to accept the invitation of the Sultan of Morocco to a Conference concerning the affairs of that country.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) M. DE BUNSEN.

No. 143.

Mr. Cartwright to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

San Sebastian, August 7, 1905.

INTERNATIONAL Conference on Morocco.

Having been asked by French Ambassador whether I could induce Spanish Government to state definitely that they wished the Conference to meet in Spain, I called to-day on the President of the Council. Señor Montero Rios told me that his Government were prepared to make a verbal but official offer to that effect, and that if M. Cambon would call that afternoon he would try and arrange a formula of it with him. He seemed very unwilling that this proposal should be made in writing, but indifferent as to whether Madrid, Seville, or Algeciras was selected as actual place of meeting. Algeciras was, I believe, suggested by M. Cambon. With regard to Tangier the President referred to a Conference held there in 1879—which came to nothing—and seemed more averse than ever to the Conference being held there.

No. 144.

Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 204.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 30, 1905.

THE Sultan has issued letters to all the tribes which remain under his authority, inviting them to send Delegates to Fez, in order to take part with the Notables, to whom the French reform proposals were submitted, in certain discussions which the Sultan expects may shortly take place.

In this instance the tribes are to choose their own representatives, whereas the Notables were all selected by the Sultan.

The object of this step is evidently, in the first place, to bring about some delay, and, in the second place, to enable the Sultan to shield himself behind them, in the event of his being compelled to take any decision.



It is also stated that the Sultan is sending a similar invitation, couched in polite phrases, to the tribes which are not under his authority, but it is extremely unlikely that these will be accepted.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 145.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 205.)  
My Lord,

Fez, July 30, 1905.

M. MAROUM, the German interpreter, recently left here, invalided, for Tangier. On his way he was met by a gentleman with whom he had some conversation, the gist of which was as follows:—

It was true that Morocco required reform, but the moment was not opportune, and, although it was desirable that the Conference should be held, it would produce no result whatever. The Sultan had arranged with the German Minister to send to Germany a number of young men, who should take up seriously a study of the various branches of administration, and if they were successful in their studies, then would be the moment to begin the regeneration of Morocco.

M. Maroum also mentioned that the Germans had a scheme in their minds for a railway between Fez and Tangier, which statement called forth a violent protest on the part of a local Kaïd who was present, and who maintained that no one in Morocco wanted railways, as it would only facilitate the introduction of more foreigners.

M. Maroum's language is much on the lines of another of the German Legation with whom I have spoken, and no doubt corresponds with the opinion of the Minister.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 146.

*Mr. Cartwright to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 65.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

San Sebastian, August 8, 1905.

INTERNATIONAL Conference on Morocco.

At the interview between M. Cambon and Señor Montero Rios, referred to in my telegram No. 63 of yesterday, the French Ambassador succeeded in persuading President to propose Spain as place of meeting in writing, and the following *note verbale* was communicated to the French and German Ambassadors and to myself last night by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs:—

“En tenant compte de ce que—

“(a.) La place de Tanger est loin d'offrir toutes les conditions désirables pour garantir la liberté d'action et de discussion dans la Conférence, par suite de l'insubordination et troubles qui règnent dans les proches tribus et de l'impuissance des autorités locales pour remédier à cet état de choses;

“(b.) Qu'il est à désirer que la Conférence ait lieu dans un endroit qui soit, d'une part, proche à l'Empire, afin d'assurer au Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Shérifienne une communication facile et suivie avec son Gouvernement, et, d'autre part, que ce même endroit offre aux Plénipotentiaires qui auront à assister les commodités nécessaires, ainsi que la pleine liberté pour leurs délibérations;

“L'Espagne offre pour le lieu de la Conférence, avec un grand plaisir pour sa part, aux Puissances quelque une des villes au Levant et au sud de la Péninsule—par exemple, Cadix, Malaga, Algeciras.

“L'expérience justifie, du reste, ce qui précède, car il ne faut pas oublier ce qui est arrivé pour la Conférence de Tanger l'année 1879, en contreposition de celle de Madrid dans l'année 1880. Ce n'est que dans cette dernière qu'il fut possible d'arriver à un accord définitif sur le droit de protection, qui n'avait pu être obtenu

dans la précédente Conférence, fort vraisemblablement par suite de l'endroit où elle eut lieu.”

(Confidential.)

M. Cambon and I have both come to the same conclusion that President of Council holds more strongly to the Conference being held in Spain than to almost any other concessions which may be made to meet Spanish susceptibilities.

No. 147.

*Notes on Bordj Saïdia by Vice-Consul Barber.—(Received August 9.)*

THE bordj is situated about 50 metres from the Oued or River Kiss, which forms the frontier between Algeria and Morocco, and 2½ kilom. from Port Say, the most westerly French settlement. It is an old ruin, as, in fact, are all these Moorish bordj (i.e., chateau or castle).

It is generally garrisoned by about 200 infantry (if they could be so called). They have no artillery, but possess two mitrailleuses; these would probably be more dangerous to themselves than to an enemy.

It is commanded by a Pasha or Governor, who is paramount in the region, and has right of life or death over all and every one, the Pasha's name is Hadj Allal.

About 4 kilom. from the sea is a very narrow and sharp rugged rocky line of mountains, which rises out of the plain to the height of about 150 metres or yards, and it is very difficult to scale. The plain, which is called the Plain du Trifa, is inhabited by the tribe of the Ouled Mansour, and extends the same length as the beach, i.e., up to Fort de l'Eau. On the south side of this line or range of mountains is the immense Plain of the Angads, inhabited by tribes of that name; the inhabitants are most armed with Remingtons, but the troops at the bordj are armed with Gras and Chassepot rifles.

This line of mountains is cut through, as if done by the hand of man, the faces being perpendicular; and it is through this tunnel or gully that the Oued Kiss flows through on its way to the sea.

On the top of the gully or mountain on the Algerian side, and dominating the Bordj Saïdia and the plain on both sides of the range of mountains, is situated a French fort called “La Sentinelle.” It has no artillery, and is garrisoned by a company of Zouaves, some Spahis, and Custom-house officers.

On either side of the Oued Kiss is held a market weekly, that on the French side being an orderly and well-conducted affair, whilst that on the Morocco side is often the scene of tribal disputes and free-fights, the nature of which may be imagined seeing that every one carries his gun loaded with him; these are very frequent occurrences. The exchange of commodities is controlled on the Algerian side by the Customs officers, and on the Morocco side a very lax one is exercised by the Pasha's troops from the Bordj Saïdia.

The bordj is about 200 metres (or yards) from the sea, and is built on the dunes or sand-heaps. The long low flat beach commences at the Oued Kiss on the east, and extends right on to the west as far as the Cap de l'Eau or Cap de l'Agua, sometimes called the Fort de l'Eau or Fort de l'Agua; but there is no fort there. The Cap de l'Eau is just inside, or, say, nearly south of, the Chaffarine Islands, a Spanish possession.

The beach is so flat that a man could walk out some 200 yards and not have water above his knees, and some 300 to 400 yards before requiring to swim; and all discharging has to be done by bringing the boats as close to the shore as depth of water will permit, and then goods are carried ashore on men's backs. If there be any wind coming in from the sea this operation is impossible. There is a strong current running all along the coast from the westward, and it would be folly to dream of building a port or harbour there; it would be silted up immediately, and all the dredgers invented could not keep it free. It is here that the Sultan debarks his troops for Oudja, and it is not always an easy matter.

Of course, as far as building a port or harbour there is concerned, there is no doubt but that, given the necessary money, everything in that way is possible, but if the port is to belong to Morocco it will never be of any use if built, for it would be silted up, and that higher even than the breakwaters and as fast as they could be built.



This is my opinion, formed from what I have seen at various points along the coast; in fact, Port Say, where M. Say endeavoured to help nature in extending a small breakwater from a small natural bay or port, he only succeeded in getting the whole thing silted up, and he is now without the small creek which he formerly possessed, much to his disgust.

Oran, July 30, 1905.

THOS. A. BARBER.

No. 148.

*Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 295.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 8, 1905.

THE Political Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed me this morning that M. Rouvier was leaving Paris to-day for Savoy. His Excellency does not anticipate that the German reply to the note of the French Government explaining their programme for the Morocco Conference will be received for the next week or so, and has profited by the delay to take a short holiday.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

No. 149.

*Mr. Cartwright to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 9.)*

(No. 67. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

San Sebastian, August 9, 1905.

INTERNATIONAL Conference on Morocco. Referring to my telegram No. 65 of yesterday.

I learn from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, on receiving Spanish *note verbale*, German Ambassador showed great irritation, and expressed his disapproval so strongly as even to assert that a direct insult to Germany was intended. Señor Ojeda added that the Spanish Government considered that Spain had as much right to express her views as to the best place of meeting of Conference as any other Power, and felt, for their part, some annoyance at the attitude adopted by the German Ambassador.

No. 150.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 9.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, August 9, 1905.

A REPORT, which is uncontradicted by the German Legation, is persistently circulated here, to the effect that an advance of 21,000,000 fr. to His Shierceffian Majesty is on the point of being concluded by a German firm; properties belonging to the Makhzen at Tangier and Dar-al-Baida are, it is said, being offered as guarantee; in this way the affair would not be classified as a concession or a loan, but would partake of the nature of a sale of land.

No. 151.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 146. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Madrid, July 29, 1905.

DURING the conversations which I had yesterday and to-day with the Minister of State and also with the Under-Secretary of State, I gathered that both these gentlemen were not well satisfied with the programme for the Conference, and were anxious lest the interests of Spain should be overlooked, and not sufficient consideration accorded

to the fact that this country had numerous Colonies at Tangier and other ports. These are points on which it is possible satisfaction may be given to them; but the Minister of State made some remarks as to the desire of the Spanish Government to be no longer influenced by what his Excellency termed the "Delcassé policy," and to have, as he expressed it, "something in their hands" when King Alfonso paid his approaching visit to Germany. Señor Sanchez Roman reiterated with emphasis the intention of Spain to maintain her "individuality," and not to pledge herself too deeply before the Conference met.

His Excellency said he was giving me the "secret of his heart," as he was a true friend of my country and anxious that our relations should be of the most amicable and frank character. He would follow our line with pleasure, but he gave me clearly to understand that it was not with equally light-hearted confidence that he listened to advice from Paris. Owing to his difficulty in expressing himself in a foreign tongue, it is not always easy to catch the exact meaning of his phrases, but the general impression I received was that his Excellency had conceived some distrust of the French Government, and he told me that he had sent stringent instructions to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris to conform literally and strictly to the orders he received from Madrid, and not to give expression in his conversations with M. Rouvier to any personal opinion.

"The Ambassador," M. Sanchez Roman added, "has been so long in Paris as to have become half a Frenchman." It was only quite recently that M. Cambon told me that he feared the Spanish Ambassador was entirely under the influence of Prince Radolin.

Señor Sanchez Roman further said that he was having great difficulty with the German Ambassador in regard to the visit of King Alfonso to Berlin, as the German Emperor was most anxious His Majesty should be there for the great review on the 4th September.

His Excellency was most unwilling that anything should be said or done which could cause annoyance at Berlin, and he asked what I thought on the matter. I told his Excellency that it was really a question in which I had no concern or on which I could express an opinion, but that I hoped nothing would occur which would offend French susceptibilities. His Excellency said that the date of King Alfonso's departure was fixed at present for the 10th September, and so far as he was concerned he would suggest no alteration; but that the German Ambassador had gone to San Sebastian and might be able to come to some other arrangement with the President of the Council.

The Under-Secretary, M. de Ojeda, subsequently repeated to me the general tenour of the remarks made by Señor Sanchez Roman, and observed that he feared that the French programme might work out to the disadvantage of Spain. He was much annoyed that any difficulty had arisen in respect to the King's visit to Germany, and said that it was ridiculous to call a review on the 4th September the "Sedan Parade," when the surrender at Sedan had taken place two days previously; and when the 4th September, long before 1870, had always been the date of a great military spectacle at Berlin. M. Cambon, he said, had caused to be inserted in the French press that the date of the King's departure had been deferred to the 10th September in deference to French wishes; and, therefore, the Spanish Government had caused a denial to be given to this statement in some of the Spanish papers.

I mention these matters to your Lordship as they afford some indications of the disposition of the two principal personages at the Foreign Office, and I hope to have an opportunity of ascertaining whether the President of the Council equally shares these views.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

No. 152.

*Sir A. Nicolson to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 147.)

My Lord,

San Sebastian, August 1, 1905.

I ARRIVED at San Sebastian yesterday morning and called on the President of the Council in the course of the afternoon. I informed his Excellency that I was desirous of seeing him so as to be able to acquaint your Lordship with his views in

[1566]

2 A



regard to the programme put forward by France of the subjects to be discussed at the Conference. I had, I added, already informed the Minister of State that His Majesty's Government had approved of the programme, and I understood that the Spanish Government had also signified their concurrence. Señor Montero Rios said that he had verbally informed the French Chargé d'Affaires that he accepted the programme, but that he hoped that a previous understanding would be arrived at between Great Britain, Spain, and France, in respect to three important points. These points were monetary reform, the suppression of contraband by sea, and the organization of the police forces at the ports. His Excellency spoke very seriously to me on the grave importance which any reform of the monetary system in Morocco would have for Spain, and he earnestly trusted that the French and British Governments would take into consideration the interests which Spain had involved. He repeated what the Minister of State had previously impressed on me that the displacement of the Spanish silver currency from Morocco would have a deplorable effect on the financial situation in Spain. With respect to the suppression of contraband by sea, he considered that it would be most desirable that the three Governments should discuss in what manner and within what limits the rights of search and supervision were to be exercised, so that when the question arose in the Conference we should be in a position to present some clear proposals for the solution of a very delicate question. As regards the police forces at the ports, he would like to ascertain the view of His Majesty's Government as well as that of France as to the manner in which it was proposed that the forces should be organized, and he was of opinion that the commanding officer should in any case be an European.

I told his Excellency that I hoped on my way through Paris to see M. Rouvier, and I proposed to communicate to him and to your Lordship the observations which he had been good enough to make to me. I thought that I could safely say that both Governments would give the most careful consideration to the interests and wishes of Spain.

I inquired of Señor Montero Rios whether he had any views on the locality where the Conference should be held, and whether the French Chargé d'Affaires had spoken to him on the subject. He said that M. de Margerie had intimated that, if the Spanish Government suggested that the Conference should be held in Spain, the French Government would be quite ready to support the proposal. He had, he said, great objections to the Conference being held in Tangier, where it would be exposed to petty local influences, and where the whole local atmosphere and situation were thoroughly unsatisfactory. At the same time he hesitated as head of the Spanish Government to formally propose that the Conference should meet in his country. I quite agreed with his Excellency as to the unsuitability of Tangier, and adduced other reasons to those he had mentioned. I understood that he should feel some delicacy in taking the initiative in proposing Spain, but with his permission I might perhaps inform your Lordship and M. Rouvier that he had authorized me to say that the Spanish Government would be highly gratified if the Conference were held in Spain. He cordially assented to this proposal.

As I had noticed in Madrid that there was considerable mistrust of the French Government at the Spanish Foreign Office, I thought it would not be amiss if I pointed out to Señor Montero Rios the loyal, frank, and friendly manner in which France had acted in communicating the programme to Spain, and soliciting an expression of her views before she had addressed herself to Germany and the other Powers, and I trusted that the Spanish Government would act throughout in close harmony with Great Britain and France. Señor Montero Rios gave what I am sure were sincere and most satisfactory assurances on this point, and, indeed, his desire that the three Governments should come to a preliminary understanding on certain points before the meeting of the Conference is sufficient evidence that he wishes to act in concord with France and Great Britain.

I informed the French Chargé d'Affaires of what had passed at my interview with the President of the Council, and he corroborated my impression that his Excellency was quite sincere in his desire to co-operate closely with the two Governments of Great Britain and France in all matters touching Morocco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

No. 153.

Mr. Cartwright to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 149. Confidential.)

My Lord,

San Sebastian, August 8, 1905.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 63 and 65 of yesterday and to-day respectively, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that yesterday morning I saw M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, by appointment, and his Excellency asked me whether I could see my way to obtaining from the Spanish Government some clear and definite proposal with regard to their wish that the Morocco Conference should be held on Spanish soil.

M. Cambon explained to me that the French Government were desirous to meet, as far as possible, Spanish susceptibilities, but, with regard to the locality of the Conference, if France was to show her good will towards Spain, he must have something tangible to lay before M. Rouvier to show what were the wishes of the Spanish Government on the subject.

I therefore called on Señor Montero Rios, the President of the Council, who received me at once. His Excellency made no secret of the strong desire of the Spanish Government that the Great Powers should consent to let the Conference be held on Spanish soil; he used every possible argument against the choice of Tangier for that purpose, but I found him most reluctant to make any written communication on the subject, I imagine from fear of exposing his Government to a refusal and to enable him to say in the Cortes, if the Conference should finally be held at Tangier, that Spain had only said that she would welcome the Conference in this country if the Powers thought fit to propose to hold it there.

The result of my interview with Señor Montero Rios was that he consented, if M. Cambon would call upon him in the afternoon, to seek with him a formula by which the Spanish Government would officially, but verbally, suggest that the most suitable country in which to hold the Conference was Spain. His Excellency was indifferent as to the actual city selected for that purpose.

I reported the above to M. Cambon, who called on the President of the Council in the afternoon and, after considerable difficulty, persuaded him to make a written communication to the French Government, in the form of a *note verbale*, formally proposing Spain as the country in which to hold the Conference.

Copy of the *note verbale* was communicated to Herr von Radowitz, the German Ambassador, and to myself last night by Señor Ojeda, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the same.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Inclosure in No. 153.

*Note Verbale.*

EN tenant compte de ce que :—

(a.) La place de Tanger est loin d'offrir toutes les conditions désirables pour garantir la liberté d'action et de discussion dans la Conférence, par suite de l'insubordination et troubles qui règnent dans les proches tribus et de l'impuissance des autorités locales pour remédier à cet état de choses ;

(b.) Qu'il est à désirer que la Conférence ait lieu dans un endroit qui soit, d'une part, proche à l'Empire afin d'assurer au Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Shérifienne une communication facile et suivie avec son Gouvernement, et, d'autre part, que ce même endroit offre aux Plénipotentiaires qui auront à assister les commodités nécessaires ainsi que la pleine liberté pour leurs délibérations ;

L'Espagne offre pour le lieu de la Conférence, avec un grand plaisir pour sa part, aux Puissances quelque une des villes au Levant et au sud de la péninsule—par exemple, Cadix, Malaga, Algeciras. L'expérience justifie, du reste, ce qui précède, car il ne faut pas oublier ce qui est arrivé pour la Conférence de Tanger dans l'année 1879 en contreposition de celle de Madrid dans l'année 1880. Ce n'est que dans cette dernière qu'il fut possible d'arriver à un accord définitif sur le droit de protection, qui n'avait pu être obtenu dans la précédente Conférence, fort vraisemblablement par suite de l'endroit où elle eut lieu.



## No. 154.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 10.)*

(Separate.)  
My Lord,

*Tangier, August 4, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I to-day returned the visit of Baron Langwerth von Simmern, the German Chargé d'Affaires in place of M. von Kühlmann, who left on leave of absence on the 2nd instant.

Baron Langwerth informed me that he had received instructions from his Government to act in perfect loyalty to the Franco-German Agreement of the 8th July, and to be careful to avoid giving any grounds for an accusation of bad faith in respect of the principles of that Agreement.

He further expressed to me his surprise that any one should consider there to be any ground for complaint at the granting by the Sultan of a Concession to a German firm for carrying out the construction of a mole at Tangier, since, he assured me, the Sultan had promised some seven or eight months ago that such a Concession should be granted to a German firm in consideration of an Agreement by the German Government not to insist upon the execution of the murderers of M. Genthe, a German subject murdered near Fez in March 1904.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

## No. 155.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 10.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, August 10, 1905.*

I HEAR that the German firm to whom it was rumoured that property belonging to the Moorish Government, as reported in my telegram, Separate, of yesterday, had been mortgaged to the amount of 500,000l., has accepted the guarantee proposed by the Makhzen, and their acceptance has been forwarded to Fez.

I am informed by the German Chargé d'Affaires that he thinks it possible that His Shereefian Majesty may thus, for a time, free himself from financial difficulties. Baron Langwerth has, however, received no official intimation in regard to this matter.

## No. 156.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lister.*

(No. 539. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 10, 1905.*

THE French Ambassador informed me this morning that he had received a despatch from the French Government informing him that no answer had been returned to the notes which they had lately addressed to the German Government upon the subject of Morocco; see my despatch No. 528 of the 4th instant. Meanwhile, it would seem that the German Representative at Fez was continuing to put pressure upon the Moorish Government for the purpose of obtaining concessions of various kinds.

We had some conversation as to the place of meeting of the Conference, and I asked His Excellency what he thought of the suggestion that Algieras should be chosen. He said that the idea seemed to him an admirable one. The place was easy of access, there was a new and excellent hotel, and it would be easy for the Conference while sitting there to obtain evidence from Morocco. He asked me whether I had any objection to say that we should regard the choice of Algieras with favour. I replied that we should be prepared to say so.

His Excellency observed to me in confidence that, in his opinion, a meeting between the King and the German Emperor would have a bad effect upon public opinion in France were it to take place before Germany had done anything to relieve the tension which had been created by her conduct in regard to Morocco.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

## No. 157.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 72.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 10, 1905.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 201 of the 26th ultimo, and I approve the language held by you in conversation with Ben Sliman, on the subject of the departure of Sid-el-Menebhi from Morocco.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

## No. 158.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 73.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 10, 1905.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 198 of the 22nd ultimo, reporting on the claim of Hadj Taleb Lazrac for damage done to his crops by Moorish soldiery, and stating that there are other small claims of a similar nature on account of damage done to the property of British subjects by Government troops.

I request that you will bear these claims in mind, and take any convenient opportunity which may occur of pressing them upon the Moorish Government.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

## No. 159.

*Sir F. Bertie to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 11.)*

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Paris, August 11, 1905.*

MOROCCO.

Before your Lordship's despatch No. 538 reached me, I already had an appointment with the Political Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in connection with the reported loan to the Sultan.

Similar information has been sent to the French Government by their Representative at Fez. The German Embassy in Paris assert that the Imperial Government have shown absolute loyalty, but, as in the case of the mole, they plead exceptional circumstances. They state that the German Legation has taken no part in the negotiations regarding the loan, which is a purely private transaction. M. Louis ridiculed this view, which could deceive no one with a knowledge of Oriental countries, more especially since the names of the firms concerned have been published. The German Ambassador has admitted the necessity for an explanation, and M. Louis said that time must be given for Count Tattenbach to send an explanation, but he did not conceal his great disgust and disappointment.



*Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 297.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 11, 1905.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 53 of to-day's date, I had a conversation this morning with the Political Director of the Foreign Office with regard to the reported German loan to the Sultan of Morocco, which has been much discussed during the last few days in the Parisian press.

The original announcement appeared in the "Temps" of the night before last, which was, however, followed by an editorial note to the effect that no confirmation of the news had been received at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Last night's edition of the same newspaper contained a very outspoken article on the subject, which concludes as follows:—

"Yet we do not wish to suspect the German Government of being a party to the policy followed at Fez. To believe that they do not disapprove it would be to suspect their loyalty and good faith. At the same time, under these circumstances, it is easy for them to put a stop to the activity of their Ambassador. Count Tattenbach's policy is contrary to the interests of the Shereefian Empire. It violates the truce implied by the Arrangement of the 8th July; it gives the lie to the intentions publicly proclaimed by Germany since the Emperor's journey to Tangier; and since it is in direct opposition to the orders which the German Government declare that they sent to their Ambassador, it appears to us impossible that the proper measures should not be taken at Berlin to put a stop to it."

A copy of this article is inclosed herewith.\*

M. Louis seemed to take a very similar view of the case. The German Embassy had, he informed me, taken the line of declaring that the attitude of the German Government had been absolutely loyal, that they knew nothing of the loan, which was a purely private transaction, and that it had not been negotiated through the German Legation. This explanation, as M. Louis said, was childish for any one who had spent more than a fortnight in an Oriental country. Private initiative in a country like Morocco was impossible, especially at the present juncture, and the excuse was rendered all the more transparent by the publication of the names of the German firms concerned in the transaction—Mendelsohn, Bleichröder, the Disconto Gesellschaft, and the Berlin Handelsgesellschaft. Was it likely that firms of this calibre moved in such matters without the knowledge of the Government? Prince Radolin had once more insisted upon the categorical instructions which, as stated in my despatch No. 293 of the 4th instant, had been sent by the German Government to Count Tattenbach, and admitted that the present question of the loan required explanation; and M. Louis said that the French Government were obliged to wait until the explanations called for had been received from Fez. At the same time he declared that the situation was becoming impossible, and that the action of Germans, if not directly of the German Government, would, if it continued, render a Conference unnecessary and impossible. It was not the amount of the loan which mattered—that was quite unworthy of consideration—but the question of the security, and also of the spirit which rendered such transactions possible at such a moment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—A still more violent article, in the same sense as that of the "Temps," has appeared in the "Débats" this evening, and there is no doubt that French public opinion is seriously irritated.

R. L.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lister.*

(No. 546.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 12, 1905.

I MET the French Ambassador last night at the dinner party given by the Prime Minister in honour of the French naval officers.

His Excellency told me that the German firm which had obtained the contract for

\* Not printed.

the construction of a mole at Tangier had been unable to provide sufficient funds for the purpose, and had approached Messrs. Schneider, of the Creuzot Works, by whom the matter had been mentioned to the French Government. The latter thought that it might be desirable that some British capital, as well as French and German, should be employed, and his Excellency asked me whether, in the event of Messrs. Schneider finding it possible to obtain the co-operation of a British firm, His Majesty's Government would have any objection to telling that firm that they regarded the proposed combination with favour. I said that although it was impossible for us to give any guarantee for such an enterprise, or to assume any responsibility in regard to it, we should certainly be prepared to express a general approval of such a British participation as his Excellency had suggested.

His Excellency told me that the Spanish Government had suggested Algeciras or Malaga as places at which the Conference might conveniently meet. The Spanish Government had also expressed a wish that Spain should be given the right of undertaking the police arrangements at a number of the principal Moorish ports; also that she should be intrusted with the duty of preventing the introduction of contraband of war; and, thirdly, that she should be allowed a privileged position in the neighbourhood of the Spanish "Presides."

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 206.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 30, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that during a conversation I had yesterday with a high Court official I took the opportunity to refer to a scandalous case of the selling of Governors' posts, which has occurred here during the last week.

In this instance three country Governors in the Gharb district were called up to Court, and shortly after their arrival were placed in confinement, orders being sent at the same time for the confiscation of their houses and property. Time having been allowed for those orders to be executed, the three Kaïds were thrown into prison and heavily chained. The districts of these Kaïds were perfectly tranquil, and, so far as I have been able to discover, there were no serious complaints against them.

The sole cause of their removal and imprisonment would seem to be that another had offered a sum of 70,000 dollars for their posts.

I pointed out to the above-mentioned official how regrettable it was that the Government should again revert to the practice of selling these posts, in which he heartily concurred, and added that, of all the Government officials, only two were responsible for this state of affairs. I gathered that the Master of Ceremonies and Hadj Omar Tazzi were the two he referred to. He told me that of the 70,000 dollars paid for this post, 10,000 dollars only had been paid into the Treasury, with 20,000 to follow. It would thus appear that 40,000 dollars have been diverted by some of the Court officials over this disgraceful transaction.

On my asking if it were not possible for this to be explained to His Majesty the Sultan, he answered that, without doubt, the two above-mentioned officials had given His Majesty some very specious reasons for the dismissal of these Kaïds, and, moreover, that His Majesty was very jealous of any of the Viziers appearing to interfere in any way with his decisions, fearing always that they were attempting to obtain influence over him. I then asked whether, in his opinion, any beneficial effect would be attained by one of the foreign Representatives placing the matter before His Majesty in its true light, and he thought that it might have a good effect, but under the political conditions of the moment any such action would, I fear, at present be out of the question.

As a further instance of the evils of this practice he cited another case, of which he had only heard yesterday from a private source.

In this instance a Kaïd of Rahamna, who had formerly been removed from his post and who had been reinstated by the usual means, had been intriguing with the Viceroy at Marrakesh to buy the post of another Governor, Ben Kebbor, who has great



influence with the Rahamna tribe. In order to get rid of Ben Kebbor, the Viceroy invited him to come to Marrakesh, with the intention of arresting him, but as he had his suspicions of the Viceroy's intentions, he only sent his son; 180 of the tribesmen accompanied him, to request that their Kaïd should not be removed, but on their arrival the son and 150 of the men were arrested and imprisoned, 30 only escaping back to their tribe, which has now joined the revolted tribes in the south and "cut" all the roads of communication with Morocco City. This powerful tribe had hitherto resisted all efforts of the disaffected tribes to induce it to join them, and my informant fears that if steps are not taken immediately to remedy this, matters may become very critical in that district.

Similarly, he thinks that the appointment of the new Kaïd in the Gharb will be distasteful to that tribe, and fears that disturbances may in consequence arise in that district also.

I merely report these cases to your Lordship in order to show how pressing is the necessity for reforms in the administration in this country. The Kaïds who buy their posts have no confidence that they will be left in undisturbed possession for any length of time, and consequently use every means in their power to reimburse themselves for their outlay as quickly as possible, and naturally commit many acts of injustice against those under their authority, and thus the present deplorable condition of anarchy is brought about.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 163.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 207.)

My Lord,

Fez, July 31, 1905.

NO communication has yet been made to the Moorish Government by the French Minister regarding the acceptance by his Government of the invitation to be present at the Conference. The Paris Arrangement of the 10th instant has merely been conveyed in an unofficial form to the Makhzen, whose members are, however, expecting proposals to be made to them regarding a programme for the deliberation of the Conference. Although quite unprepared with a programme of their own, whatever plan is suggested by the Foreign Ministers will inevitably meet with stout resistance.

From your Lordship's despatch to Sir F. Bertie, No. 463, of the 12th instant, I gather that M. Cambon considered that this opposition could in a measure be met by proposing to the Moorish Government a programme based on the original invitation to the Powers, but in that document no mention was made of the nature of the reforms proposed.

"Reforms suitable to the present condition of affairs, which His Majesty intends to introduce into his Empire," are the words used in the note of the Moorish Government. The Sultan and his advisers are constantly complaining of the abuses of protection, a condition of affairs which prevents His Majesty levying taxes, the protected being frequently supported by their Governments in their refusal to pay. His Majesty's aim in the Conference will be merely to obtain the sanction to levy taxes on foreigners, and that the matter of reform be left to him. To this taxation there would obviously be no objection provided some reform were obtained. An indication to this effect might perhaps be introduced into the programme.

It is impossible to exaggerate the difficulties that will present themselves to the Conference in inducing the Moorish Government to accept the smallest reform, as His Majesty will invariably plead the anti-Christian feeling, which he represents himself as being powerless to resist. There are indications that this is already being prepared, namely:—

The message conveyed to myself and my colleagues, as reported in my No. 193 of the 24th ultimo, regarding the alleged anti-Mahomedan action of some foreigners here;

The rumours that the *mot d'ordre* has been issued that it is no longer necessary to treat foreigners with the regard that has been observed during the past few months;

The invitation to the tribes to send Delegates.

All this points clearly to the fact that the Moorish Government intends to have recourse to all possible means of obstruction.

However limited the programme is to be, one of the most essential points to be proposed will be the police, at least for the coast towns, and such police under foreign control. The right of punishment and the payment of the men must be equally in the hands of foreigners, and to this the Moorish Government would offer a strenuous resistance: first, owing to their religious prejudice against any Mahomedan being punished by a European; secondly, under the plea that it would be interfering with the authority of His Majesty.

These objections might possibly be overcome by the introduction of a nominal Moorish Chief of equivalent rank to the Foreigner in Command.

Certainly, if the expression used in the Paris Arrangement of the 8th instant—"résultat de ces Traités et Arrangements"—is to be taken to mean published and unpublished Treaties and Arrangements, it must considerably limit the scope of the discussions of the Conference.

The important Treaties and Arrangements which bear on the matter and which form valuable *points d'appui* for France are, as far as I am aware, the following:—

1. The Protocol of Paris, 1901.
2. The Frontier Agreement, 1902.
3. Notes exchanged confining the instruction of the frontier troops to French officers, 1902 or 1903.\*
4. The option for future loans, contained in Article 33 of the Loan Contract of 1904.
5. The right of certain examination and control of the Customs provided in Article 15 of the Loan Contract of 1905.
6. The Agreement about the army said by the French Minister to have been accepted by the Moorish Government. (See my despatch No. 190, Confidential, of the 20th ultimo.)<sup>o</sup>
7. The command of the police of Tangier, at present in the hands of a French officer. This was established by an exchange of notes.

With these arrangements to support her, and with the presentation of a very moderate programme, there may be some hope of a beginning being made towards reform.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 164.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 14.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

Tangier, August 7, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that a member of the Council of Notables, named Sid Mehdi-el-Wazzani, has paid a flying visit to Tangier, having been, he said, commissioned by His Shereefian Majesty to gauge the opinion of the leading personages here, including the Wazzan Shereefs and the Governors of the surrounding tribes, with reference to the proposed Conference.

The result of his visit here has been, he declares, to instil in him the firm conviction that, amongst all the above-mentioned personages, there is unanimous sentiment in favour of the Conference, and also that it should take place as soon as possible.

Sid Mehdi stated that he was returning to Fez to-morrow, and that he should let it be known among the tribes through whose territory he would pass that the opinion of all the important Moors in this district is that the Conference is eminently desirable as compared with the single action of France.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

\* The texts of these I have not seen.—G. L.



No. 165.

*Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 212.)

My Lord,

Berlin, August 11, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Cologne Gazette" of yesterday's date, referring to a rumour current in London on the subject of a loan of 21,000,000 marks alleged to be offered by Germany to Morocco on the security of lands which might become of political as well as of financial value, states that it is not a question of a loan to be given to Morocco by Germany, but that it is merely a private business transaction of the Sultan's with certain German banks, and that the amount is not 21,000,000 but 10,000,000 marks. The paper adds that the German Government have had no reason to make a mystery of this transaction of the banks, and that it has explained to the French Government that no political concessions have been either asked for or granted for this loan. The loan is secured on certain lands belonging to the Sultan, and has the character of a temporary arrangement consequent on momentary needs. When the Conference begins the regulation of the Moroccan finances, the repayment of this loan may possibly be provided for in the final financial programme.

I have, &amp;c.

(For Sir Frank Lascelles),  
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 166.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 14.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, August 14, 1905.

MY telegram, Separate, of the 10th instant.

I have been informed by the German Chargé d'Affaires that arrangements have been made by some German financiers to advance a sum of 10,000,000 fr. to the Sultan. They will, however, only deliver 8,600,000 fr., retaining 1,400,000 fr. as security for interest on the whole sum. They have also accepted as security the lands belonging to the Government in Tangier.

Information of this transaction, according to the German Chargé d'Affaires, was given some days ago by Prince Radolin to M. Rouvier, and he considers it merely an advance to assist the Sultan in tiding over the temporary financial difficulties in which His Majesty finds himself, and that credits would be voted by the Conference to refund it.

No. 167.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 15.)*

(No. 209.)

My Lord,

Fez, August 6, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 179 and 183 of the 9th and 13th ultimo, I have the honour to furnish the following information, which I have been able to obtain regarding the German mole and warehouse contract at Tangier:—

Cost 76,000*l.*, to be repaid at the end of three years. The works to be completed in two years. The mole is to be 330 metres long by 20 metres wide. Depth at high water, only 1 metre 25 centim.

Quay area only 30,000 square metres. There is only to be one warehouse.

A statement has been freely circulated by the German Legation to the effect that this contract was given to the German firm in fulfilment of a promise made a long while ago, and is not the outcome of the German Emperor's visit, or of recent negotiations. This, however, is not borne out by the evidence I have been able to obtain. Last year the representative of the Compagnie Marocaine was invited by the Moorish Government to submit plans for the improvement of the Harbour of Tangier. A modest plan was submitted, but the Moorish Government then dropped the matter.

99

In March of this year the same Company was again invited to submit a scheme, and permission was given it to take the necessary soundings, &c., which was very carefully carried out in April, and it was only in May of this year that the German firm asked for and obtained a similar permission, and then proceeded to take their soundings, &c.

The report that the contract was given in part satisfaction for the murder of a German correspondent at Fez, the German Government refraining from insisting on the execution of the murderer, is quite probable. There can be no doubt that the Vizirs generally were opposed to the German scheme and in favour of the French, the cost of which was 20,000*l.* less, but the Sultan had committed himself to the German Minister and found it impossible to withdraw.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 168.

*Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 16.)*

(No. 302.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 15, 1905.

IN the course of conversation this morning, M. Louis said that he was somewhat surprised at the present attitude of the German Government with regard to the Morocco Conference. At the beginning they had clamoured for its immediate meeting, whereas now they appeared far from being in any hurry. They were disinclined to discuss the question of dates. The Emperor, Prince Bülow, Baron Richthofen, and M. de Mühlberg were all absent from Berlin, and the direction of the Foreign Office had been left to Count Pourtales, Prussian Minister at Munich, who was not *au courant* of all that had passed, and would probably plead ignorance in order to delay taking any decision. M. Louis said that it really looked as though the Germans had realized that they would obtain less than they had originally expected by a Conference, and that their interests would have after all been better served by manoeuvres such as those in which Count Tattenbach had proved himself to be such an adept.

The question still continues to be the object of discussion in the whole of the Paris press, and M. Clémenceau, in an article to-day entitled "C'est Trop," is more outspoken than ever. As his readers know, he has never attached particular importance to Morocco in itself, but he considers that the dignity of France has been seriously compromised by the recent action of Germany, and insists upon the necessity of the French Government taking a strong stand before it is too late.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

No. 169.

*Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 17.)*

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, August 17, 1905.

MOROCCO. I have been informed to-day by the Political Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that the German Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier told his French colleague yesterday that the loan by German financiers to the Sultan had not been finally settled. Certain engagements had been entered into, but there still remained some formalities unfulfilled. It was still possible therefore that the negotiations might prove abortive.

This intelligence did not, however, appear to reassure M. Louis. The German Government had hitherto always found means to wriggle out of every statement made by them however categorical in appearance, and their action had throughout been the reverse of frank.



No. 170.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 17.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, August 17, 1905.*

GERMAN loan to the Sultan.

I am confidentially informed by the German Chargé d'Affaires that he telegraphed on Monday last to his Government a suggestion which had been made to him by the Tangier correspondent of the "Times," that, in order to prove their good faith, a proposal should be made by the German Government to the French Government to the effect that half the sum to be advanced should be taken over by French financiers.

The German Chargé d'Affaires, however, fears this suggestion reached the German Government too late to be of any value.

No. 171.

*Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 299.)

My Lord,

*Paris, August 17, 1905.*

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 54 of to-day's date, the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs told me this afternoon that the French Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier had been informed yesterday by his German colleague that the question of the loan to be made by certain German financiers to the Sultan of Morocco had not been definitely settled. Engagements had been taken, but there still remained certain formalities to be complied with. M. de Saint-Aulaire had gathered that the negotiations might still fall through, provided, as M. Louis remarked, that the German Government wished it and brought the necessary pressure to bear.

M. Louis did not appear to be much reassured by the intelligence which he had received. The action of the German Government had throughout the negotiations in regard to Morocco been the reverse of frank. They had found means, in the case of the mole, to wriggle out of the formal engagement which they had taken; their attitude in the present matter inspired him with little confidence, and he was filled with apprehensions as to the future. He admitted to me that he was at a loss to understand what was Germany's object. On the whole, he inclined to the view that she realized that she had made a false calculation; that she now wished the Conference to fall through, but that she was determined that the odium for the actual rupture of the negotiations should rest with France. With this end in view she intended to continue her present manoeuvres until the patience of this country was exhausted, and on this account M. Louis considered it most important that the French Government and people should keep their heads and act with the utmost forbearance consistent with their dignity.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

No. 172.

*Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 307.)

My Lord,

*Paris, August 18, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a note which was officially communicated to the press last night, through the medium of the Havas Agency, giving a detailed statement of the communications which have passed between the French and German Governments with regard to Morocco since the 8th July. The note reasserts the view of the French Government that it follows as a natural consequence of the Agreement of the 8th July that the Representatives of both countries at Fez should abstain from all private negotiations with the Maghzen.

The attitude of the French Government, it continues, manifests a sincere desire to carry out loyally the procedure adopted at the request of Germany for the settlement of the Morocco question; whilst the German Government has spontaneously and on more than one occasion given assurances of a nature too formal to admit of a doubt that the negotiations now proceeding will result in a satisfactory conclusion.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

Inclosure in No. 172.

*Extract from the "Matin" of August 18, 1905.*

## LA QUESTION MAROCAINE.—UN COMMUNIQUÉ DU GOUVERNEMENT.

LE Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a communiqué hier à la presse, par l'intermédiaire de l'Agence Havas, la note suivante :—

"Le 10 Juillet, le jour même où le Président du Conseil a donné connaissance à la Chambre des lettres et déclarations échangées entre les deux Gouvernements, le Cabinet de Berlin exprimait le vœu que le Gouvernement Français voulût bien proposer un projet de programme pour la Conférence.

"A la date du 22 Juillet, M. Rouvier faisait connaître au Prince de Radolin, par une note très sommaire, les points mis à l'étude en vue de la rédaction de ce projet.

"Le 1<sup>er</sup> Août, le projet de programme était communiqué au Prince de Radolin, accompagné d'une lettre du Président du Conseil, exposant, à l'appui des propositions du Gouvernement Français, les vues d'ensemble qui les inspiraient et les raisons principales qui les avaient déterminées.

"C'est pendant la période consacrée à l'étude et à la fixation du projet du programme que le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a été informé des démarches du Comte Tattenbach à Fez et des négociations poursuivies auprès du Sultan au bénéfice de maisons Allemandes, en vue de la concession des travaux du port de Tanger, puis d'un prêt important à effectuer au Maghzen.

"Au cours d'un entretien avec le Prince de Radolin, le Président du Conseil appela aussitôt son attention sur ces démarches et ces négociations; il lui fit parvenir ensuite, par lettres du 29 et du 31 Juillet, les observations qu'elles comportaient. Ces observations furent renouvelées dans la lettre du 1<sup>er</sup> Août précité.

"De son côté, notre Ambassadeur à Berlin a dû, par deux fois et en conformité d'instructions venues du Quai d'Orsay, entretenir de la question le Sous-Secrétaire d'État des Affaires Étrangères.

"Une note transmise le 4 Août par le Prince de Radolin a fourni de premières explications à ce sujet et en a promis de nouvelles dès que seraient parvenus les rapports demandés au Comte Tattenbach.

"Le Gouvernement Français n'a cessé de considérer comme une conséquence directe et immédiate de l'Accord du 8 Juillet la nécessité pour les Représentants des deux pays à Fez, chargés d'une mission commune par cet Accord même, de s'abstenir désormais de toute négociation particulière auprès du Maghzen.

"L'attitude du Gouvernement Français témoigne d'un désir trop sincère de mener à bien la procédure adoptée à la demande de l'Allemagne pour le règlement de l'affaire Marocaine; le Gouvernement Impérial, de son côté, a donné spontanément et à plusieurs reprises des assurances trop formelles sur le caractère de son intervention pour qu'il ne soit pas permis de penser que les entretiens en cours apporteront à ces incidents une solution satisfaisante et ne tarderont pas à rendre à la situation son caractère normal."



No. 173.

*Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Paris, August 19, 1905.*

ALTHOUGH a telegram has been received from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier dated this morning, I am informed by Political Director that nothing concerning reported attack on two Algerian schoolmasters by Moors has been heard officially.

There is no truth in reported incident with regard to officer of French yacht "l'Aigle."

No. 174.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 210. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Fez, August 6, 1905.*

I HAD some conversation to-day with Count Tattenbach, who had had an audience of the Sultan in the morning. Count Tattenbach said that it was high time that our Governments recalled us from Fez. It was useless our remaining here. There were, apparently, great difficulties in arriving at an arrangement in Europe regarding the programme of the Conference. No doubt a formula would eventually be found in the same way in which a "meaningless" formula had been agreed upon in the Arrangement of the 8th July, but the difficulties would only then begin, for he felt convinced that His Majesty the Sultan would have nothing to do with the programme which he understood was now being framed. Some system of foreign police or gendarmerie would no doubt be a leading feature of the proposals, and this His Majesty would under no consideration accept. I ventured to observe that the difficulties that now presented themselves were among the reasons that had induced His Majesty's Government in the first instance to discourage the idea of the Conference. If, I said, the Sultan were averse to any system of foreign police, which was the essence of the regeneration of the country, he could not be very sincere in his desire for reform. To these observations the Minister made no reply, but seemed to consider that it would be impossible to persuade the Sultan to accept a programme representing in any way the present French ideas.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 175.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 212.)

My Lord,

*Fez, August 7, 1905.*

I UNDERSTAND that a German scheme for the laying of a cable from Tangier to Mogador, which the German Government have had in view for some time past, was put forward by the German Minister in his conversations with the Sultan and the Makhzen immediately after the contract for the mole and the warehouses at Tangier was secured.

It does not, however, seem to have been pursued very energetically, and under present circumstances is not likely to meet with very favourable consideration.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

103

No. 176.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 214.)

My Lord,

*Fez, August 10, 1905.*

IT having been intimated to me that the Makhzen had sent orders to the Secretary commissioned to investigate the Madden murder case at Mazagan to withdraw and join one of the Sultan's relatives who has been sent on a special mission to the Morocco City district, I called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs to protest against any such proceedings, and pointed out how regrettable it was that he should be withdrawn before the conclusion of the case.

His Excellency, however, was of opinion that, as all the persons suspected were either in prison or their whereabouts well known, there was no need for the continued presence of the Commissioner at Mazagan, as the only thing left to be accomplished is the arrest of the two still at liberty, and he trusted that, in view of the last orders, this would not be long delayed.

During our conversation I informed his Excellency that I could not conscientiously report to your Lordship that the Moorish Government were doing all they might to arrest the suspected persons, and also that if the Governor of Mazagan had shown some energy at the outset they could doubtless have been arrested immediately after the act, and in any case that what could not be done by the force at their command might be accomplished by a judicious expenditure of money.

His Excellency, however, maintained and repeated his former assurances that the Makhzen had done, and was still doing, all in its power to bring the guilty parties to justice, but unfortunately the two men whose arrest is wanted have, he informs me, escaped to a tribe in which the Sultan's authority is at present not recognized. Orders have consequently been sent, and are being repeated, to the Governor of Mazagan to spare no means to catch the men who are under suspicion, and his Excellency assured me that His Majesty the Sultan would be prepared to pay any reasonable sum for the apprehension of these men. Orders have also been sent to Kaïd Aïssa-ben-Omar, the most influential and powerful Governor of Southern Morocco, to use every possible means to send in the two men under suspicion to Mazagan, and to work in conjunction with the Governor of Mazagan and the Colonel sent there from Fez in command of the few horsemen who were dispatched to assist the Governor in maintaining order.

He then expressed the hope that the measures already taken by the Government would lead to the speedy capture of the men who are wanted, and added that he would recommend that another Commissioner be appointed to take the place of the one who was being withdrawn.

I told his Excellency that I was prepared to make every excuse for the Moorish Government under the exceptional circumstances he described, in which the Sultan's orders were, owing to the rebellious condition of the tribes, left without effect, but it was my duty conscientiously to report that the progress towards the apprehension of the assassins was extremely slow, and that His Majesty's Government might possibly eventually be compelled to take some energetic measures.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 177.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 21.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, August 11, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that during the last few days it has been persistently rumoured here that the Sultan was negotiating with some German firm to mortgage the property belonging to the Government situate at Tangier and Dar-al-Baida for the sum, it is said, of 500,000l.

It is even said that a definite acceptance of this transaction has been received here from the firm at Berlin for transmission to Fez.

In conversation to-day with Baron Langwerth, the German Chargé d'Affaires, I asked him whether he had heard of this transaction, and he replied that he had had no official information in connection therewith, but that he had heard the rumours. He added that he considered it quite possible that His Majesty the Sultan might take



such means in order to temporarily extricate himself from the financial difficulties in which he is at present placed. He imagined that this would be only a temporary measure, and that as soon as the financial reforms were decided upon at the Conference this mortgage would be redeemed.

There is among the Moors no such thing as a mortgage as understood in Europe, the system being in place thereof an actual sale of property with option of repurchase within a certain specified period, after which period, unless the property is redeemed, the sale becomes absolute.

As reported in my despatch to your Lordship of the 25th ultimo, Separate, a Commission is at present engaged here in appraising the value of the Government properties at Tangier; a similar Commission has, I understand, been appointed for the like purpose at Dar-al-Baida. These Commissions have not, I believe, as yet finished their task, but the French Chargé d'Affaires told me yesterday that a French estimate placed the value of the combined Government properties at Tangier and the coast ports at 12,000,000 fr., or 480,000l., at the outside.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

No. 178.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 21.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, August 12, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received a despatch from the Acting Vice-Consul at Dar-al-Baida informing me that the tribes in that district are at peace with one another. This state of tranquillity he attributes in the main to the dependence of the people on imported food-stuffs, the result being that the tribes further inland are afraid to attack those situated between them and the coast towns lest these latter should cut off their supplies.

It appears that among the tribes there exists very little respect for Government authority. Each Kabyl appoints its own Chief, who has under him various Headmen, whose rule over their respective sections of the Kabyl is comparatively despotic; it is they who negotiate for the recovery of stolen cattle or property, and collect monetary compensation when necessary from their fellow-tribesmen.

Owing to the increasing demand for building sites outside the walls the price of land is increasing rapidly, and shops and stores are being rapidly built in close proximity to the town.

Mr. Broome reports that the local authorities have received instructions from Fez to make a survey of all Government lands in and around Dar-al-Baida, and to seize any waste lands that may be found near the town until a proper title to it should be forthcoming from any claimant.

The authorities are also instructed to make a list of all Government buildings, houses, and stores, noting what rents are paid for the same and for what rents they are subleased.

Mr. Broome further states that it is rumoured at Dar-al-Baida that similar surveys are to be made at all the coast ports, in order, it is supposed, to be in a position to obtain a mortgage on all the Government properties or to offer these assets as a security for a further loan.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

No. 179.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 21.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, August 14, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that I have received a despatch from Mr. Neroutsos, British Vice-Consul at Rabat, in which he states that the same unsatisfactory state of affairs which has existed in his district during the past two years still exists.

Mr. Neroutsos observes that it is only due to the precautions taken by the European residents themselves that serious acts of brigandage do not occur within a short distance of Rabat. The only steps which the Governor of that town has taken to remedy such a condition of affairs are to issue warnings from time to time against Europeans leaving the town gates, whilst he sells the rifles issued to him by the Maghzen for the protection of the town to the very tribesmen whose attacks he is supposed to take measures to frustrate. Mr. Neroutsos considers that the increasing state of famine will decrease the fighting propensities of the tribesmen, since they are losing their horses owing to the scarcity of fodder, and are being compelled to sell their rifles in order to be able to purchase food for themselves.

The Governor himself is also open to a bribe, and is, moreover, practically in the hands of a cunning scribe whom he was supposed to have dismissed some years ago.

The native sentiment regarding European residents takes the form of indifference rather than of fanaticism, and amongst the better class of natives the opinion still exists that the Government is able to play off one Government on another as effectively as ever.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

No. 180.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 21.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, August 14, 1905.*

WITH reference to Mr. Lowther's despatch No. 177 of the 7th ultimo, I have the honour to report that considerable difficulties have arisen herewith, regarding the settlement of questions relating to title to real property.

As your Lordship is aware, Article XI of the Convention of Madrid, 1880, enacts that "the purchase of real property must be made with the previous consent of the Government, and the titles to such property shall be subject to the Regulations prescribed by the law of the country."

"Any question which may arise respecting such right shall be decided according to the same law with the appeal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs which is stipulated in the Treaties."

Up till quite lately the above was the procedure adopted, and its legality had never been contested by the subject of any nation.

Some short time ago, however, a French lawyer who was defending a French citizen against a German subject in a question relating to real property, after the case had already been submitted to the Moorish Tribunal, brought forward a contention that, by the terms of the German Constitution, State Treaties, in order that they should become operative, must receive the ratification of the Federal Council and the Reichstag. This ratification, he contended, had never taken place, and therefore Article XI was, so far as German subjects were concerned, unenforceable.

He therefore argued that, even should he procure a verdict from the Moorish Tribunal favourable to his client, the German authorities would be unable to enforce compliance by the German subject, and thereupon he withdrew from the Moorish Court.

The German Chargé d'Affaires to some extent upheld the force of this contention and referred the case to the High Court of Appeal at Leipzig. The decision of this Court is still awaited.

The effect of this incident in the German Court was that all the French lawyers adopted similar theories and contested the right of French authorities to compel French citizens to submit cases relating to real property to the decision of the Moorish Courts.

They contend that by virtue of the Constitutional Law of the 16th July, 1875, no Treaty having reference to the right of French citizens holding property in foreign countries is valid unless it shall have been presented for ratification to the two French Chambers, which action they contend was never taken.

The French Chargé d'Affaires has, he tells me, referred the matter to his Government; but meanwhile he acknowledges that the French Court has no power to enforce compliance with Article XI of the Convention of Madrid by French citizens.

The same contention also, I understand, is applicable to Spanish subjects.

As regards British subjects, it is enacted by paragraph 24 of the "Rules and Orders for Regulating the Practice in Her Britannic Majesty's Court for Morocco, 1898," that,  
[1568]



"except as hereinafter contained with respect to re-entry by the landlord, no action in any matter relating to lands or tenements can be tried in the Court, but the proceedings in all such cases are regulated by the provisions of Article XI of the Madrid Convention, 1880."

As an illustration of the impossible state of affairs now existing, I would beg leave to be allowed to give the facts of a case which, for the reasons given above, has been brought to a practical standstill and in which, I regret to say, a British subject is unfortunately concerned.

Last summer a British subject brought an action in the French Consular Court for violation of domicile by a French citizen resident here. The French Court, in accordance with Article XI of the Madrid Convention, 1880, declared itself incompetent to deal with the case since the French defendant disputed the title of the British plaintiff to the property in question, and referred the parties to the Moorish Tribunal for its decision as to which of the parties was the rightful owner of the disputed property.

The case was accordingly submitted to the Moorish Tribunal by both parties, and after several weeks the French defendant, finding great difficulty in conducting his defence, suddenly withdrew from this Court, the Judge having, however, already decreed that until he was able to give his final decision, and as the defendant had so far been able to advance no proofs of any kind to support his contention, the defendant must cease to enjoy or approach the premises in dispute.

As the defendant showed no signs whatever of complying with this decision but began building operations on this property, I called upon the French authorities here to enforce this decision, but they replied that they regretted that they had no power to do so.

And so the case stands, and, although I have still hopes that the French citizen may be prevailed upon to resume his appearance before the Moorish Court, I have very little doubt that should the decision, if one is ever arrived at, be adverse to him, he will not of his own accord comply therewith, and it appears that, unless special instructions are received, the French Court will declare itself incompetent of enforcing such decision.

I would, with all respect, submit that it is high time that some remedy be found to put an end to such an unsatisfactory and equivocal state of affairs as I have endeavoured to explain above, a state of affairs which, as I have pointed out, places British subjects in a more disadvantageous position than those of any other nation.

I would further beg to submit that the suggested Conference of the Powers would be a fitting opportunity to arrive at a fitting solution of the question.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

No. 181.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 21.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, August 21, 1905.*

ARREST of Algerian at Fez. Mr. Lowther's despatch No. 216 of the 12th instant.

I am informed by the French Chargé d'Affaires here that on Saturday last he sent a courier to M. Saint René Taillandier with a despatch from Paris in which his action in demanding an indemnity on account of the Algerian imprisoned at Fez by the Sultan, and also his release, is approved by the French Government.

I was given to understand by the French Chargé d'Affaires that, in the event of the Sultan refusing to comply with these demands, the French would make a naval demonstration and also occupy a town on the Algerian frontier.

No. 182.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 215. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Fez, August 12, 1905.*

I ASKED Count Tattenbach last night whether he had not yet received any instructions as to the presentation to the Sultan of a programme for the Conference.

His Excellency replied that he had received a telegram, a part of which he had been able to decypher, and which led him to believe that it contained the text of the programme, but that the remainder had been sent in a cypher of which he had not the key, which would entail another week's delay.

This is very unfortunate in view of the fact that it must be anticipated that the Sultan and his Government will place every obstacle in the way of the acceptance of the programme once presented.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 183.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 216.)

My Lord,

*Fez, August 12, 1905.*

THE French Minister has a new and somewhat unpleasant incident to deal with. An Algerian residing in the Gharb country having had some dispute with the local Kaïd, has been arrested and brought in chains to Fez.

M. Saint-René having carefully investigated the matter, demanded:—

1. That he should be immediately released.
2. That a sum of 2,000 dollars be paid as indemnity.
3. That the Kaïd should be dismissed.

M. Saint-René presented these demands verbally, adding that he would send an employé of the Legation yesterday to receive the man. On the official presenting himself, he was informed that the man would not be handed over; and his Excellency has since been verbally informed that the man has been imprisoned by the Sultan's order, and that His Majesty does not regard Algerians as French citizens, implying that Treaties are nothing to him.

Pending a further discussion of the case, which promises to give rise to a very unpleasant situation, M. Saint-René has stated that for every day the man is detained he will demand a further indemnity of 100 dollars.

This audacious attitude assumed by the Makhzen, of which this is by no means the first instance, is very remarkable.

The insolent disregard of Treaty engagements, carried as far as it recently has been by the Makhzen, is a somewhat novel feature of Moorish diplomacy.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 184.

*Memorandum communicated by M. Geoffray, August 22, 1905.*

NOTRE Ministre à Fez vient de me faire connaître que le Gouvernement Chérifien a emprisonné un de nos sujets Algériens, le nommé Si Bouzian-el-Miliani, en marquant son intention de le soustraire à notre juridiction.

Ce fait constitue une violation des Traités et la question qu'il soulève touche la France au premier chef comme Puissance limitrophe du Maroc, en raison notamment du grand nombre de nos ressortissants Algériens qui résident ou qui voyagent dans l'Empire Chérifien. Si les Algériens ne pouvaient plus séjourner au Maroc, sans être exposés à subir un semblable traitement, les relations entre le Maroc et l'Algérie deviendraient impossibles. Le Gouvernement de la République se voit, en conséquence, dans l'obligation de demander complète satisfaction.



Toutes les Puissances Signataires avec le Maroc de la Convention de Madrid du 3 Juillet, 1880, ou y ayant adhéré, ont d'ailleurs intérêt au respect des principes qui se trouvent ainsi mis en cause. En vertu d'une règle reconnue par cet Acte international, les Marocains protégés échappent à la juridiction Marocaine; *a fortiori*, les étrangers, sujets des Puissances, doivent-ils bénéficier du même avantage.

Je vous serai très obligé d'indiquer au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité le point de vue où se place le Gouvernement de la République pour faire donner à cet incident une solution également satisfaisante pour toutes les Puissances qui ont des ressortissants au Maroc. Vous ajouterez que la France a l'intention de poursuivre seulement les réparations nécessaires sans rechercher à cette occasion aucun avantage particulier.

No. 185.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Fez, August 19, 1905.

GERMAN loan to Moorish Government. Mr. Wyldbore Smith's telegram, Separate, of the 15th instant.

It seems to me improbable that the matter has been concluded actually, and possibly the German Chargé d'Affaires' communication to the British and French Chargés d'Affaires at Tangier was put forward as a "feeler," as neither the French Minister nor myself have heard a word on the subject from Count Tattenbach.

M. Saint-René Taillandier tells me that no information has reached him respecting any communication made by the German Embassy at Paris to his Government on the subject.

No. 186.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 22.)*

(No. 85.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Fez, August 19, 1905.

MY despatch No. 215 of the 12th instant: Conference on Morocco.

I am informed that Count Tattenbach has sent a reply to the German Government, in which he approves in general terms of the programme drawn up for the Conference. He states, however, that an International Bank must be substituted for the Moorish State Bank, the latter being opposed to the religion of the country. He also mentions that, owing to the question of punishment, the Moorish Government will oppose the proposal for foreign police. See my despatch No. 210 of the 6th instant.

According to Count Tattenbach, there will be no serious resistance offered to the programme either on the part of the Moorish Government or the Notables.

No. 187.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 23.)*

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Fez, August 20, 1905.

GERMAN loan to Sultan. My telegram No. 84 of the 19th August.

I have received information from a very good source that the Viziers have been informed by Count Tattenbach that the loan must be abandoned for the present: I have notified M. Saint-René Taillandier of my information.

The theory put forward by the German Embassy in Paris, as reported in Mr. Lister's telegram No. 53 which I received here to-day, to the effect that the loan is a private one, cannot be accepted, as the Sultan would not accept any guarantee but that of the German Legation, and also the firms concerned have no representative in Fez at the present time.

109

No. 188.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 81.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 25, 1905.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 214 of the 10th instant, and I approve the language held by you in conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the steps taken by the Moorish Government to effect the capture of the murderers of Mr. Madden.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 189.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 217.)

My Lord,

Fez, August 14, 1905.

COUNT TATTENBACH paid a visit a few days ago to the French Minister and adopted a very injured tone regarding an article, which recently appeared in the Paris "Temps," criticizing Count Tattenbach's conduct somewhat severely for having continued to pursue his policy for obtaining concessions from the Moorish Government in spite of the Arrangement of the 8th July concluded at Paris between Germany and France.

Count Tattenbach argued that the charge was unjustifiable, seeing that this contract had been promised to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Tangier so far back as March last, and added that he was prepared to support this statement by documentary evidence, at the same time handing to M. Saint-René a paper.

The French Minister tells me that he took the precaution of having this document translated, and so far from its being an engagement to give the contract to a German firm, it was merely an ordinary note from the Makhzen containing the vaguest of phrases to which generally no importance whatever is attached here.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 190.

*Mr. Lister to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 315. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 25, 1905.

THE Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay informed me to-day that M. Saint-René Taillandier had not as yet communicated the reply of the Sultan of Morocco to the very strong representations which had been made to him with regard to the arrest and detention of a French subject, but that it was hourly expected. The French Government had, as they had informed the Powers in their Circular, insisted on the immediate release of the man, and also on full reparation. They had been discussing the best measures to take in the event of the reply being unsatisfactory, and of coercion being necessary, and were still hesitating between a naval demonstration and a temporary occupation by French troops of a portion of Moorish territory. M. Louis laid stress on the temporary character of this occupation, which would only last till full satisfaction had been given to the French demands, but he said that the French Government were absolutely determined to exact that satisfaction.

No reply had been received from the German Government to the Circular, but they considered the utterances of the semi-official German press as tantamount to an acquiescence in its terms, and in any case they had no intention of waiting for an answer, were action rendered necessary by the Sultan's attitude.

I asked M. Louis whether he had received information similar to that which Mr. Lowther had obtained and communicated to his French colleague, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 571 of the 24th instant, with regard to the German loan to the Sultan. M. Louis replied that the same information had reached M. Saint-René

[1566]

2 F



110

Taillandier from another quarter, and that he had no doubt that it was true, although the German Government had as yet made no statement to that effect. The French Government had continued to insist very strongly on the irregularity of the whole transaction on two grounds: (1) That the Arrangement of the 8th ultimo, by tacit but clear understanding, rendered all transactions of an official character temporarily impossible; and (2) That if the loan were of a private nature, the Sultan was bound by his agreement of last year with the French financial Syndicate to apply first to them for money, and in the event of their accepting his terms to grant to them the right of negotiating the loan.

M. Louis can only attribute the action of the German Emperor and his Government to ignorance of the conditions of such a country as Morocco. They had not realized what their action entailed, or how far they might be involved. They were now getting nervous, and thought it wiser to retire. He certainly considered their policy the reverse of skilful, if their idea at the beginning was to detach France from England. They had now succeeded, first by the violence and sharp practice of their interference in Morocco, and secondly by the disloyalty and "mauvaise foi" of their subsequent actions, in creating throughout France a feeling of distrust so deep that M. Louis doubted whether any press campaign, however adroitly carried on, could now remove it.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) REGINALD LISTER.

No. 191.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Fez, August 23, 1905.

MY despatch No. 216 of the 12th instant.

Arrest of Algerian at Fez.

The Moorish Government presented a written reply yesterday to the French Minister in which all his demands were refused.

No. 192.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 26.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tangier, August 26, 1905.

ARREST of Algerian at Fez.

My telegram of the 21st August, Separate.

I am informed by the French Chargé d'Affaires that he has just received, by telegram from M. Rouvier, instructions for M. Saint-René Taillandier to request an audience of the Sultan immediately, and then to inform His Majesty that, unless his demands shall have been acceded to previously, he will withdraw from Fez within eight days.

No. 193.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 219.)

My Lord,

Fez, August 17, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 200 of the 26th July, I have the honour to report that the prisoner Taib, son of Bu Amama, and two other prisoners, retainers of his, arrived in Fez yesterday, and were consigned to the prison for political offenders in New Fez, pending His Majesty's pleasure.

The fighting with the Pretender's troops seems to have been of a very desultory kind since the battle of the 9th, 10th, and 11th July, and the Pretender seems to be now between Ayoon Sidi Melooch and Taza, probably collecting fresh adherents and supplies. Some 500 more troops are expected to leave here shortly.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

111

No. 194.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 220.)

My Lord,

Fez, August 19, 1905.

THE depleted condition of the Treasury and the apparent necessity which exists on the part of the Vizirs to indulge their extravagant tastes has made it necessary for the Makhzen to resort to every possible means to obtain money.

The Moorish Government have now charged Ben Daiid, ex-Kaid of Morocco city, to sell by auction all such properties of the Moorish Government in or adjacent to Fez, wherein they are part owners, i.e., to sell the Government share in them. There are some 96 properties of this description, and they are being put on the market 20 at a time.

In regard to properties owned entirely by the Government, the grants are being called in; the rents are to be estimated, and the places will then be leased for six months to the present occupiers at a third of the estimated rent. Afterwards the occupiers must either pay the full rent or leave.

It is estimated that some 75,000 dollars, or about 9,400*l.*, to 100,000 dollars, or about 12,500*l.*, will be raised by the first-mentioned properties.

With regard to Mosque properties at Fez, I am told that the Moorish Government has ordered the Nadirs (supervisors) to make lists of these, and have their rentals valued. The holders will then be called upon to pay the estimated rental or leave. This, however, it is supposed, will not affect occupiers of such property who have leases from the Mosque and pay rent.

But it will either put a stop to arbitrary grants by the Court and their friends of the use of Mosque properties, or, what is more likely, provide the Moorish Government with a number of houses wherein they may instal, at no expense to the Government, some of their friends, occupiers of Government property, who lose the free use of houses by the revoking of their privileges in regard to such properties.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

No. 195.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 28.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

Tangier, August 18, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch to your Lordship, Separate, of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that the French steam-yacht "Aigle" left Mogador on the 8th instant. His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mogador reports that he learns that the Mission have now finished their survey of the southern section of the Morocco Coast, and have succeeded in charting Mogador Bay, Cape Sin, and Agadir; they did not, it seems, consider it worth while to proceed as far south as Cape Juby.

Mr. Madden was told by the French Vice-Consul at Mogador that as a result of their investigation of Agadir Bay, the Mission have concluded that the value of the bay as a harbour has been greatly exaggerated—they found it to be exposed to the north-east winds and the depth of the water in the bay to be very much less than had been supposed; in fact, it was clear that it would be far more practicable to construct harbour works at Mogador than at Agadir, where a very much greater outlay would be necessary.

Mr. Madden has also been informed that another result of the investigations of this Mission is to discover that the astronomical position of the coast line of Morocco, as shown on present maps, is 5 kilom. to the west of its true position.

It appears that the visit of the yacht to Agadir was made at the instigation of the recently constituted "Agadir Society," and was in defiance of the advice given by the French authorities here, who strongly warned the Mission from attempting to go to Agadir.

The British Vice-Consul at Mazagan reports that the yacht left that port on the 15th instant for Gibraltar.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.



*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 28.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, August 20, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that Baron von Lengworth informed me to-day that the German training ship "Charlotte" would be visiting Mogador on the 23rd September, and would remain there three days.

He observed that this visit was merely part of the regular summer cruise of this ship, which would previously visit Lisbon, Funchal, and Las Palmas, and after leaving Mogador would continue her cruise to the Levant.

The actual presence of another German training ship, the "Stosch," in this bay, together with the above reported prospective visit, would appear to point towards the determination of the German Emperor to show his flag as often as possible in Moorish waters.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

No. 197.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 28.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, August 23, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that, from reports I have received from the various towns on the coast, it seems that intertribal fighting is prevalent, although only on a small scale.

It would seem that the cause of this state of restlessness is occasioned either by the discontent of the people with their respective Kaïds, owing to the way in which the latter extort money from them under the pretence that they are collecting taxes under orders from the Central Government, or by these Kaïds themselves, whose rapacity has instilled in them a desire to increase the limits of their jurisdiction and to this end attack rival Kaïds.

The lack of both water and provisions, owing to the drought, prevents large bodies of men from remaining for any length of time in one district. This fact may account for the absence of reports of any serious fighting on a large scale.

The British Vice-Consul at Tetuan reports that frequent robberies of cattle have taken place of late on the road between that place and Ceuta.

The district around Tangier is at present unusually quiet, the Anghera tribes being occupied in deciding between the merits of two rival Governors.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

No. 198.

*Sir H. Howard to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 143. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*The Hague, August 23, 1905.*

WITH reference to the visit of the Dutch cruisers "Gelderland," "Utrecht," and "North Brabant" to Tangiers on their way from Netherland East India, which has been announced in the press, M. de Monbel, my French colleague, informed me, confidentially, just before these vessels reached that port, that, in view of the German Representative at Tangiers being in charge of Dutch interests, he had pointed out to Vice-Admiral Ellis, at that time both Minister for Foreign Affairs and of Marine, that the proposed visit would be probably interpreted in Morocco as meaning that The Netherlands shared the views of Germany respecting the Franco-Anglo Convention in regard to Morocco, and that he was, therefore, of opinion personally, for he had no instructions from his Government on the subject, that the visit would be inopportune. M. de Monbel added that Vice-Admiral Ellis had replied that the visit

was solely intended to be an act of courtesy, and in return for the invitation which the Sultan of Morocco had extended to the Netherland Government to attend the proposed International Conference on the affairs of Morocco.

On the 17th instant, while travelling to the Loo with the officers of the British fleet, the subject of the return of these vessels to Holland and their proposed inspection by the Queen on their arrival at Flushing was discussed. I happened to be sitting next to M. Van Tets, the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and asked him why the cruisers were touching at Tangiers, when he replied that he really did not know.

This afternoon his Excellency held his first official reception of the Diplomatic Corps, and just before the close of my interview with him he reverted to the question I had put to him in the train, and said that he had now learnt that as no Dutch men of war had visited either Algiers or Tangiers for some time, it was thought well that the cruisers in question should touch at those ports and show the Dutch flag there.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY HOWARD.

No. 199.

*Mr. Cartwright to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 154. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*San Sebastian, August 24, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that this morning I had the opportunity of having some conversation with M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, who has just returned here from Paris. His Excellency told me that on the previous day Herr von Radowitz, the German Ambassador, had called on him to make certain inquiries with regard to the arrangements to be made for the King of Spain's journey through France on his way to Berlin in November next. M. Cambon took this opportunity of inquiring whether the German Ambassador had received any recent instructions from Berlin respecting Morocco. The reply was that for the last three weeks he had not received a single word on the subject from his Government. On this M. Cambon expressed to Herr von Radowitz in very forcible terms the feeling at the French Foreign Office with regard to the recent conduct of Germany in the Morocco question. Three months ago Germany was in a desperate hurry to solve the difficulties which had arisen in Morocco, no time was to be lost, France was worried to give an immediate reply on the question of the Conference; she had done so, she had met Germany's demands in a conciliatory spirit; the Conference was accepted in principle, and the sketch of the subjects proposed to be discussed at it had been sent to Berlin. A change, however, had come over the scene; Berlin now was mute; the German Government seemed to take no further interest in the meeting of the Conference, but meanwhile Count Tattenbach did not cease his activity at Fez. M. Cambon impressed upon Herr von Radowitz that the apparent disloyalty of Germany in this Moroccan question was causing great irritation in France, and he must not suppose that the French Government would allow themselves to be duped by Germany's dilatory ways in the present negotiations, and if Count Tattenbach continued to extort concessions from the Sultan of Morocco while France loyally abstained from pressing for any for herself, he warned the German Ambassador that it might become necessary for the Powers mainly interested in Morocco to insist that all concessions recently obtained should be examined by the Conference before they were finally ratified. The present attitude of Germany, concluded M. Cambon, if persisted in could only cause irritation all round and do no good to any one.

To all this Herr von Radowitz had little to say except that during the summer the Emperor and the Chancellor were away from Berlin, and that some delay in the negotiations must inevitably occur.

Later in the day M. Cambon went to see the President of the Council and repeated to him what he had said to Herr von Radowitz. Señor Montero Rios expressed his entire approval of M. Cambon's language, and stated that he would speak in the same sense to the German Ambassador at the very first opportunity.

After some moments of silence and hesitation, M. Cambon said to me, the President of the Council suddenly opened out his heart to him and took him into his confidence in a manner which struck him very much taking into consideration the feeling of distrust



which still exists in this country against France. Señor Montero Rios said that Spain was at present placed in a very difficult position; she was too weak to do anything by herself, and therefore had put herself, and would continue to remain, in line with France and Great Britain on the Morocco question, but she could not help feeling deeply hurt and depressed at the high-handed and discourteous manner in which she was being treated by Germany, who had not even deigned to give any reply to his proposal (mentioned in my despatch No. 149 of the 8th instant) that the Conference should be held in Spain, a point on which he laid great stress. But there were other matters of even greater importance in which Spanish aspirations and interests were being trampled upon by Germany. It had been generally understood that Tangier and the northern coast of Morocco should be more or less in the sphere of Spanish influence, it was there that a large number of Spanish subjects resided and where real Spanish economic interests existed; yet it was just there that German intrigues had succeeded in obtaining a concession for a German firm for the construction of a mole and the general commercial development of Tangier, and not satisfied with that it now appeared that practically the whole of the State property in the neighbourhood of that place had been mortgaged to a German bank in return for a loan which was not for national purposes but merely to provide for the Sultan's amusements. Suppose it was decided to introduce an international administration of Tangier and neighbourhood, how could the funds be found for this purpose if the State lands there could be claimed as the property of a German bank? Under all these provocations on the part of Germany, Spain had to remain mute. France was the mouthpiece of the three Powers who were working together to save the situation in Morocco, and his Excellency expressed an earnest hope that she would not yield all along the line to German pressure, and would bear in mind what were the modest but real interests of Spain in Morocco. Señor Montero Rios concluded, so M. Cambon informed me, by bringing down his fist upon the table and saying, "We shall not forget what Germany has done to us on this occasion."

The impression left on M. Cambon's mind is that the Spanish Government, though outwardly maintaining a calm demeanour, are at the present moment deeply incensed with the Kaiser's Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

No. 200.

*Notes exchanged between Prince Radolin and M. Rouvier respecting Tangier Mole and German Loan.—(Communicated by M. Geoffray, August 28.)*

(1.)

*Prince Radolin to M. Rouvier.*

LE Comte de Tattenbach, invité à s'expliquer sur son attitude au sujet des questions de concessions, vient de répondre que pendant son séjour à Fez il n'a demandé ni obtenu des concessions, soit du Sultan, soit du Gouvernement Marocain. Il n'a pas appliqué ses instructions à la construction du port de Tanger, parce qu'il s'agissait dans ce cas d'une demande d'exécuter un plan de construction tout arrêté, commande qui avait été donnée à l'industrie Allemande contre remboursement plusieurs mois avant notre entente avec la France et à laquelle il ne s'agissait que de donner une conclusion formelle.

D'après ces renseignements, votre Excellence voudra bien se convaincre que les nouvelles concernant des prétendues démarches de la part du Comte Tattenbach, en vue d'obtenir des concessions de câble et des commandes de navires, ne sont pas fondées.

Vous voulez bien vous rappeler, M. le Président du Conseil, qu'au mois de Juin j'ai eu l'honneur de vous communiquer que des entreprises commerciales, surtout des constructions de port en grand nombre, nous avaient été offertes de la part du Gouvernement Marocain; mais que par égard pour la France nous avions renoncé à accepter toutes ces offres.

Je ne puis que rappeler à votre Excellence que mon Gouvernement fait tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour ne pas modifier l'état de choses au Maroc et pour ne pas porter préjudice à l'avenir de ce pays. Aussi mon Gouvernement a-t-il renouvelé au Comte de Tattenbach à plusieurs reprises ses instructions dans ce sens.

*Paris, le 21 Août, 1905.*

(2.)

*M. Rouvier to Prince Radolin.*

VOUS me faites connaître par lettre du 21 de ce mois que le Comte de Tattenbach, invité par son Gouvernement à s'expliquer sur la concession du môle de Tanger, vient de répondre "qu'il n'a pas appliqué ses instructions à la construction du port de Tanger, puisqu'il s'agissait dans ce cas d'une commande d'exécuter un plan de construction tout arrêté, commande qui avait été donnée à l'industrie Allemande contre remboursement plusieurs mois avant l'entente avec la France et à laquelle il ne s'agissait que de donner une conclusion formelle."

D'après des renseignements qui me sont parvenus de source sûre, l'industrie Allemande n'avait étudié aucun plan, ni dressé aucun devis avant la fin du mois de Mai 1905; ses propositions, basées sur des études hâtives et rudimentaires, ont eu surtout en vue de supplanter des propositions de l'industrie Française antérieures de plus de dix-huit mois qui avaient déjà reçu un commencement d'exécution par la construction d'un magasin de douane à Tanger et qui s'appuyaient sur des plans et devis des plus complets dressés à la suite d'une demande du Maghzen lui-même en date du 15 Mars, 1905.

Il suffit d'énoncer ces faits pour qu'il apparaisse que la participation, aujourd'hui reconnue, du Comte de Tattenbach, à la conclusion de cette affaire se produisant au lendemain même de nos accords, était difficilement conciliable avec l'esprit de ces accords et l'attitude qu'ils dictaient aux Représentants des deux pays chargés désormais d'une mission commune auprès du Sultan.

Le Comte de Tattenbach reconnaît d'ailleurs qu'il n'a pu agir que par voie d'interprétation de ses instructions. En fait son initiative paraît en opposition réelle avec les assurances que votre Altesse m'avait données dès le mois de Juin et qu'elle prend soin de rappeler elle-même, assurances d'après lesquelles "des entreprises commerciales, surtout des constructions de ports en grand nombre, avaient été offertes par le Gouvernement Marocain au Gouvernement Allemand, qui, par égard pour la France, avait renoncé à les accepter."

D'après la note que votre Altesse Sérénissime m'a fait parvenir le 4 Août dernier, le Gouvernement Impérial réservait son opinion sur le contrat en question. J'espère qu'en considération des observations ci-dessous, il voudra bien s'employer pour que l'exécution en soit suspendue jusqu'à la réunion de la Conférence. La question se réglerait alors tout naturellement par l'application du principe d'adjudication en matière de travaux publics que nous avons proposé d'établir comme garant des intérêts du Sultan et de la liberté économique sans aucune inégalité de traitement stipulé dans nos Accords du 8 Juillet.

*Paris, le 25 Août, 1905.*

P.S.—Votre Excellence trouvera ci-jointe une note en réponse aux explications qu'elle a bien voulu me transmettre au sujet de l'emprunt.

*Note attached to foregoing Letter.*

*M. Rouvier to Prince Radolin.*

Dans ses entretiens des 16 et 21 Août avec le Directeur des Affaires Politiques et le Directeur du Cabinet, le Prince Radolin a fait connaître que le Gouvernement Impérial n'envisageait pas l'opération, qui serait sur le point d'être conclue par un groupe de banques Allemandes, comme un emprunt, mais comme une simple ouverture



ture de crédit—une avance de banque de courte durée. Dans ces conditions, le Cabinet de Berlin ne le jugeait pas en contradiction avec l'Accord du 8 Juillet, ni avec les arrangements verbaux qui ont précisé cet Accord.

Le Gouvernement de la République ne saurait se ranger à l'opinion qui est exposée par le Prince Radolin. Les conditions qui régissent l'opération poursuivie par les établissements Allemands—gage non négociable commercialement, intérêts anticipés, durée du prêt portée à deux années, coopération d'un groupe de banques—ne permettent pas de donner à l'affaire un autre caractère que celui d'un véritable emprunt. Elle paraît, en conséquence, incompatible avec l'Accord du 8 Juillet et avec l'œuvre qui doit être entreprise à la Conférence.

L'importance des chiffres du futur emprunt, qui correspond à une annuité du revenu des douanes Marocaines, appelle d'ailleurs d'autres observations.

Loin de favoriser l'acquiescement du Sultan à l'œuvre de la Conférence, l'emprunt permettrait au Maghzen d'écarter à l'heure actuelle le programme de réformes, et de reprendre pendant un nouveau délai sa politique de gaspillage et d'insouciance du lendemain. Après avoir épuisé les ressources mises à sa disposition, le Gouvernement Marocain ne manquerait pas de chercher à s'en procurer d'autres par les mêmes procédés, sans se soucier désormais de compromettre son crédit que la dernière consolidation de sa dette avait si heureusement établi à un taux jugé favorable par les États régulièrement administrés.

C'est par une politique financière prudente, et qui ne prodigue pas au Maghzen les moyens de dépenser, que l'on rétablira la sécurité et l'ordre au Maroc. Le Gouvernement Français s'est toujours inspiré de ces vues; ses efforts ont toujours tendu à restaurer l'autorité du Sultan, en lui accordant son appui fidèle contre ses sujets révoltés. Mais il ne saurait considérer comme service rendu au Sultan la mise à sa disposition d'une somme aussi élevée, sans garantie donnée sur son emploi.

Sans doute, il n'entre pas dans les desseins du Gouvernement de la République d'accabler Sa Majesté Chérifienne à des embarras d'argent particulièrement pressants et pénibles. S'il ne s'agit en effet que de lui prêter une assistance pécuniaire limitée à des besoins reconnus, le principe en serait admis facilement, à la condition toutefois que l'avance consentie fût de beaucoup moindre importance, de courte durée, et ne comportât pas de gage immobilier; la somme ainsi prêtée devrait en outre faire à bref délai l'objet d'une opération de consolidation sur les bases qui seraient déterminées par la Conférence.

Pour réaliser une opération de ce genre, le Gouvernement Chérifien n'a pas besoin de recourir à des combinaisons nouvelles. Les voies et moyens qui lui ont permis de contracter l'Emprunt de 1904 restent à sa disposition, comme ils l'eussent été à tout moment, s'il avait demandé aux banques Françaises qui ont souscrit cet emprunt d'en chercher une nouvelle application.

Quant au droit de préférence qui a été reconnu à ces banquiers, il ne saurait être mis en question. Il est d'ailleurs la contre-partie d'avantages consentis simultanément au Sultan. Ce droit est inscrit à l'Article 33 du Contrat du 12 Juin, 1904, le seul Article qui ait trait aux engagements financiers du Gouvernement Chérifien en dehors des Articles qui règlent les conditions mêmes de l'emprunt.

Cette clause ne crée pas au profit des banques Françaises un monopole susceptible de porter atteinte à la souveraineté du Sultan, puisqu'elle n'exclue pas la concurrence d'autres établissements financiers de toute nationalité, que, tout au contraire, elle le stimule au profit du Trésor Chérifien. La clause de préférence ne prévaut en effet qu'à égalité de prix et de conditions. On ne peut demander au Gouvernement de la République de méconnaître et d'abandonner les droits particuliers qui découlent pour ses ressortissants des contrats passés par le Sultan et le Maghzen.

Telles sont les observations d'ordre général qui empêchent le Gouvernement de la République d'adhérer à l'avis exprimé par le Prince Radolin. L'opération financière projetée par les établissements Allemands apparaît comme étant préjudiciable aussi bien aux intérêts véritables du Maghzen qu'à l'œuvre réservée à la Conférence.

Le Gouvernement de la République appelle de nouveau l'attention du Cabinet de Berlin sur les considérations qui doivent mettre obstacle à la conclusion de l'opération projetée. Il a confiance que la Chancellerie Impériale sera elle-même d'avis qu'il est préférable de ne pas donner suite à la négociation de l'emprunt offert par les banques Allemandes.

No. 201.

*Memorandum communicated by M. Geoffray, August 28, 1905.*

LE Conseil des Ministres Français a décidé à l'unanimité que, dès la réception des instructions qui suivent, le Ministre de France devra demander sans retard au Sultan une audience de congé. Dans cette audience, il exprimera au Sultan, sur un ton mesuré, les regrets du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères que la Mission Française soit interrompue dans de telles conditions et n'ait pas obtenu le résultat que permettaient d'en espérer les intérêts communs et permanents des deux pays, et les preuves d'amitié que le Gouvernement de la République n'a cessé de prodiguer au Sultan et à son peuple. M. Saint-René Taillandier aura en même temps à faire connaître à Ben Sliman qu'il a reçu ordre de quitter Fez dans un très bref délai si toutes les satisfactions exigées par le Gouvernement de la République ne lui sont pas immédiatement accordées. Le départ de M. Saint-René Taillandier devra s'effectuer approximativement dans le délai d'une semaine; à l'expiration de ce délai, il se dirigera avec le personnel de la Mission sur Larache, où il est désirable qu'il n'arrive que le 15 Septembre. Au moment du départ, notre Ministre fera savoir à Ben Sliman qu'il acceptera la remise de Si Bousian, entre ses mains ou entre celles du Vice-Consul, jusqu'à l'arrivée de la Mission à Larache, mais qu'ensuite l'affaire recevra telle suite qu'il conviendra au Gouvernement de la République; il y aura lieu de faire remarquer à Ben Sliman que le Maghzen est tenu pour responsable de la vie de Si Bousian, ainsi que des dommages qui pourraient être causés à la personne ou aux biens de nos nationaux et de nos ressortissants au Maroc. Si M. Saint-René Taillandier recevait satisfaction en cours de route, il se bornerait à en donner acte, en ajoutant qu'il lui est prescrit d'aller prendre les ordres du Gouvernement de la République à Tanger. Un navire de guerre prendra, le 15 Septembre, la Mission Française à Larache pour la conduire à Tanger, où des instructions seront envoyées à M. Saint-René Taillandier. Celui-ci est laissé libre soit de maintenir à Fez notre Vice-Consul, soit de le ramener avec lui, ainsi que notre Mission militaire.

M. Geoffray a été invité à communiquer oralement la substance de ces instructions au Foreign Office, afin que le Gouvernement Britannique puisse, s'il le juge nécessaire, comme il est probable, rappeler à Tanger son Ministre. M. Rouvier attache le plus grand prix à ce que le Gouvernement Britannique veuille bien considérer comme strictement confidentielle la communication dont il s'agit, attendu qu'il désire pour le moment n'en aviser aucun autre Gouvernement.

No. 202.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 29.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

Tangier, August 24, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 18th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have received a despatch from the Acting British Vice-Consul at Saffi, informing me that the French steam yacht "Aigle" left that port on the 13th instant.

During her stay there a party from on board landed to take observations. They were met by the port authorities, who informed them that unless they had Shereefian orders such proceedings could not be permitted. The party thereupon returned to the yacht.

I understand that the French yacht "Centa," during her visit to Saffi last June, made extensive surveys ashore and soundings in the bay.

The British Vice-Consul at Mazagan reports that the "Aigle" arrived at that port from Gibraltar on the 24th instant and has commenced surveying operations.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.



No. 203.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lowther.*

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Foreign Office, August 29, 1905.*

THERE does not seem to be any use in your remaining at Fez if the French Mission is withdrawn. You should therefore make preparations to enable you to leave Fez about the same time as the French Minister.

No. 204.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 30.)*

(No. 221.)

My Lord,

*Fez, August 20, 1905.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 214 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a further despatch from Mr. Consul Maclean, who is still investigating the murder of Mr. Madden at Mazagan.

Unfortunately the Governor of Mazagan, who appears to be the stumbling-block in the investigation, is strongly supported by Ben Aish, a Court official much in favour at this moment. Hence my endeavours to obtain the removal of the Governor must always prove ineffectual, and unfortunately the political situation of the moment encourages obstruction in this direction.

Mr. Maclean's despatch gives a sufficiently graphic description of the difficulties in the way of arriving at the truth to render it unnecessary to enlarge upon them.

I will lose no opportunity of pressing upon the Makhzen the necessity of acting with energy, and, if necessary, will speak with the Sultan again upon the matter, though I am anxious to reserve such a step for a case of extreme necessity.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 204.

*Consul Maclean to Mr. Lowther.*

(Separate.)

Sir,

*Mazagan, August 13, 1905.*

THIS morning I received your Excellency's despatch of the 8th instant.

I beg to inclose copy of narrative related in Mazagan by Mohammed-ben-Boobker Stuki and Saïd-ben-Tahar.

These stories, and the statement made by Mohammed-ben-Boobker in Fez, and the latter's producing the watch, taken together, seemed to me to afford a real clue, which we are, and have been, endeavouring to follow.

Saïd-ben-Tahar is enlisted into our service, and I am receiving assistance from a British semsar, Bonshaib-ben-Yehia, a cousin of the Legation Taleb, who is under obligations to us for assistance rendered in a long case he had against the late Governor of Mazagan.

The Governor has been the stumbling-block right through the case.

Booashreen is a reliable person, and an excellent cross-examiner, but he has no powers beyond advising the Governor. The latter is not only incapable, but also jealous.

The orders from the Makhzen to the country Governors and to the Commander of the Mhalah have produced no fruit.

We have in prison two of the four men mentioned by Saïd-ben-Tahar.

The other two are still in their village, and, so far, all ruses to obtain their capture have missed fire.

One of these, Mesod-wold Embark-ben-Mashu, is the brother to the wife of Mohammed-ben-Boobker Stuki.

The girl who found the watch is named Zahra; she is a young girl of precocious habits. All these people live in the same village, and are related to each other several times over.

119

Zahra has been on her way to us several times, but has been waylaid, and sent back.

We have interviewed and cross-questioned and re-examined a great number of people. It is a laborious task. Not the least of our difficulties is that there is only one prison, which has no separate rooms, so all prisoners can talk together and compare notes.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) ALLAN MACLEAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 204.

*Statement made by Mohammed-ben-Boobker-ben-Abdallah-Stuky-el-Wazawee in the Presence of Boo Ashreen, the Governor, his Secretary, B. Carleton, and two Public Notaries, July 5, 1905.*

THAT he lived in the Ababda district, "Duar-al-Bahar," in the jurisdiction of Kaïd Hadj Caddore-el-Killally. That, two days after the murder had been committed, a woman from the village, named Fatma-bint-Saïd-bel-Maschy, wife of El-Ghalee-el-Abady, told him that she believed a man named Mohammed Wold Mesod had committed some crime, as he seemed as if he had something on his conscience. On hearing this he commenced to watch him. Five days later he saw him going to a "Zuan," and he followed him. Arriving at the foot of a tree, he sat down, with his back turned to him. He remained watching him until he went away, and then he examined the ground where he had been sitting. He found the earth had been disturbed, and so he dug there, and found a gold watch. This he kept fifteen days, and when he heard that rewards were offered for articles that were missing from Mr. Madden's he went to see M'Sahal, a Stuka man employed by Mr. Carleton, and told him about the watch under the promise that his name would not be mentioned. This woman also told him that she was at Benshaib Salmee's house at Mazagan, and overheard Mohammed Wold Mesod telling Mohammed Wold Boofee (a stepson of the former) about the murder, and that he said they went to kill Mr. Madden, and were hired by Abdrahman-ben-Yessif. On being questioned if they got any money he replied, "No, only two watches, some rings, a candlestick, a revolver, a knife, and a pair of boots." He (Mohammed-ben-Boobker) further stated that he had confided this news to Saïd Wold Hadj Tahar-el-Madanee, and gave him permission to repeat it to the Governor on the condition that he did not name his informant. He advised him to tell the Governor, if he could not get hold of Mohammed Wold Mesod, to arrest Bonshaib Salmee (El Garab) and his stepson, Mohammed Wold Boofee, who knew about the murder, although they were in no way concerned in it themselves. He further stated that Wold Mesod told him he was ill, and could only account for his illness as through fright at having been present at the murder of Mr. Madden.

Inclosure 3 in No. 204.

*Statement made by Saïd Wold Hadj Tahar.*

HE stated that the Governor sent for him, and offered to reward him well if he discovered any clue that would lead to the discovery of the murderers. He employed Mohammed-ben-Boobker Stuky and his wife. She (Stuky's wife) was mistress of Boafee-el-Abady, who is an uncle of Mohammed Wold Mesod, the prisoner, and his niece, Zahra (a granddaughter of Fatma-ben-Saïd-el-Maischi, mentioned by Stuky as his informant) is mistress to Mohammed Wold Mesod. He stated that Stuky told him that Zahra knew all about the case, and that two of the murderers were named Mohammed Wold Mesod and Mesod Wold Embark-ben-Maishie (a brother of Mrs. Stuky). Saïd sent to Zahra, who told him that she discovered Mohammed Wold Mesod with a bundle containing some Moorish money (about 100 dollars) and two rings. She took one ring, and said she was going to keep it, but he took it away from her, and said he would only give it to her when all the articles had been divided amongst them. She told Saïd that, on the following day, Mesod Wold Embark-ben-Maishie was with him, Mohammed Wold Mesod, and they would not allow her to remain with them, but that, when he left, she went to Mohammed Wold Mesod, and claimed



the ring, but he informed her that it had not fallen to his share. She told Saïd that if Hadj Caddore-el-Kelaly, the Governor of the province, seized Mohammed Wold Mesod, he was to come to her, and she would show him where the articles were. One day Mohammed heard a rumour that the Kaïd Hadj Caddore-el-Kelaly had been requested to arrest him, and he stayed away from his hut, and she found the watch, and sent it by Stuky to Saïd, but the latter was afraid that, if he brought the watch to the Governor, the latter would seize him until a confession was made by Mohammed. He told Stuky to take it to the Governor, and saw no more of him. Later on he went to the Governor for payment for Zahra, but was refused it. He sent to Zahra to get other articles, but she replied she was not going to be taken in twice. When she saw Stuky before the watch was taken, she told him Wold Mesod told her that the men who were with him, Ben Bwee, Mesod Wold Embark Bonshaib (Mrs. Stuky's brother), Boufee (an intimate friend and paramour of Mrs. Stuky), and four men from Mazagan whom he did not name. He stated that they found Mr. and Mrs. Madden sleeping in separate rooms, and they had a light burning. Mr. Madden told them they had no right to come into his house, but, as they had done so, they could take what they wanted. Then Wold Mesod struck at him with a dagger, and he called out, at which one of the others shot him, and Mrs. Madden appeared on the scene, and begged them to spare life, and, when shot at, disappeared. Wold Mesod had Mr. Madden's hat put on his head by his friends, and they remarked, "Now you are the N'srance." They then got scared, and took away whatever they came across.

## No. 205.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 30.)*

(Separate.)

My Lord,

*Tangier, August 24, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that I have had a conversation this morning with Mr. Isaac Abensur, the Tangier Agent of Messrs. Mendelssohn, the principal of the group of German financiers with whom the Sultan is negotiating a loan for 500,000l.

Mr. Abensur told me that the rate of interest for this loan is to be 6 per cent.; it is to be redeemed within two years' time, or sooner, if the Sultan should be in possession of sufficient monies to be able to do so. Mr. Abensur observed that this point tended to show that the transaction does not partake of the nature of a loan, but of a temporary advance which is to be repaid at the first opportunity, or at least within two years. He further remarked that the officials at Fez no longer seemed so eager to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion, but I may mention that this last remark does not tally with information I have received from another source, which would go to show that the Sultan is annoyed at the protracted negotiations in connection with this transaction, and is anxious to obtain delivery of the money as quickly as possible.

Mr. Abensur informed me that he did not consider that the Government properties situated at Tangier would constitute a sufficient security for the sum advanced, and that further guarantees would be necessary; he mentioned in connection with this the properties belonging to the Government at Daralbaida, which are said to be of a considerably greater value than those at Tangier.

I am told that the Maghzen would be willing to allow the banks to retain a certain proportion of the loan as a security for the due payment of the interest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND WYLDBORE SMITH.

## No. 206.

*Mr. Wyldbore Smith to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 30.)*

(Separate.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tangier, August 30, 1905.*

ARRESTED Algerian.

I have been informed by the German Chargé d'Affaires that on the 28th instant the Moorish authorities handed over the arrested Algerian to the French Minister at Fez.

## No. 207.

*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Lister.*

(No. 585.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 30, 1905.*

WITH reference to the final paragraph of my despatch No. 546 of the 12th instant on the subject of the Morocco Conference, the French Minister called at this Office this afternoon and informed Sir Eldon Gorst of the proposals which the French Ambassador at Madrid is to submit to the Spanish Government with a view to arriving at a preliminary understanding on matters in which Spain is specially interested.

The proposals are as follows:—

*Police.*—Spain to undertake the police arrangements at Larache—perhaps at Tetuan—and on the land frontiers of the Spanish "Présides."

At Tangier Spain to administer the police arrangements of that port, on the condition that a French Inspector-General would superintend generally the policing of all four ports.

*Contraband by Sea.*—The prevention of this contraband to be intrusted to the Spanish and French navies—a Franco-Spanish division being alternately under the command of an officer of each country.

*Participation of Spanish Capital in the State Bank.*—The presidency of the Board of Administration to be assigned to France. The number of Spanish members to be proportionate to the amount of Spanish capital, which would be superior to that of the other Powers (France excepted).

The circulation of the Spanish peseta in Morocco to be preserved.

M. Geoffray stated that M. Jules Cambon had been instructed to place himself in communication with Mr. Cartwright, and that the French Government counted on his co-operation should the necessity arise.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.



*Annex to Volume, containing a Despatch which should have appeared on page 50.*

No. 88\*.

*Mr. Lowther to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 176.)

My Lord,

*Fez, July 6, 1905.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a very complete Memorandum which Mr. Vice-Consul MacLeod has drawn up of the events connected with the proposals for reform put forward by the French Government, together with certain criticisms which have presented themselves to him from a lengthy experience of this country and from local considerations.

As there seems to be some discrepancy as to the actual proposals made, I asked Mr. MacLeod to furnish an Appendix with a comparative statement of the various proposals as they have reached His Majesty's Legation from different quarters.

Another Appendix contains a statement of the German case as represented here.

Appendix 2 I have omitted in this despatch, as it contains merely the copies of the résumés of the Conferences on the French Reform Proposals, which have already reached your Lordship from His Majesty's Legation at Tangier.

I regret that this Memorandum has, of necessity, become somewhat voluminous, but I think it will be found very useful for reference and guidance in the event of a Conference being held to discuss the question of reforms here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 88\*.

*Confidential Report by Vice-Consul MacLeod.*

# 1. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

THE French Minister, M. Saint René Taillandier, arrived at Fez on the 26th January last.

Shortly thereafter he had a series of private discussions with the Moorish Government, mainly, as I understand, for the exchange of ideas upon the Moorish situation generally, and the reforms which should be instituted to cope with it.

The Moorish Government agreed that reforms were necessary, but professed to fear that the country would be alarmed by the institution of innovations.

To prevent this, the Moorish Government suggested, and the French Minister agreed, that an assembly of Notables be convoked, whom the Moorish Government would choose from all the leading towns in Morocco, and who would be men in whom the public had confidence. The Ulema (religious doctors) and the commercial classes would be fully represented in this body. The French Minister agreed to expound his proposals in the hearing of a Committee of Notables and the Viziers, but the Notables and Viziers were not to reply then, but to discuss the French proposals afterwards between themselves.

The French Minister's idea in assenting to this plan was to secure for his proposal at least a fair hearing by the Notables, and through them by the public.

The French Minister and his First Secretary, and the French Vice-Consul here, expressed to me at the time their general approval of the persons chosen as Notables.

Many of them were, of course, of the most fanatical classes, but, on the other hand, the majority appeared to be, as Moors go, moderate, intelligent, and fairly reasonable men. Discussions continued to take place, all very privately and informally, with the object, so to speak, of formulating a case for submission to the Notables.

[1566]

2 K



This formed what may be called the bargaining stage of the negotiations—the Moorish Government professing that if the Notables agreed to the proposals thus formulated they, too, would assent to them—and the French Minister premising that he could not thereafter reduce his proposals.

As before stated, the preliminary discussions were very private, so no outside information was procurable upon them. The French officials at the time gave me no details of them, and with the approval of His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, I studiously refrained from making inquiries in Moorish Government quarters upon them, for the reasons (1) that to have done so might have given the Moorish Government the impression that we were not in the confidence of the French, (2) that the French might, if (as was very probable) they learned of such inquiries, consider they were being watched.

I thought further that any (even little) outside information I could get would be more useful than French or Moorish Governments' versions of events, for comparison with any information the French Government might have given to our Government in advance as to the programme intended to be carried out.

On the 21st February the Notables had their first meeting with the Court. On the 22nd February the first of a series of five Conferences between French Minister, Viziers, and Notables took place. At this Conference the Minister discoursed upon the situation generally, and briefly indicated the remedies France suggested. Résumés of those of the Ministers' discourses were, after these Conferences, circulated by the Moorish Government among the Notables for their study and comments.

Of these I procured copies privately, and I inclose summary translations of them herewith.\* I forwarded the Arabic (full copies) to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, of course, at the time. I inclose also herewith a comparative précis,† giving the information on the proposals as (1) communicated to us by the French Mission from time to time, (2) as shown in the above-named résumé, and (3) as mentioned to His Britannic Majesty's Minister lately by the Sultan.

To resume the narrative of events. Considering how distasteful its subject-matters must have been to the bulk of his hearers, and to so conservative a public, the Minister's discourses and proposals were surprisingly well-received at the beginning.

The army proposals were looked at askance, but amongst the merchant classes, particularly, one heard pretty general approval of the Customs and port improvements proposals.

The public, too, seemed to me to have been considerably impressed by the Minister's pictures of the Moorish Government's failure of late to keep the roads, &c., safe.

About the 5th (6th) March, i.e., just when there was time for the views of the German Government upon the French programme expounded on the 22nd February to have arrived, the German Acting-Consul began the anti-French action here, which Germany has since followed.

I called the French Minister's attention to this on the 7th March, but he considered the German Acting-Consul was certainly not authorized in that sense by his Government.

Thinking that the Minister must have some private and reliable information as to Germany's attitude, I concluded he was most likely right, but I at once reported on the subject to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, who replied that in his opinion the German Acting-Consul had been really authorized to take the line he had assumed.

From all I could learn then and later, it was clear that it was the Germans who interposed first.

The Moorish Government had some idea of appealing to Germany, but had decided against doing so. The effect of the German action became apparent on the 16th March, when, at a meeting between the Viziers and the Notables, strong opposition was offered to the French proposals, and counter-demands against France in respect of incroaching on the frontier were advocated.

This opposition—it was suspected by the French, I think rightly—was instigated really by certain of the Viziers (for up till then the Notables had always acted tractably at the Court's hint) so as to afford a pretext for abandoning the negotiations. Meantime the Conferences (Viziers, Notables, and French Minister), however, continued to be held. On the 30th March I reported that the German Acting-Consul had asserted that a contract (or Concession) had been made with a German firm to rebuild the old mole at Tangier. On the 31st March the German Emperor visited Tangier. On the 11th

\* Appendix No. 2, not printed.

† Appendix No. 1.

April the fifth (and last) Conference of the French Minister, Viziers, and Notables took place, when the Minister expounded the frontier question.

On the 17th April it was known that Germany had made an Agreement of her own with Morocco regarding her "cabotage," or coastwise, shipping.

On the 11th May the German Envoy, Count von Tattenbach, reached Fez.

From the 11th April till the 28th May the French negotiations appear to have consisted, in effect, of a series of—so to speak—"low" offers from the Moorish Government towards acceptance of the army proposals—offers so low as, if agreed to, to have rendered the scheme a mere shadow, and of no benefit to the country, and a total rejection—on the pretext of their cost, I suppose—of the Port Improvements Scheme and (for what reason I have no information beyond His Serene Majesty's statement to His Excellency Mr. Lowther, that they were drawn in the interests of France and not of Morocco) of the finance proposals. The Moorish objection, on the one hand, was backed with much violence by the German Minister, and, on the other, increasing pressure was brought by the French Minister for the acceptance of the proposals.

The German Minister supported his representations by offers of military instructors (Germans) for the army, assistance in finance, public works, and the like, insisting that, under the most-favoured-nation clause of the Madrid (1880) Convention, in whatever way one signatory of it was treated, any other signatory so desiring must be treated in *identically* the same way. In this connection I inclose a summary, which explains itself, of what I understand to be the German "case" and the French "defence" to it.\* So far, however, the only outcome of these demands has been the contract—above referred to—entered into for rebuilding the old mole at Tangier, and the engagement of a German military doctor at 1,200*l.* a-year by the Sultan. No unquestionably reliable information on these two subjects is as yet available, however, so possibly they may prove to have been merely German aspirations, and not Moorish grants.

Meanwhile official notice of the Spanish Government's wish to send a mission to Fez to support the French proposals reached the Court.

Resistance to the French proposals culminated on the 28th May, when, with the Notables' approval, the Moorish Government rejected them.

Simultaneously the Moorish Government stated that they could not introduce reforms by the aid of any one Power, nor otherwise than by guarantee of all the other Powers—signatories of the Madrid Convention (1880). These Powers were invited, at the same time, to empower their Representatives at Tangier to meet at a Conference there for the consideration of such reforms, and means of providing for the cost of them.

In this latter connection an increase of taxation would be required, and it would be necessary that foreign residents in the country contribute thereto.

The British mission arrived at Fez on the 31st May.

## 2. RETROSPECT.

A perusal of the comparative précis (Appendix No. 1, herewith) will show that, while in some details information from one source supplements that from another, and with one exception (schools), which will be noticed hereinafter, yet in no case is there any disparity in the information received here regarding the French proposals.

In the first place it should be observed that the French Minister has never claimed that his proposals were intended to be comprehensive of all the needs of the country. They were merely a first start in the direction of reform, and consisted therefore of no more than it was thought the Moorish Government, with French assistance, would undertake at present. They were limited to four objects, namely:—

1. Army reform.
2. Port improvements.
3. Public safety.
4. Finance.

### Army Proposals.

The Army Reform proposed was the gradual organization of a force to be small, but not limited in numbers, to comprise Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, and to be commanded and instructed by Frenchmen and Algerians in the proportion of three

\* Appendix No. 3: German "case"; French defence to it.



foreigners to 100 natives. Funds for this were to be lent by France, and to be disbursed by Moorish officials, under the inspection of the French officers. The force was to be trained at Tangier, Oujdah, Figuig, and later on, I presume, if men enough were found, at other Moorish ports.

The military "entourage" of the Sultan (who is almost always in the interior of the country) was to be left untouched, so as not to disturb the positions of foreigners already employed at His Serene Majesty's Court, nor to excite the tribes' hostility by increasing the number of Europeans around the Sultan.

Moreover, the new troops were most required at the places named, and could be maintained there much more cheaply than in the interior (for other points see Appendix No. 1).

The scheme, so far as it went, while unobjectionable enough to European ideas, was not eminently practical or well conceived for presentation to a people so intensely prejudiced towards innovation as the Moors. The impression is irresistible that a large force (i.e., large to Moorish ideas) was actually suggested or implied to the Notables and Viziers. That impression was certainly given, even to me, by the French Vice-Consul, and, if this was not what the French Minister meant, I conclude that he must either have been misinterpreted by his dragoman staff, or misunderstood by them, and that the latter ventured to express what they thought the Minister's plan amounted to, and not what he actually had said.

The other serious defect in the scheme was that no Commissariat was designed, though presumably this would have come later on. The troops were to be paid in money, and to feed themselves (though not their horses, I believe), and so the old grotesque abuses (1) of men saving their money and deserting when food was cheap, (2) starving and deserting when food was dear, (3) having their fighting efficiency almost annulled on campaign by having to spend part of their time searching (often in vain) for food, and being dependent for it on camp followers and local tribes, often the tribes against whom they were operating—all were untouched.

Comparing Moorish soldiers with the only enemies they have had to encounter, or are ever likely to have to face, there is not much difference between them as regards courage (or want of it), discipline (or want of it), or good (or bad) shooting.

Advantages of ground, which the tribes have, are largely lost by their having no artillery. The one enormous advantage the tribesman has, is that he is somewhat better fed (even in time of peace), and infinitely better fed in time of war.

The recent campaigning between the Sultan's troops and the Pretender's afford striking illustrations of this, each party (so curiously destitute do Moors seem of any gift of organization) failing invariably to hold any ground, where the tribes would not or could not feed them.

Since it was a "first step" only that had to be made, I therefore doubt whether the step suggested was either short enough or wholly in the right direction, and I think that, both as regards the obtainable results and (very especially) as being far less alarming to the Moorish Government and people (and to jealous foreigners too), it would have been better had a far smaller number of military (combatant) instructors and a few really able Commissaires, with full supervision of funds and supplies, formed the new element in the proposed forces in their relation to the army proposals.

The foregoing, I should remark, are not altogether *ex post facto* opinions, but for the most part are the conclusions arrived at in the course of prolonged and minute study of the Sultan's Pretender's campaigns, minute reports on which I furnished at the time, and drew attention to this radical weakness in Moorish army "management."

It is to be observed that no alteration is suggested regarding the selection of Administrators, nor is there to be any restriction of their functions.\*

The Reforms proposed are of four classes:—

| Proposal.                                   | How Financed.                                                                                            | Remarks.                                          |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| (A.) Improved methods of customs management | Money outlay insignificant.                                                                              |                                                   |
| (B.) Improved lighterage ..                 | French will lend funds* ..                                                                               | * Up to 3,000,000 fr. = 120,000 <i>l.</i> in all. |
| (C.) Land works ..                          | French will lend funds,* but all foreigners may build bond warehouses on similar concessions from State. |                                                   |
| (D.) Sea works ..                           | French will lend funds.*                                                                                 |                                                   |

\* 2. Port improvements—Customs reforms, see Appendix No. 1.

Control.—All above to be under State control.

Constructions.—All classes to be open to public tender by all nationalities, except where the nature of these public works do not allow of this. (See remarks upon Telegraph Cable in Class D, treated of hereinafter.)

Class (A).—The improved methods of Customs management (e.g., as to charging for storage of goods, weighing and measuring of packages, of signed declarations given in by owners of packages of their contents and values, &c., &c., store book-keeping, &c.) are of so very necessary and elementary a character that it might well be matter of wonder to persons not familiar with Morocco how it has been possible to administer the Customs hitherto without them. The present bonded store-keepers are Europeans of various nationalities, born in Morocco, and there is no suggestion that persons of that category should not in future be employed for the store work, for which they are fitted. However much the above proposals were (naturally enough) disliked by the individuals appointed as Administrators from year to year, with their friends, and the small group of Court officials, whose influence procures their appointments, these proposals (Class A) met with general native public approval here.

Class (B). *Lighterage*.—By Treaty<sup>o</sup> the lighterage in Moorish ports is a Government monopoly. Its inefficiency and the losses this causes to steam-ship companies are notorious. The French proposal is that it should remain under Government control, but be improved so as to increase its yield of revenue to the Government.

On the other hand various steam-ship companies have advocated their taking it over themselves.

Sir Arthur Nicolson told me in May 1904, that an international group of steam-ship companies, amongst them Forwood Brothers, wished to undertake it, and that the French Minister had expressed approval of the idea.

This approval, Sir Arthur added, had done much to change the unfavourable opinions of the Anglo-French Agreement, which Mr. Ernest Forwood, then in Tangier, had held. Subsequently the French Minister must have changed his views, since, three or four months later, on the ground that this course would best preserve the Sultan's rights, he advocated the lighterage remaining directly under Moorish Government control, but being made efficient.

Last autumn he declined to put forward a scheme of the (French) Compagnie Marocaine for their taking over the lighterage on terms from the Moorish Government, and successfully procured the rejection of a similar proposal for Tangier in favour of the German firm of Haessner and Joachimssohn.

The discountenancing, however, of the Cie. Marocaine's proposal was not generally known, nor publicly explained—though the rejection of the German proposal was soon known—and the change of policy gave, I fear, the impression to the steam-ship companies that, after all, their original fears were right, and that by-and-bye the lighterage would pass into French possession.

In March last, the above-named German firm obtained an order to supply some lighters and lighter-tugs for Tangier, as a consolation presumably for not getting the lighterage monopoly there.

Why a full public statement should not have been made when the French Minister changed his attitude towards the Steam-ship Companies' project does not seem clear.

Had this been done many jealousies and heartburnings, both on this and on other subjects, would have been averted, for this was in the press and elsewhere quoted as a sort of "discovered instance" of how the French meant to acquire monopolies for themselves.

Class (C). *Land Works*:—

- (1.) Bonded stores.
- (2.) Jetties and cranes.
- (3.) Harbour lights.
- (4.) Lighthouses on coast.

The French Loan Contractors are willing to erect bonded warehouses for general use by the public at rates to be fixed beforehand with the State. The profits accruing

\* See Appendix No. 4.



therefrom are to be shared with the State. At such warehouses the system of "warrants" would be established, and be of much advantage to merchants.

The French Loan Contractors, moreover, ask for no monopoly of such warehousing, and are agreeable that concessions be issued on the same footing to firms of any nationality.

The rates of storage to be charged are to be by consent of the Diplomatic Body, and presumably the existing Government bonded stores would first of all be utilized for the general stores proposed by the French Loan Contractors.

The proposal all round seems reasonable, and it would obviously be of much utility, both for the facilitation of traffic (the congestion of which is notorious at nearly all the ports) and as a source of revenue to the Moorish Government. The remaining suggestions of Class (C) (jetties, cranes, harbour lights, and lighthouses) are of obvious usefulness to the public, and likely to prove sources of revenue to the State.

The Diplomatic Body's consent to the dues leviable in connection with these improvements also was to be asked, as such dues would obviously be payable mostly by foreigners.

*Class (D). Sea Works.*—These comprise breakwaters, anchorages, clearance of river bars, harbour-making, docks, submarine or wireless telegraph.

Of these the only one immediately practicable is telegraph communication.

The rest entail more or less prolonged surveying beforehand, and for their construction a very large outlay of capital. The French Loan Contractors are willing to advance funds for a French engineer to survey and report.

Thereafter the construction of the works decided upon by the State, will be open to contract tender by persons of all nationalities "except where the nature of the public works in question does not allow of this." These projects (Class (D)), from their economic value and the complicated political difficulties, which the protection of them might occasion, have already raised considerable anticipatory jealousy and suspicion.

Here again a full and public declaration of France's proposals and intentions made beforehand might have averted considerable misunderstanding, for the proposals it will be seen are designed to invite rather than to restrict international competition in such undertakings.

The one reservation made, however, appears to require clear definition. For instance, what things are and are not closed to competition? Examples ought to be named.

Moreover, who is to determine the point as to what are and what are not works, "the nature of which excludes public competition in regard to their construction," is not stated, and it is not difficult to foresee that this reservation as it stands might lead to many disputes.

The remaining item of Class (D) is a submarine cable—or a wireless telegraphy—installation between the ports. The French Government are ready to lay such a cable as at Tangier or to instal wireless telegraphy. No mention of this proposal has ever been made to me by any member of the French Mission, but whether this was an oversight or intentional I am unable to say.

The Eastern Telegraph cable from Gibraltar to Tangier, 35 miles, cost some 12,000*l.* according to a statement to me by that Company's Manager at Tangier shortly after it was laid. So at that computation a cable from Tangier to Mogador—roughly twelve times the distance from Gibraltar to Tangier—should, with the cost of shore communication at various ports, cost about 150,000*l.*

Adding this sum to the 120,000*l.* (3,000,000 fr.) offered by the French Loan Contractors, it would appear that France was willing to lay out some 270,000*l.* altogether, as a start towards the creation of all the port improvements suggested. The whole of these proposals were to be carried out gradually and as unobtrusively as possible. I would remark that there are two items, namely, the requests for the officials of the French Loan Contractors to be permitted to check the Customs Administrators' receipts daily, and to have office quarters at the custom houses, which I have not included in the foregoing classifications of the port reforms (see Heading 2, Items (e) and (f) in Appendix No. 1).

The former (Item (e)) is a request for the fulfilment of a clause of the Loan Contract of 1904, and the latter (f) merely a detail arising from the former, and obviously necessary, if the contract clause referred to were fulfilled.

They are, therefore, not innovations which the Moorish Government is free to assent to or to refuse, and, by consequence, are not in that sense reform proposals. It seems strange therefore that the French Minister should have submitted for debate

by the Viziers and notables points such as these, instead of, by keeping them apart, making his list of suggestions as small and therefore as palatable as possible.

#### *General Administration.*

In regard to *General Administration* the only suggestion is that Governors should be carefully selected, and their posts made secure to them by their being changed as seldom as possible, so as to increase public respect for them.

To this principle no exception is, or is likely to be taken either in the country or outside of it.

#### *Public Safety Police.*

Before examining the French proposals on these points, it may be well to describe what the term "Public Safety" implies in *Morocco*, as regards the State's position to it, what are the Moorish usages and ideas, and what are the general conditions observable. The remarks hereinafter are applicable, it should be remembered, only to those tracts of the country normally under Government control.

There is no distinction in Moorish usage between civil and criminal offences, and the State adjusts the punishment or otherwise of them by request only of the injured parties.

The non-fulfilment of, or resistance to a Governor or Kaid's command or decision, or acts of revenge upon such functionaries or their assistants, or obstructions in the execution of their duties are alone seen in the light of public or political offences and to be treated of, as such, by the State.

For the protection of the only class of persons to whom (in theory) under the foregoing conditions justice is not readily available, namely, "travellers, or strangers" of all sorts there is the right of "Aman," or security for their persons and property, which in its turn is based upon the primitive idea of "hospitality," and the inviolability of a guest. The guest (=the traveller or stranger) is bound to respect the persons and property of his hosts (=the village or tribe in the country, or the street or quarter in a town), and the hosts (=the villager or tribe in the country, and the street or quarter in towns) are responsible for his safety, and liable to make good injuries to him in person or property. If special protection be necessary the traveller pays for it by bargain with his protectors. The State's function is simply to enforce the fulfilment of these obligations.

Therefore "Public Safety" to Moorish perception signifies only the traveller's obtaining or not obtaining his immemorial right of "hospitality."

Roughly speaking, the population is divided into two classes—those inhabiting walled towns, and those living in country villages.

The former are, on the whole, generally peaceable and law-abiding in disposition; the latter are ruder, less "civilized," and often far less amenable to authority. The disorders and crimes, which have been so rife of late years, for instance, are, speaking generally—it is to be noticed—on the part of country and not town inhabitants.

The *causes* (the immediate cause at any rate) of the present widespread lawlessness, is the ever increasing incapacity and impotence of the Administration to fulfil the above simple obligations incumbent on it, particularly as regards observance of the "host and guest" principle in regard to the travelling public.

The *effects* are the constant interruptions to traffic, trade, and commerce by robberies of caravans, couriers, &c., and attacks on individuals.

The necessity of a remedy was generally obvious to both the native and foreign public, particularly as regards the latter, by reason of the risks to which the present state of things exposed the properties and lives of Europeans, especially at Tangier. To suggest a remedy on the lines of their policy of "pénétration pacifique" was the problem before the French Government.

This condition implied that the solution must be one upon which the Moorish and French minds would come to mutual and voluntary agreement. To attain this, it was necessary to reconcile the primitive ideas above described with our modern notions of State responsibility.

It was essential therefore to find a common point of view, either by the French adopting the Moors' standpoint, and improving native institutions agreeably to native usages and prejudices, or, by educating the Moors (a very long and hard matter) up to our idea and then discussing the point.



The former seems, obviously, the more practicable course, and is one which, while not repugnant to native ideas, might be made perfectly efficacious as regards foreigners' safety.

Bearing all the foregoing conditions in mind it seems clear that to native ideas, general administration is only feasible through the existing hierarchy, and that the maintenance of the obligations on which public surety rests is an inherent function of the Administration.

The reform therefore might, if at all possible, be through the *existing* Administration.

The problem, in short, is how to effect the maximum of improvement with the minimum of innovation, novelty, or disturbance of native ideas.

The French solution to this was the establishment in each coast town of a Police Force—of a size proportionate to the town's requirements—composed of natives under one French and one Algerian instructor.

As to the guarding of the long roads between the coast and interior towns, there appear to have been no suggestions, although interruptions of traffic on these roads are of even greater concern to the bulk of the native population than is the state of the coast towns themselves and their environs.

It is obvious, however, that the existence of an adequate army force would enable the Central Government to uphold country Governors' authority. The French reform project would therefore, if carried out, have been of great value in this connection, as creating a force which could punish promptly and severely road outrages of all sorts.

In short, it is an attempt at a compromise, but only in the sense of meeting neither party's views, while presenting grave disadvantages from both parties' standpoint.

The foreign element is too small to be effective from an European administrative point of view, and it is not provided that the pay and discipline of the men, as well as the instruction, should be exclusively in the Europeans' control. [The admittedly poor results which have attended the French effort at Tangier last year, on exactly the above lines, illustrate this so fully that one is surprised the French had no better plan to suggest than a repetition of that experiment.]

From the Moorish point of view the project is repellent, as introducing two foreign officials (one a Christian) to each town, and who would, in their eyes, be in a measure their rulers, to the humiliation of the native authority and of themselves as Moslems, and also as instituting a body of men, of whose functions (superadded to those of the Governor and Kadis and their staffs) the native mind in its present untutored state cannot conceive the use.

In Tangier the foreign population is very large in proportion to the native element. In the other towns the foreigners are relatively mere handfuls next to the native populations, and these foreigners themselves admit that if the Moorish Governors were energetic and severe they would be in no special danger.

The Moorish population all over the country regard Tangier as already a half foreign place, and European innovations there do not alarm them. At the Moorish Court the same idea obtains, and was illustrated by their consent last year to the French suggestions in regard to policing Tangier. So, I think it not unreasonable to suppose that, had the Moorish Court been asked to do less at the other towns they might have been willing to do a little more for Tangier.

The weaknesses of Moorish Administration from top to bottom are so numerous that it is impossible within the limits of such a Memorandum as this to treat of them in detail. One main cause of this condition (with its far-reaching consequences) may, however, be noticed, namely the (to Europeans) almost unrealizable ignorance of the Sultan and Court of the proceedings of the Governors. The Sultan hears *nothing*, except when trouble arises in some quarter, and even then as little information as possible is furnished to him, and so Governors' conduct for the most part escapes supervision almost entirely.

In a general way the Governors' knowledge of, and influence over, their people are much greater than the Sultan's knowledge and control of the Governors.

I should think, therefore, that some simple plan by which the Governors' conduct would come under regular and close scrutiny by the Sultan would have been preferable to the French proposal. Such a plan would have energised the whole executive in town and country (instead of merely at the ports), would have afforded the Sultan himself the opportunity of playing a leading part, and the indispensable European assistance necessary could have been kept within such small limits, and exercised in so veiled a way as to have presented a minimum cause of offence to the native public.

To offer suggestions as to how this could be done is, of course, beyond the subject matter of this Memorandum.

### Finance.

Of all matters connected with Moorish Administration, this is by far the most difficult to treat, mainly for the want of detailed information.

No accounts are published, and the most diligent efforts to obtain even roughly accurate information as to the management of money matters at the Shereefian Court, and the Government receipts and expenditure, have been so fruitless as to make one wonder whether such information is possessed even by the Viziers and Treasury officials themselves!

Indeed, the system itself would seem scarcely to allow of this being possessed by anyone save the Sultan himself. The system may be described briefly as follows:—

There are two classes of finance officials—the one collectors and the other payers. Some collectors—for instance, Customs Administrators—perform both functions in this way, that they make payments authorized by the Sultan, and take credit for these when remitting their receipts.

At the Court itself, however, the two classes are theoretically distinct, and are headed by the "Amin-ed-dakhal," or chief collector (Sheikh Tazzi) and the "Amin-es-sair," or Chief Paymaster (Hadj Mohammed Al Mukhri) respectively.

The choice of men for service as collectors or payers lies mostly with them.

Subordinate officials hold their post from year to year only. They thereupon retire, and are reappointed mostly to some post of equal category but other than the one they previously held, a system productive of infinite corruption between patrons and employés, and in the course of administration between the latter and their friends in trade.

Supervision of these two chief officials falls to the Sultan himself or to no one.

If, therefore, the Sultan happens to be (and this has been the case with most Moorish Sultans) appreciative of the value of money, and times are normal, matters may go on fairly well. But when the Sultan is himself—as is unfortunately the case now—both an easy-going collector and an indulgent paymaster, it immediately happens that confusion, waste, and corruption become rampant, the collectors stopping *en route* to the Treasury what they can of the receipts, and the payers disbursing as much as they can withdraw, and thereby earning commissions and gifts from the recipients.

The finance officials are almost invariably merchants or ex-merchants, and in no case have had any special training or experience of finance, beyond the scraps they may have picked up in the course of their private trading or term of official employment.

They are really, therefore, merely cashiers or collectors, and in no case *financiers*, and are consequently utterly incompetent to deal with the new financial state of things which has come into existence of late, *e.g.*, loans from Europe and the like.

The state of the country has been such that for over three years almost no inland taxes have been paid, and the Sultan has borrowed 2,000,000*l.* from France.

The interest and sinking fund of this loan take up 60 per cent. of the Customs receipts, at all times the chief source of revenue.

The last instalment of the French loan having been delivered, the Government has now to exist upon the remaining 40 per cent. of Customs receipts, the market dues of the inland towns, and by putting off payment of old debts for things supplied from Europe.

How, indeed, the Government has not financially come to an absolute standstill before now has puzzled every inquirer on the subject.

The financial situation has been further complicated by the policy of the Government regarding coinage. Formerly the currency of Morocco was chiefly Spanish coins, and relatively only small quantities of Moorish coins were minted and circulated. So the course of exchange for gold followed pretty regularly the Madrid exchange. Of late years, however, the Government has made large withdrawals of Spanish coin, and substituted for it new coin called "Hassani" (or "Azizi"), procured from Europe.

Not being exchangeable in Europe, this new coinage has fallen steadily in ratio to Spanish silver until now the depreciation is some 30 per cent.

Spanish silver exchange is just now about 34 per cent., so that the exchange, *i.e.*, loss, between "Hassani" coin and British or French gold is about 66 per cent., and, besides, is very variable.



For a number of reasons, chiefly poor crops, and therefrom a diminution of exports, consequent upon the general drought this season, a further depreciation of Moorish "Hassani" coinage seems imminent. In regard to this branch of administration there are to be added the same difficulties as in the others, viz., that of finding a mutual point of agreement between native and foreign ideas, and of infusing the maximum of improvement by means of a minimum of foreign innovation, either in personnel or method.

As first steps towards curing these evils, the French Minister proposed—

- (1.) The cessation of further minting of Hassani money.
- (2.) Abolition of the "Agio" on currency.
- (3.) The establishment of an Imperial State Bank.

The bank was to manage all currency matters gratis, to have a note circulation, to do the remittance of State moneys within the Empire at a commission not exceeding 2 per cent., and a Moorish Government Commissioner (presumably a native) would survey its operations to insure that it fulfilled its various engagements.

The soundness of the first proposal, the cessation of further minting of Hassani money, is self evident, and as being a matter entirely within the Sultan's control arousing no native suspicions or dislike (for the newer issues of Moorish coinage have never been popular), and entailing no expense, appears perfectly practicable.

This step would itself eventually tend to, at least, limit the "Agio" in currency, the abolition of which (a step touching many foreigners' vested interests) (the second financial proposals) it is proposed to accomplish by means of the third project, namely, the State Bank already described.

That such a bank would be of great advantage to the country will, I think, scarcely be denied by Europeans of any nationality, unless by those who object to the privileged position the scheme contemplates for its promoters. But how it should have been put forward as even *one* of the *first* steps to be taken in financial reform, I cannot understand.

The existing radical evils of finance in Morocco—as has already been shown—lie in the total want of capacity, honesty, and proper system of control, and supervision throughout the Administration, but most of all at the top.

By interference with *it* individual official interests are touched more directly than in any other branch of the Administration, and so strong native official opposition to reform of it is inevitable.

Both the Sultan and the general native public have, and know they have, everything to gain by limits being put to these existing abuses.

The solution of the problem would therefore—one would have expected—have been a plan (1) easily comprehensible by the Sultan, and in the operation of which he himself would have directly participated; (2) presenting the minimum of innovation in personnel and system, and thus as little alarming as possible to the native public.

The French proposal for a bank, however, met none of these requirements. Very few indeed, even of the more intelligent inhabitants of Moorish towns, have more than a vague idea of banking.

The great mass of the population, viz., the country people, have no idea of it at all.

None of them, even of the highest officials, are capable of participating in the working of a bank, for the whole work and management of which, therefore, foreigners must be introduced.

Examination of the details of the scheme shows that the principle of foreign control was introduced, but went no further than the control of the bank itself and of the funds the bank (*i.e.*, the French Loan Contractors) would advance towards the cost of the reforms projected in this and the other branches of the Government, that is to say only over the innovations which for many years to come can form, relatively only, a very small part of the whole Administration.

The result seems to be in short the introduction of a large foreign element with little scope of general control and influence, *instead* of the introduction of a minimum of foreign innovation in personnel and system with a maximum of influence on the maladministration, by which the Sultan and public at present suffer so grievously.

Such features lay the scheme open to so many misrepresentations that it is not surprising that its opponents should have succeeded in persuading the Sultan that it was formulated in the interests of its promoters alone and not of Morocco.

Amongst the Sultan's advisers the only ones with even elementary knowledge of such subjects as modern finance are precisely those officials whose private interests predispose them more than others against reforms. To them the scheme lent itself to

the obvious criticism of introducing so many foreigners as would certainly excite native hostility in the interior, and as in effect, if not in name, affording the Sultan no real control over its operation.

The one class of persons who might possibly to some extent have appreciated these finance proposals were the merchants amongst the Notables.

But the French Minister, for what reason I do not know, did not describe them to the Notables, and discussed them with the Sultan and Viziers exclusively.

### *Schools.*

There is no evidence whatever to be found in support of the Sultan's assertion that the French wished to establish any schools in Morocco, much less schools where presumably French alone would be taught, and be the medium for teaching other things at the Moorish Government's charge but not subject to the Sultan's authority.

It was not mentioned to the Notables, and during the whole course of these negotiations when their subject matters were equally discussed, I heard of no suggestion about schools.

The French Vice-Consul the other day, on my mentioning the Moorish Government's allegation, affirmed positively that there was no foundation for it, no proposal, formal or informal, in that connection ever having been put forward. The French Minister might have, when speaking to the Sultan (and, if he remembered aright, his Excellency had done this), made some remark to the effect that the want of schools for the training of officers and non-commissioned officers added greatly to the difficulty of putting the army on a sound permanent footing.

But that, at the most, was all there was in it.

### *The Line of Negotiations.*

It had frequently been the practice of Moorish Sultans to consult the Ulema, *i.e.*, religious doctors—[a well-known instance was that of the suspension of the Mecca Pilgrimage one year, advocated by the Diplomatic Body, approved by the Sultan, and for which the Ulema of Marakesh practically found scripture]—and selected Committees—[a well-known instance of this kind was that of the then Sultan's procedure over the commercial proposals, in 1892, of Sir C. B. Euan-Smith, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Fez, when Fez merchants were similarly consulted]—of merchants on religious and fiscal questions, whether raised locally or by foreign Diplomatic Representatives.

The bodies consulted, however, were merely those of the town at which the Sultan happened to be residing, and, in practice, it was notorious that they were summoned merely to give weight to the Sultan's known wish for the adoption or rejection of the measure under discussion.

When the French reform proposals were known to be coming on, the Party opposed to them persuaded the Sultan that it would be highly dangerous for him to even discuss such things on account of the native opposition they might raise, especially if the native public formed an impression that the country was going to be put, in effect, under French rule.

Of this these advisers themselves professed to be apprehensive.

If the country could be aroused against the proposals, the results would be (1) that the French would either drop them in alarm, or greatly modify them, and (2) that the Sultan would be popularized by seeming to be against, instead of favourable to, increase of foreign influence.

All the tribes and towns in the country were therefore to be invited to send delegates to Fez to confer on these proposals. Having brought the Sultan thus far to their views, these advisers, in December 1904, persuaded His Majesty to precede that step by dismissing, ostensibly for reasons of economy, all the Europeans in his employment, including Kaid Sir H. Maclean, Major Ogilvy, Dr. Verdon, and the French and Italian military missions.

The French and British Governments, resenting this, thereupon ordered the withdrawal of their Consular officers and all their subjects from Fez, and the French mission to Fez was ordered not to leave Tangier. The Moorish Government, in alarm, at once reinstated the dismissed Europeans, and professed all friendship and willingness to consider the French proposals.



A new Ministry came into power in France just then, M. Delcassé, however, remaining Minister for Foreign Affairs.

They (the British Government doing likewise) accepted the Moorish explanations, and the French mission thereupon proceeded to Fez.

The Moorish Government then so far modified its attitude as to restrict the selection of Notables to Moorish towns only, and, even by French admission, selected men for the most part of an intelligent, reasonable kind, and enjoying respect generally in their respective towns. The French Minister assented to this, and, with the object apparently of turning the Notables largely from a means of opposition into channels for circulating amongst the public the fact of the state of the country and the making known the real character of his proposals, agreed to a Committee of Notables being present at the discussions of the proposals.

These therefore, if all went well, might become voluntary or involuntary promoters of "pénétration pacifique" ideas. At any rate, they might prove to be awkward critics for the Moorish Government.

In determining the point as to whether or not to have anything to do with the Notables, the French Minister had apparently in view this principle, that a little reform, with the public confidence assured for it beforehand, would be more valuable than a larger reform to which merely, as innovations, the public's natural dislike would have to be faced later.

This is perfectly intelligible, and the Minister's decision was, I think, a very wise one. What, however, is not so intelligible is how, having taken that line, the Minister should not have confined the questions put before the Notables to those of reform alone.

Instead of this, the Minister added to them the frontier question (see last part of Appendices Nos. 1 and 2, and the notes in Appendix No. 1) and a demand for the putting in force of certain clauses of the French Loan Contract of 1904, namely, as to the facilities to be afforded at the customs-houses to the agents of the French Loan Contractors.

As demands for the fulfilment of existing engagements on the part of the Moorish Government, neither of these were reform questions at all, and were properly only cognizable by the Moorish Government and the Minister.

The French case on both these points, being merely the exaction of existing rights, was in no danger, and the representations about them might consequently have been left, or, at any rate, not have been pressed until after the Moorish Government and Notables had decided upon the reform proposals.

On the other hand, the French Minister, for what reason it does not appear, refrained from explaining his financial proposals (*i.e.*, those of the bank and relating to coinage) to the Notables, although these were reforms purely, and notwithstanding that many of the Notables were merchants, men as capable, or more so, of appreciating them as any of the Court officials.

It will be noticed that from the beginning of the Conference with the Notables, the Minister recounted the injuries suffered by France on the frontier at least very sharply, and stated that there was a limit to the French Government's patience.

In the many conversations I had with the Minister and his staff, their attitude was never concealed. On one occasion I remember the Minister relating that at a Conference a Notable had asked whether the proposals were framed in the interests of France or Morocco, and he had answered, to the Viziers' and Notables' surprise, that they were framed first of all in France's interest, for it was just because they were of such vital interest to France that France as a neighbour could not remain impassive at sight of the present anarchy.

The consequences of its continuance were greater to France than to Morocco, but the proposals were all the same framed to be of the utmost conceivable interest to Morocco, and were carefully limited to matters such as the Morocco population could not reasonably object to.

The Minister added that his frankness had met with expressions of approval from the meeting, who appreciated his candour.

At the last Conference (*i.e.*, the 11th April, after the German indications of activity) he spoke on the frontier question again in this strain, and thereby, I fear, gave colour to the assertions, which the Moorish Government and anti-French Europeans made presently that Morocco was being threatened, that its independence was being attacked, and so on.

When it is remembered that Fez is three days, at least, distant from Tangier, and within telegraphic reach of Europe, and that the details of the proposals were bound to transpire before long, may it not be asked whether a full public statement of the

proposals, simultaneously with the Minister's exposition of them to the Notables, might not have forestalled much European suspicion and hostility to them?

I would observe, however, that the foregoing remarks on the line of negotiations, which the Minister followed, are made with all diffidence, for his Excellency may have had many weighty reasons for the course he took, which have not come to my knowledge.

These criticisms, therefore, are not submitted as conclusions, but merely as indications of points for inquiry, and for, thereafter, the forming of opinions on them in the quarters competent to judge on such matters.

In conclusion I trust that it will not be inferred from the tenour of this Report that any or all of the French proposals would not have been of benefit to the country had they been adopted; nor is it to be inferred that the Moors are, in their present state, capable of reforming themselves.

The misfortune is only that the proposals were of kinds, the benefits of which Moors generally appear to be, as yet, far too primitive in ideas to grasp.

One may therefore hope that the knowledge of this fact, which Europeans may gain by the study of recent negotiations on the one part, and on the other the ideas that the proposals themselves may have awakened in the native mind, which is undoubtedly (here at any rate) beginning to wonder vaguely whether something may not have to be done to mend the present disorders, may lead to the resumption of those negotiations with a nearer mutual understanding, and that the result will be a gradual but sure and lasting invigoration of the whole Moorish Government.

Fez, July 4, 1905.

(Signed)

J. M. MACLEOD.



# APPENDIX No. 1.

## COMPARATIVE Précis of Information regarding French Reform Proposals.

| COLUMN I.<br>According to French Minister, French Finance Delegate, or French Vice-Consul.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | COLUMN II.<br>According to Moorish Government, as per their Résumés of Conferences.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | COLUMN III.<br>According to Sultan.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Observations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>1. Army Proposals.</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| (a.) "Household" troops to be left as at present, or as His Shereefian Majesty might direct from time to time, i.e., Em-haznia, French Military Mission (artillery) and Major Ogilvy's cavalry, and Kaïd Sir H. Maclean's men.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | (a.) No mention.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| (b.) One regiment infantry, one regiment artillery, one regiment cavalry for each port, and for Oujdah, to be raised company by company, existing army to form nucleus for recruitment.<br><br>First places to be thus garrisoned were to be Oujdah and Tangier. Regiments to be of 500 each with two Algerian and one French instructor to each 100 men.<br><br>Pay to be 1-25 pts. to 1-50 pts. to privates, and to be paid by Moorish Amins through French officers. | (b.) No mention as to various arms' foreign instructors.<br><br>Forces to be raised at [for] Tangier, Oujdah, and "elsewhere."<br><br>At Tangier each regiment to be organized should have four French officers and a secretary attached. Total for Tangier should be 1,500 men with 15 Moorish and 27 Algerian officers. Two Algerian and one French instructor to each 100 men, plus one French officer to each regiment.<br><br>Pay—<br>1-50 pts. privates, 2nd class, per day.<br>1-75 " " 1st " " | (b.) According to Sultan's statement to his Excellency Mr. Lowther, the French first proposal was that the proportion of foreign instructors to native soldiers should be about 10 per cent. (46 to 400 or 500).<br><br>[NOTE.—A series of discussions between the French Minister and the Moorish Government on reforms generally took place soon after the Mission arrived at the end of January.<br>The point was debated as to whether it would be best to have a small force with a large proportion of French instructors, or a large force with a | (b.) French Minister subsequently stated to me he had never mentioned any total number for the force to be raised, or any total number of French instructors.<br>All he had stood out for was—but which the Moors could not see—that the new force should have the said proportion of French instructors per 100 or per 1,000, and that the force, however small, should be officered, paid, &c., in the manner described.<br>This statement did not correspond with what the French Vice-Consul told me, nor with general |

136

France would lend the money therefor if this were done, and also for barracks and other like purposes. (See Note\* in Column II.)

### Total force contemplated—

|                                                                  |       |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| Men .. .. .                                                      | 7,250 |
| Company instructors ..                                           | 219   |
| Foreign (French) higher grade superintending officers, say .. .. | 10    |
| Total .. .. .                                                    | 7,479 |

Discipline. No suggestions mentioned.  
Desertions. " "

Sick, &c. No scheme.  
Proportion of foreign instructors to native soldiers, roughly, 3 per cent.

Commissariat.—No scheme.

### 2. Port Improvements.

(a.) Further stores to be built, and storage to be charged for.

|                                                    |  |
|----------------------------------------------------|--|
| 2-00 pts., subalterns, 2nd class, per day.         |  |
| 2-75 " " 1st " "                                   |  |
| 5-00 " captains, 1st " "                           |  |
| If food be provided, cost to be deducted from pay. |  |
| Colonels, 3rd class, 10-00 pts. per day.           |  |
| " 2nd " 15-00 " "                                  |  |
| " 1st " 20-00 " "                                  |  |
| Amins, 2nd " 10-00 " "                             |  |
| " 1st " 15-00 " "                                  |  |
| Amins, Assistants, 2nd class, 5-00 pts. per day.   |  |
| " " 1st class, 7-50 pts. per day.                  |  |

French superintendent instructor, salary, 15,000 fr. per year, and other French officers according to their rank at 7,000, 8,000, and 9,000 fr. per year.

Discipline to be enforced.  
Deserters to be brought back and punished.  
Sick should be properly cared for.  
Proportion of foreign instructors, roughly, 3 per cent.

[NOTE\*.—Financing of army was apparently not mentioned by French Minister to Notables.]

.. .. .

smaller proportion of foreign instructors.

The discussions were (I understood) for the purpose of stating a case on all the reforms for the Notables' consideration. The scheme to be put before the Notables being agreed on, and the French Minister stipulating that it must now be accepted or rejected *in toto*, the conference then took place. About the Army I understood that the French Minister favoured a small force, with a large proportion of foreign officers, but the Sultan preferred the other plan, and so the French Minister assented to it. The Notables latterly wanted to reduce the *reduced* proportion by two-thirds, while not the numbers of the native soldiers, and to this the French Minister would not agree. From the foregoing it will be seen that while in the letter this statement is true, it is nevertheless uncandid and misleading.]

.. .. .

impressions here, and that it was made *after* the German intervention was very distinct. Still, strictly speaking, it does not seem very inconsistent with the Moorish Government's own version of the proposals.

Commissariat.—The want of any commissariat is the weakest point in regard to Moorish troops at present.

The omission of any suggestion on this point seems to me an important defect in these proposals.

137

(a.) Ditto. Merchants to be given a receipt for goods and produce stored in bond. Storage might be made profitable to Government.



COMPARATIVE Précis of Information regarding French Reform Proposals—continued.

| COLUMN I.<br>According to French Minister, French Finance Delegate, or French Vice-Consul.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | COLUMN II.<br>According to Moorish Government, as per their Résumés of Conferences.                                                                                                                                                     | COLUMN III.<br>According to Sultan. | Observations.                                                                                                                                   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2. Port Improvements—continued.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (b.) Stores to be in charge of French officials.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (c.) Goods to be weighed and packages measured on entry and exit, and weights carefully registered, and to be checked off ship's manifests, and compared daily with Umana's accounts. Repression of fraud and smuggling. Establishment of system of "warrants" (see p.).                                                                                          | (c.) Diplomatic Body and Moorish Government to make regulations to prevent fraud by foreigners.                                                                                                                                         |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (d.) Many more lighters and tugs should be used.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | (d.) Ditto. Otherwise Steam-ship Companies will do service themselves, and loss thus ensue to Moorish Government.                                                                                                                       |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (e.) French finance officials should be given office quarters at custom-houses. Germans have asked for orders for lighters. A French firm has offered to do all lighter-ing for Moorish Government, and allow Moorish Government one-fourth of profits. (This offer was not approved by French Minister, who thought it should be a Moorish service exclusively.) |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (f.) French finance officials should check Umana's receipts daily before taking their percentage for the bondholders.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | (f.) Ditto. They were entitled under the loan contract to do this, but in the event permission had been refused.                                                                                                                        |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (g.) Harbour and coast lights should be set up. French loan contractors will open a credit for same. Light dues to be received by Moorish Government.                                                                                                                                                                                                             | (g.) No mention.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (h.) Jetties for landing of goods and passengers should be made.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | (h.) Jetties be made, and cranes used for landing of goods, &c.                                                                                                                                                                         |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (i.) Moorish Umana to continue, as before, to assess the dues and collect them, and thereafter, as before, to pay 60 per cent. thereof to the officials of French bondholders.                                                                                                                                                                                    | (i.) (Though not specified, this is obviously what is contemplated.)                                                                                                                                                                    |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | (j.) Merchants to submit signed declarations of goods entered at Customs.                                                                                                                                                               | .. ..                               | (k.) It should be noted that "foreigners" were to be the contractors. There is no suggestion that the contractors are to be French exclusively. |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | (k.) Moorish Government should retain all port improvements in their own hands, but should contract with foreigners for the building of them, cost thereof being paid out of profits earned, and property thus reverting to Government. | .. ..                               | (l.) The French, for what reason I do not know, never mentioned this item to me.                                                                |
| (l.) A saving in cost of 60 per cent. is possible by instituting (instead of a cable) wireless telegraphy. French loan contractors are willing to give a credit for creation of a telegraph under Moorish Government control and for Moorish Government profit.                                                                                                   | (l.) Telegraph cable should be laid to connect all the ports. French Government is willing to lay it, as done at Tangier, but would prefer Moorish Government to do it with their assistance.                                           |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (m.) Public works and supplies for Government to be put up to tender publicly, and open to competitors of all nationalities, except when the nature of the works do not allow of this; and the Moorish Government should not concede to private firms works, the administration of which in other countries are undertaken by the State.                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (n.) A competent engineer to study and report what harbour works are practicable, and the loan contractors will open a credit for that purpose of 5,000,000 Hasani pts. (3,000,000 fr.) for the most urgently necessary works. With aforesaid exceptions, such works will be put up to public tender, to all nationalities, by degrees.                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (o.) French loan contractors will not increase their European staff at the ports.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | (o.) No mention.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | (o.) No mention.                    |                                                                                                                                                 |
| (p.) French loan contractors are willing to build such public warehouses, and allow                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                     |                                                                                                                                                 |



COMPARATIVE Précis of Information regarding French Reform Proposals—continued.

| COLUMN I.<br>According to French Minister, French Finance Delegate, or French Vice-Consul.                                                                                                                                                                                          | COLUMN II.<br>According to Moorish Government, as per their Résumés of Conferences.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | COLUMN III.<br>According to Sultan. | Observations.                                                                                 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>2. Port Improvements—continued.</p> <p>Moorish Government a share in the profits.<br/>French loan contractors have no objection to other firms obtaining similar concessions.</p> <p>3. General Administration.</p> <p>(a.) Public safety .. .. .</p> <p>(b.) Police .. .. .</p> | <p>(a.) Governors should be carefully selected, and be capable, non-avaricious men, and should be changed as seldom as possible. Present lawlessness in this country was fully described.</p> <p>(b.) Police forces should be established at each place. Men to be Moors under one French and one Algerian instructor. These instructors would leave when their services were no longer necessary. Such police would aid in repressing smuggling.</p> <p>[NOTES.—(1.) The only other question treated of at the Conferences was that of the frontier.<br/>That, however, seems to me a political dispute between the French and Moorish Governments, wherein the former calls on the latter to fulfil certain Treaty obligations of no direct consequences to other Governments, and of very little direct interest to European commerce generally,</p> | <p>.. .. .</p>                      | <p>No details of these proposals were given to me by French Minister or any of his staff.</p> |

140

[1566]

at any rate in the meantime, rather than a general reform question. So while treating of it in the Memorandum attached hereto, I omit further reference to it herein.

(2.) No reference was made at the Conferences to the question of finance (i.e., the Conferences when the Notables were present) except a remark by the French Minister that the matter of funds for carrying out these reforms and finances generally would be treated by him later on. There was no allusion whatever to the establishment of a State bank, reformation of coinage, &c. When later on the French Minister did put forward his proposals, it was to the Sultan and Viziers alone that he explained them.]

4. Finance.

- (a.) Loans for public works (see port improvements).
- (b.) Currency reforms. These to be effected by a State bank. In order that the public works and currency may be under State control, the bank should have monopolies of them. In regard to the currency, the bank would give all the profits to the Moorish Government. In regard to the loans, the bank would earn the interest on the sums lent, while the profits on the undertakings (less the said interest on capital) would go to the State.

Bank to be allowed to issue notes up to an amount three times the value of a metal reserve, which it will set apart. Bank will undertake, if required, remittance of Treasury bonds from place to place in Morocco, at a commission of 2 per cent., thus avoiding delays of trans-

4. Finance.

(See note (2) above.)

4. Finance.

His Shereefian Majesty, while citing no reasons for this view, denounced the financial proposals as conceived entirely in the interests of France, and omitted the interests of the Moorish Government. It amounted to this, that all economic dealings with foreigners as regards their economic undertakings would have to be under French control, and this was an attack on His Shereefian Majesty's sovereign rights.

(a.) and (b.) For full details see Memorandum furnished confidentially by M. Regnault, French Financial Delegate, to His Britannic Majesty's Minister.

141



| COLUMN I.<br>According to French Minister, French Finance Delegate, or French Vice-Consul.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | COLUMN II.<br>According to Moorish Government, as per their Résumés of Conferences. | COLUMN III.<br>According to Sultan.                                                                                                                                                         | Observations. |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| <p>4. <i>Finance</i>—continued.</p> <p>port of specie, and consequent unpunctuality in receipts and payments. Shereefian Commissioners to be appointed to examine and survey all the above operations to insure that the bank fulfils its engagements exactly. The French Loan Contractors are willing to establish a bank on the above footing.</p> <p>No mention.</p> | No mention.                                                                         | <p><i>Schools.</i></p> <p>These to be established, but French and not Moorish Government is to control them. His Shereefian Majesty considers this an attack upon his sovereign rights.</p> |               |

## APPENDIX No. 2.

[Not printed.]

## APPENDIX No. 3.

*The "German Case" and the French "Defence" to it in Morocco.*

THE "German Case," as I understand it, is this:—

1. That if the French programme be carried out in thirty years or less France will be able to lay down trade terms in Morocco to all European nations and America.
2. That meantime all the materials for improvements will be bought in France exclusively instead of partly in Germany, as just now, or as they would be but for France, thus injuring a possible future economic interest of Germany.
3. That by the Treaties Morocco is precluded from granting anything to one Power without extending the same or an equivalent advantage to all the other Powers. The German Minister at Fez even says identical advantages are claimable!

The French answer, as I understand it, is:—

1. That, unlike us, having no engagement about thirty years, &c., Germany will in future be fiscally better situated in Morocco than will Britain or Spain, for their (German) Treaty rights are not to be touched.
  2. That by cautious reforms and improvements, and by the strengthening of the Sultan's authority, general trade in the country could not fail to increase, and Germany would benefit enormously thereby.
  3. That in no case could France, Spain, and [or] England ever have consented to the establishment of fixed German interests of kinds, the protection of which in certain emergencies might have given pretexts for the occupation of territories where such fixed interests were situated. [Things such as railways, harbour works, and the like, other than such as can be paid for and become at once State property. France is willing that such things be open by public tender to persons of all nationalities.]
- It is therefore absurd for Germany (the French say) to say she has lost or may lose what she could not conceivably ever have possessed.
4. That Germany is not a neighbour of Morocco, and it is unreasonable for her to assert interests equal to those of Morocco's territorial neighbours.
  5. That if Germany is to be compensated for the loss of what she could never have possessed, even other nations might justly ask for compensation, fixable only, apparently, by the limits of the respective nations' imaginations.

## APPENDIX No. 4.

*Extract from the British Convention of Commerce and Navigation with Morocco of December 9, 1856.*

ARTICLE XI.—Should British subjects desire to embark in or discharge goods from vessels arriving in the ports of Morocco they shall employ the Moorish Government boats for that purpose, but if within two days after the arrival of a vessel the Moorish Government boats are not placed at their disposal for the aforesaid purpose, the British subjects shall have the right of employing private boats, and shall not pay in such case to the Port Authorities more than one half of what would have been paid had they employed the Government boats. This Regulation shall not be applicable to the ports of Tangier and Tetuan, inasmuch as there is a sufficient number of Government lighters at those two ports.

The charges now paid for lighterage at the different ports of Morocco shall not be augmented, and the Administrator of Customs at each port of Morocco shall deliver to the British Vice-Consul a Tariff of the charges now demanded for lighterage.

Article XII.—The Articles of this Convention shall be applicable to all the ports in the Empire of Morocco; and should His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco open the ports of Mehedea, Agadeer, or Wadnoon, or any other ports within the limits of His Majesty's dominions, no difference shall be made in the levying of duties or anchorage between the said ports and other ports in the Sultan's dominions.